Spencer F. Toole

The landlord brought a motion to dismiss the tenant's appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board order terminating the tenancy for non-payment of rent.

The tenant had not paid any rent since moving in and failed to comply with a Board consent order requiring payment of rent into the Board.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was completely devoid of merit, raised no genuine questions of law, and constituted an abuse of process designed solely to prolong a rent-free existence.

The motion was granted, the appeal was dismissed, the stay was vacated, and the landlord was awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs, owners of a fitness club, sued the defendants for alleged misrepresentations regarding the availability of parking spaces and for failing to provide adequate alternative parking during construction.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment.

The court found that the misrepresentation claims were barred by the 'four corners' clause in the lease agreement, the releases signed by the parties, and the expiry of the two-year limitation period, as there was no evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment.

The court also found no triable issue regarding the alternative parking, as the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence that membership cancellations were linked to parking issues.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claims against the moving defendants were dismissed.

The tenant brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for failing to file a transcript on time.

The landlord opposed the motion solely on the ground that the appeal lacked merit.

The court found that the appeal raised a valid question of law regarding whether the Landlord and Tenant Board erred in terminating the tenancy based on a breach of an order that had been stayed.

The court granted the motion, set aside the Registrar's order, and allowed the tenant 30 days to perfect her appeal.

The plaintiffs commenced Small Claims Court actions for dental malpractice more than two years after the date of the dental surgery, but within two years of the termination of the doctor-patient relationship.

The motion judge dismissed the defendant's motions to strike the claims as statute-barred, finding the limitation period ran from the end of the relationship.

On appeal, the Divisional Court reversed the decision, holding that there is no blanket rule tolling the limitation period until the end of the medical relationship.

Applying the presumption of discoverability under section 5(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002, the court found the limitation period commenced on the date of the surgery.

The actions were dismissed as statute-barred.

The landlords brought a motion to quash the tenants' appeal of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order and to lift the automatic stay.

The tenants had appealed the Board's refusal to grant an adjournment, which they requested because their legal representative was unprepared.

The Divisional Court found the appeal was devoid of merit, raised no question of law, and was an abuse of process intended solely to delay eviction while the tenants continued to pay no rent.

The motion was granted, the appeal was quashed, and the stay was lifted.

The appellant moved for a stay pending appeal of a Small Claims Court order that refused to set aside a judgment made after she failed to attend trial.

The appellant also sought to stay the enforcement of a writ of seizure and sale.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant failed to meet the first branch of the RJR-MacDonald test because there was no serious issue to be decided.

The appellant had not complied with Rule 17(5) of the Small Claims Court Rules, which requires a motion to set aside a judgment to be brought within 30 days of becoming aware of it.

The plaintiff moved to continue a Mareva injunction freezing assets allegedly connected to a multi‑million dollar international fraud scheme.

One defendant opposed continuation of the injunction, arguing material non‑disclosure, delay, lack of evidence connecting the defendants to the fraud, absence of risk of dissipation of assets, and insufficiency of the plaintiff’s undertaking as to damages.

The court held that any alleged non‑disclosure regarding the plaintiff corporation’s status or its principal’s personal bankruptcy was not material and did not justify dissolving the injunction.

The court further found that the criteria for a Mareva injunction were met, including a strong prima facie case of fraud and a risk of dissipation of assets inferred from suspicious financial transfers.

The Mareva injunction was continued until trial or further order, subject to conditions requiring proof of the plaintiff corporation’s good standing and notice to the principal’s bankruptcy trustee.

Following a successful motion by the plaintiffs for non-party production of investigative materials from the Special Investigations Unit under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court addressed costs.

Although the plaintiffs obtained the production order, the court declined to award costs.

The court held that the SIU reasonably opposed the motion given its public policy mandate, confidentiality assurances to witnesses, and status as a non-party to the litigation.

The evidence and submissions from the SIU assisted the court in determining whether the exceptional remedy of non-party production should be granted.

An elderly condominium unit owner was allegedly injured when an unleashed dog owned by other residents attacked her on the condominium’s common elements.

The plaintiff sued the dog owners under the Dog Owners' Liability Act and the condominium corporation for negligence and under the Occupiers’ Liability Act.

The condominium corporation brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the action, arguing that the Dog Owners’ Liability Act exclusively governed liability and that it was not a dog owner or harbourer.

The court held that the Act does not preclude negligence or occupiers’ liability claims against a non‑owner of the dog and that it was not plain and obvious the claim against the condominium corporation could not succeed.

The motion to dismiss was therefore refused.