SCJ 2025

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault and serving a 720-day conditional sentence order with 425 days of home confinement, applied under s. 742.4(5) of the Criminal Code for two variations: permission to travel internationally to India for a non-immediate family wedding and to extend his community service beyond the prescribed 120 hours.

The court dismissed the travel request, finding it inconsistent with the sentencing judge's express intention to eliminate the applicant's travel lifestyle as a punitive restriction, and that permitting such travel would undermine the denunciatory and deterrent purposes of the CSO.

The court granted the community service variation, allowing the applicant to volunteer two days per week at a museum, as the restorative and rehabilitative purpose of continued community service did not displace the sentencing balance.

Following the granting of the defendant's motion to strike, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The self-represented plaintiff had appealed the order alleging judicial bias.

In the circumstances, the court determined that costs should be in the cause to maintain the appearance of fairness, rather than awarding costs to the successful moving party.

Case conference endorsement in a civil action that had been transferred from Ottawa to Toronto on consent.

The defendants sought to vacate the case conference following the transfer order, arguing the Ottawa court lacked authority to make further decisions.

The court declined to vacate, finding nothing in the transfer order or the Rules prevented it from finalizing pending issues to ensure an orderly transition.

The court directed the parties to proceed to examinations for discovery rather than pursue further production motions, reasoning that outstanding production issues could be canvassed under oath during examinations and a timetable was established on consent.

The defendants brought a motion to strike certain paragraphs of the plaintiffs' second reply pleading and to revise the litigation timetable.

The court found that paragraphs responding to unamended portions of the amended statement of defence were improper, relying on Van Huizen v Trisura, and that many allegations improperly pleaded evidence and legal argument contrary to Rule 25.06.

Paragraphs 5-7, 8-32, and 45-51 of the second reply were struck.

The court revised the timetable on consent, assumed case management, and barred further motions without leave.

Costs of $1,500 were awarded to the defendants.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction findings of guilt for assault and assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the trial judge's written reasons, delivered approximately 11 months after the guilty verdicts, should not be considered on appeal as they were divorced from the reasoning that led to the verdicts.

Applying the framework from R. v. Teskey, the appeal court found that the repeated promises of imminent delivery of reasons followed by repeated failures to deliver, the lack of any satisfactory explanation for the delays, the nature of the evidence requiring detailed credibility and factual analysis, and deficiencies in the written reasons themselves constituted cogent evidence rebutting the presumption of judicial integrity.

The Crown conceded that the brief oral reasons at verdict were insufficient for appellate review under R. v. Sheppard.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting breath sample evidence obtained in breach of his ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights.

The trial judge had found the roadside breath demand violated the appellant's Charter rights because the officer lacked objectively reasonable suspicion, but declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter applying the R. v. Grant framework.

On appeal, the sole issue was whether the trial judge erred in finding the first stage of the Grant test favoured admission.

The appeal court found the trial judge did not improperly equate the officer's conduct with good faith, but rather assessed the totality of police conduct including respectful treatment and diligence in facilitating s. 10(b) rights, and upheld the s. 24(2) analysis as reasonable and well-supported.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder in 2009 and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, applied under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code for a reduction in her parole ineligibility period.

The court had previously determined there was a reasonable prospect the application would proceed and empanelled a jury.

After hearing evidence over twelve days, the jury reduced the applicant's parole eligibility date from May 16, 2032 to May 16, 2029, granting a three-year reduction in parole ineligibility.

The court considered whether to appoint an amicus curiae in a family law proceeding involving self-represented parties with three young children.

Applying the framework from Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides, the court found the appointment justified given the high stakes, the complexity of financial issues, the unavailability of Legal Aid counsel in the region, the respondent's pattern of litigation abuse, and the siloed nature of parallel family, civil, and criminal proceedings bearing on the respondent's income and child support obligations.

The court appointed amicus with detailed terms specifying the scope of duties, including assisting with disclosure, trial preparation, and ensuring an orderly trial process, with funding managed by Legal Aid Ontario at Legal Aid rates.

Crown sentence appeal from a decision rejecting a joint submission on sentence for operating a conveyance with a blood-alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The sentencing judge declined the jointly submitted 60-day conditional sentence and instead imposed a $2,500 fine, finding the proposed sentence disproportionate.

The appeal court held the sentencing judge applied the wrong test by assessing fitness of sentence rather than the public interest test from R. v. Anthony-Cook, which requires that a joint submission only be rejected where it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed and the conditional sentence of imprisonment was imposed as originally jointly submitted.

The plaintiff brought a motion for leave to admit a late-served expert report on broker negligence in an action arising from a motorcycle accident.

The expert report was served five months after the deadline under the Rules of Civil Procedure and one month after a without-prejudice deadline set by the pre-trial judge.

The court applied the two-part test under Rule 53.08(1), finding that while the explanations of difficulty finding an expert and staff turnover were problematic, the unique circumstance that the report was served nearly two years before the reconvened pre-trial tipped the balance in the plaintiff's favour.

Leave was granted.

The court also directed the order of trial, ordering the tort action against the municipality to proceed first, followed by the broker negligence action.

The respondent in a pending application sought an adjournment of the hearing scheduled for December 4-5, 2025, claiming he had not received his complete client file from former counsel, was catastrophically impaired, and that the applicant had recently served a revised factum.

The court found the adjournment request unreasonable, noting the matter had been extensively case managed for over a year, the respondent had participated in scheduling the hearing dates, had failed to file any responding materials despite earlier deadlines, and had only formally requested his client file one week before the hearing.

