SCC 1993

The police received informant tips about a marihuana grow operation at the appellant's residence.

Officers conducted a warrantless perimeter search, smelling marihuana and observing vents.

They subsequently obtained a search warrant and discovered a hydroponic grow lab.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the perimeter search violated s. 8.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the warrantless perimeter search violated s. 8, the search warrant was validly issued based on other compelling evidence.

The Court concluded the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as the police acted in good faith reliance on existing law.

The accused was charged with unlawful cultivation of marihuana and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

Police conducted warrantless perimeter searches of the accused's property, relying on s. 10 of the Narcotic Control Act, and subsequently obtained a search warrant under s. 487 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding the searches violated s. 8, and acquitted the accused.

The Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 10 of the Narcotic Control Act violates s. 8 of the Charter to the extent it authorizes warrantless searches outside exigent circumstances.

However, the Court found the search warrant was validly issued under the Criminal Code and that the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2), as the officers acted in good faith and the evidence was real.

The appellant contractor successfully bid on a road building contract and entered into a contract with the province.

The contractor alleged it lost money due to errors in the specifications and construction drawings prepared by the respondent engineering firm.

The contractor sued the engineering firm and the individual engineers for negligent misrepresentation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the engineering firm owed a duty of care to the contractor, as the firm knew contractors would rely on its tender documents.

The contract between the contractor and the province did not negate this duty.

However, the Court dismissed the claim against the individual engineers, finding that merely affixing a professional seal to the documents was insufficient to establish a duty of care.

The respondent contractor successfully tendered for a dredging project using a suction method, but later incurred losses when it could not obtain the necessary permits.

The contractor sued the engineering firm that prepared the tender documents and the conservation authority, alleging negligent misrepresentation for failing to warn about the permit requirements.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that an engineer preparing tender documents owes no duty of care to advise prospective contractors about the need for permits or the viability of their chosen construction methods.

The accused was convicted by a jury of engaging in anal intercourse with his step-son.

While the accused's appeal was reserved, the trial judge submitted an unsolicited report to the Court of Appeal stating he would not have convicted the accused and considered the verdict unsafe.

The Court of Appeal relied on this report to quash the conviction and order a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that a Court of Appeal should not routinely request a report from a trial judge under s. 682(1) of the Criminal Code, and that the unsolicited report in this case was unauthorized and should not have been considered.

Without the report, there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the trial judge's charge to the jury was adequate.

The appellant and her common law husband were charged with aggravated assault and failure to provide necessaries of life to their infant son.

At trial, the appellant did not testify, and counsel for the co-accused commented on this failure.

The trial judge instructed the jury on an objective standard for failure to provide necessaries.

During deliberations, the jury asked if they had to agree on guilty or not guilty, and the judge answered they must be unanimous one way or the other.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the judge's answer to the jury's question improperly suggested they did not have the right to disagree, necessitating a new trial.

The Court also held that the objective standard of fault for failure to provide necessaries under s. 215 of the Criminal Code does not violate s. 7 of the Charter.

The accused was charged with storing firearms and ammunition in a careless manner contrary to s. 86(2) of the Criminal Code.

He challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated s. 7 of the Charter by allowing conviction based on mere negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 86(2) does not violate s. 7, as the objective standard of a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person satisfies the minimum fault requirement for this offence.

The appeal was allowed and the stay of proceedings was lifted.

The appellant, a police officer, shot and killed a fleeing suspect and was charged with manslaughter.

The Crown argued that the appellant's careless use of a firearm contrary to s. 86(2) of the Criminal Code constituted the predicate unlawful act.

The trial judge instructed the jury that a 'criminal state of mind' was required for a conviction under s. 86(2), and the appellant was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the fault requirement under s. 86(2) is an objective standard requiring a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person, and that the trial judge's misdirection necessitated a new trial.

The appellant injected the deceased with cocaine, resulting in her death from cardiac arrest and asphyxiation.

He was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the common law definition of unlawful act manslaughter, which requires only objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm rather than death, violates section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm is the appropriate mens rea for manslaughter and accords with the principles of fundamental justice.

The respondent was charged under a municipal by-law that prohibited all postering on public property after he affixed posters to hydro poles to advertise his band's performances.

He challenged the constitutionality of the by-law under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that postering conveys a meaning and is a protected form of expression under s. 2(b).

The Court found that the absolute ban on postering on public property infringed freedom of expression.

While the by-law's objectives of preventing litter, aesthetic blight, and safety hazards were pressing and substantial, the complete ban did not minimally impair the right and could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The appellants, who were minors at the time of their respective motor vehicle accidents, commenced actions for damages more than two years after the accidents but within two years of reaching the age of majority.

The central issue was whether the two-year limitation period in section 180(1) of the Highway Traffic Act excluded the operation of section 47 of the Limitations Act, which postpones the running of limitation periods for persons under legal disability.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions are not inconsistent and that section 47 applies to postpone the limitation period for minors.

