Stuart Rothman

R.A. was convicted of two counts of sexual interference against his 11-year-old stepdaughter, C.A. The court considered aggravating factors, including the breach of trust and multiple incidents, and mitigating factors, such as R.A.'s pro-social life and lack of criminal record.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for child sexual offences.

Despite the defence's request for a conditional sentence and potential deportation consequences, the court found a non-custodial sentence would be insufficient.

R.A. was sentenced to two years in penitentiary on the more serious count, concurrent to six months on the other, along with mandatory ancillary orders.

The accused was tried on two counts of sexual interference involving an 11-year-old complainant: one count for sexual touching and one count arising from two kissing incidents.

The court granted the Crown's cross-count similar fact application, holding the evidence on each count was probative of the other and provided context for the complainant's conduct.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and relying heavily on the complainant's immediate disclosure to her mother as a spontaneous utterance, the court rejected the accused's denial and found that inconsistencies in peripheral details did not undermine the core allegations.

The court also rejected the defence theory of fabrication based on family conflict and motive.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

Quoc Tran was convicted of possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000 and fraud over $5,000, stemming from a scheme where he received $291,459.12 through fraudulent credit card product returns orchestrated by a friend.

The court found his claim of unawareness fabricated.

In sentencing, the court considered aggravating factors, including the large sum and protracted nature of the fraud, and mitigating factors, such as Tran's lack of criminal record, pro-social life, and family responsibilities.

The court imposed a 2-year less a day conditional sentence, 2 years' probation, and a stand-alone restitution order of $291,459.12, finding it consistent with sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation without requiring incarceration.

The offender was found guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault against his 10-year-old niece.

The offences occurred while he was living in the family home, constituting a significant breach of trust.

The Crown sought 18 months' imprisonment, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

Applying the principles from R. v. Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, rejecting a conditional sentence as disproportionately lenient.

The offender was sentenced to 14 months' imprisonment, followed by 3 years' probation, along with mandatory SOIRA and DNA orders, and a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order.

Quoc Tran was charged with possession of proceeds of crime over $5,000 and fraud over $5,000.

The charges stemmed from a scheme where Mr. Tran's friend, Mr. Ha, defrauded his employer and repaid a purported loan to Mr. Tran using fraudulently obtained funds credited to Mr. Tran's credit cards.

The court found Mr. Tran's explanations regarding his lack of knowledge about the fraud to be incredible, citing inconsistencies in his testimony, his financial sophistication, and his unquestioning acceptance of unusual repayment methods.

The court concluded that Mr. Tran either knew of the fraud or was wilfully blind to it, establishing the mens rea for both charges.

Mr. Tran was found guilty on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single-vehicle rollover on Highway 427.

The Crown proceeded on both counts.

The defence challenged the arrest on reasonable and probable grounds and brought Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7 and 8 regarding video surveillance of the accused urinating in a police cell.

The trial judge found the arrest was lawful and dismissed the Charter applications, finding that although a privacy breach occurred, the police had provided adequate notice and privacy protection measures.

The accused was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of the over-80 offence.

The offender, a senior bank manager, pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud over $5000 after embezzling approximately $1.78 million from her employer over 14 years.

The offender used the funds to support a lavish lifestyle for her family, driven by a major depressive illness following her husband's infidelity.

Upon discovery, the offender made full restitution of $1.85 million.

The court declined to impose a penitentiary sentence due to the guilty plea, full restitution, and mental health factors, but also rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence for large-scale breach of trust frauds.

The offender was sentenced to a total of 17 months in custody.

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud over $5,000, having defrauded her employer, the Toronto Dominion Bank, of $1,778,543.57 over approximately 14 years while employed as a senior manager with authority over internal accounts.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while defence counsel sought a lengthy conditional sentence with probation.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 17 months (14 months on count 1 and 3 months consecutive on count 2), rejecting a conditional sentence despite significant mitigating factors including full restitution, guilty plea, and evidence of major depressive illness.

The court also imposed a five-year employment prohibition under section 380.2.

During a jury trial for sexual assault and unlawful confinement, the accused brought a Corbett application seeking to exclude his criminal record from being used in cross-examination should he testify.

The court considered the Corbett factors including the nature, similarity, and remoteness of prior convictions and the impact on trial fairness.

The judge held that the adult convictions could be used in cross-examination because the case turned largely on credibility and excluding the record would create a misleading impression for the jury.

However, the accused’s youth conviction was excluded due to its remoteness and the prejudicial impact associated with youth offences.

Following convictions for criminal harassment and breaches of probation, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court reviewed the offender’s extensive criminal history including numerous sexual offences, violent offences, and repeated breaches of court orders, as well as psychiatric assessments diagnosing schizophrenia, traumatic brain injury, paraphilias, and substance abuse disorders.

Expert evidence established a high risk of future sexual violence and persistent failure to restrain behaviour.

The court concluded the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation were met under both s. 753(1)(a)(i) and (ii).

The offender failed to establish that community management would adequately protect the public, and the court imposed a penitentiary sentence followed by long‑term supervision.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 mgs on May 24, 2012.

The trial was scheduled for September 3, 2013.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay.

The court found that the total delay was approximately 15 months, with the Crown responsible for at least 2.5 months of delay due to delayed disclosure and institutional delay accounting for 11.5 months.

The court determined that the institutional and Crown delay was unreasonable and granted the application, imposing a stay of proceedings.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) of the Charter had been infringed.

The accused faced charges of impaired driving and driving with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of the legal limit arising from an incident on December 27, 2010.

The information was sworn on January 4, 2011, and the trial was scheduled for October 19, 2012, resulting in approximately 21.5 months of delay.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Morin and found that while institutional resource constraints accounted for approximately 9.5 months of delay (within the 8-10 month guideline), the accused had not established sufficient prejudice to warrant a stay of proceedings.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with three counts of fraud over $5,000 relating to three cheques totaling $115,000 drawn on the victim's account.

The Crown alleged the victim provided the cheques in blank to the accused to settle her debts, but the accused dishonestly made them payable to himself and his company.

The accused claimed the funds were a deposit for the victim's purchase of his restaurant.

The court found the accused guilty on two counts relating to $100,000 deposited to his company, finding he lacked authority to use the funds for that purpose.

The court acquitted the accused on the third count for $15,000, finding reasonable doubt as he had partial authority to use those funds to settle the victim's debts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level was over 80 mgs on February 10, 2011.

The trial was scheduled for April 12 and 13, 2012, approximately 14 months after the charge.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found that institutional delay of 11.5 months was unreasonable and unacceptable for a relatively simple 1.5 day trial, particularly where the defence and Crown were not responsible for the delay.

The court granted a stay of proceedings as the appropriate remedy.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference of an 11-year-old child on August 30, 2011.

The Crown alleged that the accused touched the child's breasts and vaginal area outside her clothing while she sat on his lap in his garage.

The accused denied all allegations, claiming the contact was innocent and that the child voluntarily sat on his lap.

The trial turned on credibility assessments of the complainant, a nine-year-old witness who observed the alleged conduct, and the accused.

The court found the complainant and the child witness credible and rejected the accused's evidence, finding him guilty as charged.