The revised factum contained only minor administrative updates.

The adjournment was denied and the application was ordered to proceed as scheduled.

The applicant's counsel of record appeared at a family law case conference but advised she was on medical leave and would not be speaking to the matter.

A student-at-law, who was not a lawyer, paralegal, or family legal services provider, rose to represent the applicant without indicating he was appearing under the Family Law Pilot Project or that he was a Permitted Candidate.

Upon inquiry, the court determined his Law Society identification card as a Licensing Process-Lawyer Candidate had expired over a year earlier.

The court reviewed the requirements under Rule 4 of the Family Law Rules and the Family Law Pilot Project for non-lawyer representation and ruled that the individual was not permitted to represent the applicant.

Family law trial following the breakdown of a nine-year relationship between married spouses with two children.

The applicant sought equal unsupervised parenting time, no child support obligation, spousal support, and equal division of matrimonial home sale proceeds.

The respondent sought supervised parenting time, retroactive and ongoing child support, equalization, a restraining order, dismissal of spousal support claims, and costs.

The court found the applicant lacked credibility, had serious mental health concerns without supporting medical evidence, had repeatedly contravened court orders by arranging secret parenting time, and demonstrated inability to control emotions.

The court ordered temporary supervised parenting time pending a psychiatric assessment and updated OCL report, retroactive child support arrears of $32,949 payable from the applicant's share of matrimonial home proceeds, a five-year restraining order, dismissed the spousal support claim, and directed the entirety of the remaining home sale proceeds to the respondent.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a conveyance with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit, contrary to s. 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

She argued that the trial judge erred in finding no breach of her s. 8 Charter right arising from video surveillance of cell toilets during her detention, relying on the principles in R. v. Mok.

The appeal court found that police took reasonable steps to mitigate the privacy intrusion by informing the appellant of the surveillance, offering privacy gowns and blankets, and posting signage.

The court held the application judge did not reverse the burden of proof and correctly found no s. 8 breach.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Toronto-Dominion Bank, sought summary judgment against Michael D’Cruz and Rosalind D’Cruz to set aside a $94,000 payment made by Michael to Rosalind in February 2022, shortly before Michael’s bankruptcy.

The court found that the payment constituted a preference under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and was void under the Fraudulent Conveyances Act, as it gave Rosalind preferential treatment over other creditors.

The court granted judgment in favour of the plaintiff for $94,000 and provided directions for costs.

The Local Administrative Judge in Hamilton raised, sua sponte, the issue of whether a civil action for recovery of investment funds had any rational connection to Hamilton.

Neither the parties, the property, the subject matter, the events, nor the lawyers had any connection to Hamilton; all connections were to the Central West and Toronto Judicial Regions.

The plaintiffs argued they had legitimate concerns about fairness in Central West due to the defendants' significant local presence and over fifty similar actions in the region, but the court rejected the allegations of bias as without foundation.

Relying on the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own process and the Consolidated Civil Provincial Practice Direction, the court found the plaintiffs' venue choice was not a legitimate exercise of procedural rights and ordered the plaintiffs to bring a written motion to the RSJ in Central West for transfer of the proceeding.

The action was stayed pending that determination.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment arising from the defendant's breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property in Mississauga.

The purchase price was $8,385,000 and the defendant failed to close the transaction after multiple extensions.

The parties agreed that carrying cost damages were $550,000, leaving only the loss of the benefit of the bargain in dispute.

The defendant argued the plaintiff failed to mitigate damages by not accepting a $7 million offer with a vendor takeback mortgage and by initially listing the property at the original price in a declining market, but led no expert or appraisal evidence despite being given an adjournment to do so.

The court found the plaintiff took reasonable steps to mitigate by relisting the property within two weeks and reducing the price on several occasions, and granted summary judgment for $1,835,000 in loss of bargain damages plus $550,000 in carrying costs.

The plaintiff brought a refusals motion seeking an order that the defendant answer undertakings and refusals from the continued examination for discovery of its representative, and that the representative re-attend for a continued examination.

The motion addressed ten groupings of refusals relating to succession planning, supervisor qualifications and conduct, harassment policy, employment records, conflict of interest, and HR practices in a wrongful dismissal action alleging inducement and misrepresentation.

The court granted some questions and denied others across the groupings, finding divided success.

The defendant was ordered to answer within 45 days and the plaintiff was permitted one further one-hour examination by Zoom.

Each party was ordered to bear its own costs.

The respondent in the original family law proceeding moved to set aside default orders made at an uncontested trial regarding child support, equalization, post-separation adjustments, and transfer of the matrimonial home.

The moving party established that he never received notice of the proceeding because substituted service was effected to an email account he could no longer access.

Applying the factors from Zia v Ahmad and Mountain View Farms, the court found the moving party acted promptly, had an arguable defence on the merits regarding both the matrimonial home and imputed income for child support, acted in good faith, and would suffer greater prejudice if denied his day in court.

The motion was granted and the default orders were set aside.

The defendant brought three requests under Rules 2.1.01 and 2.1.02 to dismiss or stay the action and two motions as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff had commenced an action arising from a purported vehicle purchase, claiming the defendant accepted a non-negotiable promissory note as payment by updating his order status.

The court found the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, the grandiose damages claims ranging from $30,000,000 to $8,000,000,000 were far beyond what any reasonable person would expect, and the plaintiff's ongoing multiple filings, misuse of legal terminology, baseless allegations against counsel and the court, and attempts to enforce unilaterally created PPSA registrations were hallmarks of vexatious litigation.

The proceedings were dismissed in their entirety.