The appeals of the minor plaintiffs were allowed.

However, the adult plaintiff's claim, which was commenced after the limitation period expired, was held to be incurably out of time and was dismissed.

The appeal arose from a federal constitutional referendum held everywhere in Canada except Quebec, where a separate provincial referendum proceeded under different residency rules.

The appellants had recently moved from Ontario to Quebec and, because of the interaction of the federal and provincial residency requirements, could vote in neither process.

The majority held that the federal referendum legislation did not extend voting rights to persons ordinarily resident in Quebec on the federal enumeration date, and that the Chief Electoral Officer lacked authority to adapt the scheme to do so.

The Court further held that s. 3 of the Charter does not guarantee a right to vote in a referendum, that s. 2(b) did not require the state to provide this expressive platform, and that s. 15(1) was not infringed.

Appeal dismissed, with dissent on the s. 2(b) issue.

The appellant was charged with narcotics trafficking and proceeds of crime offences.

The trial was conducted intermittently over eight months.

The trial judge convicted the appellant of trafficking but acquitted him of the proceeds charges, noting the sporadic trial was unsatisfactory but declining to declare a mistrial to avoid hardship to the accused.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittals, finding the trial judge should have declared a mistrial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the trial judge did not err in refusing a mistrial and restoring the acquittals on the specific proceeds counts.

However, a new trial was ordered on the global proceeds count because the trial judge failed to consider whether the Crown had proven that at least some of the money was from trafficking.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to traffic in narcotics.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal, which was set aside by the Court of Appeal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that section 465(3) of the Criminal Code does not preclude the application of the Libman real and substantial connection test.

Finding evidence that the alleged trafficking offences had a real and substantial connection to Canada, the Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the order for a new trial.

The appellant, a self-employed lawyer, sought to deduct nanny wages as business expenses rather than under the capped child care deduction in the Income Tax Act.

The majority held that, although child care expenses raise difficult questions under general business-expense principles, s. 63 specifically and comprehensively addresses child care costs incurred to enable a taxpayer to carry on a business, and therefore precludes deduction under ss. 9 and 18.

The majority further held that the appellant failed to prove that s. 63 drew a distinction based on sex for the purposes of s. 15(1) of the Charter, because the evidentiary record established disproportionate social burdens of child care on women but not disproportionate payment of child care expenses.

The appeal was dismissed, with two judges dissenting on both statutory interpretation and equality analysis.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and kidnapping after carrying the complainant from a trailer without her clothes, transporting her 40 miles to a remote cabin, tying her to a bed and having sexual intercourse with her.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the majority (5-4) held that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit cross-examination on the complainant's medical records for the purpose of determining whether there was evidence supporting a defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent or an allegation of fabrication.

All nine justices agreed that s. 265(4) of the Criminal Code, which imposes the air of reality test for the defence of mistaken belief in consent, does not violate ss. 11(d) or 11(f) of the Charter.

The Court extensively discussed the principles governing cross-examination of sexual assault complainants on medical records, the privacy interests at stake, and the proper scope of the air of reality threshold applicable to all criminal defences.

The Crown appealed from an order directing a new trial after a second degree murder conviction arising from a co-accused homicide and robbery scenario.

The Court held that a secondary party may be convicted of manslaughter under both s. 21(1) and s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code even where the principal is guilty of murder, provided the accused lacked the mens rea for murder but met the objective fault standard for manslaughter.

The Court further held that the jury charge was inadequate because it failed to clearly explain that the respondent could be guilty of manslaughter although the principal was guilty of murder.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) did not apply.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial was confirmed.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm and elected trial by judge alone.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge found insufficient evidence for the original charge and committed the accused to stand trial on the lesser included offence of common assault.

The prosecutor nevertheless preferred an indictment on the original charge.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the prosecutor had no power to prefer an indictment under section 574 of the Criminal Code for an offence in respect of which the accused had been discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

The appeal was allowed and the indictment quashed.

The appellant, a young offender, was convicted of second-degree murder based on a second statement made to police after an initial statement was ruled inadmissible.

The first statement was excluded because the appellant was not advised of the possibility of being transferred to adult court, vitiating his waiver of the right to counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the second statement was also inadmissible.

It was causally connected to the first statement, as the first statement was a substantial factor leading to the making of the second, and the taint of the initial Charter and Young Offenders Act breaches was not cured by a subsequent consultation with counsel.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial based on the non-disclosure of a victim impact statement and its admission as fresh evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that defence counsel failed to bring the non-disclosure to the trial judge's attention at the earliest opportunity, making a tactical decision instead.

Furthermore, the proposed fresh evidence failed the due diligence criterion of the Palmer test.

The Court of Appeal's judgment was set aside and the matter remitted.