Ryan Morrow

The defendant was charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration under the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant challenged the legality of the roadside screening procedure, the pat-down search conducted prior to the screening, the delay in administering the screening, and the delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court conducted a blended voir-dire and ruled on the Charter application.

The court found no violations of the defendant's Charter rights and dismissed the application for exclusion of the evidential breath testing results.

The accused was charged with assault, uttering threats, and criminal harassment against his former intimate partner.

The complainant alleged the offences occurred after she discovered he was married with a child and attempted to end their relationship.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming they were planning to marry and the complainant's family conspired against him.

Applying the W.(D.) principles, the court found the complainant highly credible and rejected the accused's evidence as illogical and internally inconsistent.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

The offender was convicted of sexually assaulting and sexually exploiting his girlfriend's two young daughters over a three-year period.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence argued for a conditional sentence based on the offender's lack of a criminal record and positive background.

The court found that a conditional sentence would not adequately address the principles of denunciation and deterrence given the breach of trust and the profound impact on the victims.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day incarceration, consistent with the sentence imposed at the original trial.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of sexual interference against his girlfriend's two daughters over a three-year period ending in 2004.

The complainants, now adults, testified that the accused entered their bedrooms at night while they slept and engaged in inappropriate sexual touching.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainants credible and reliable witnesses, rejected the accused's minimization of his presence in the home, and found him guilty on all four counts.

The court also addressed the admissibility of similar fact evidence and found no collusion between the complainants despite the opportunity for communication.

The accused was charged with stabbing the victim at a house party.

The victim, who was highly intoxicated, identified the accused as the stabber.

The defence called a third-party suspect who denied involvement.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the defence witness and the party host lacked credibility.

However, the court also found the victim's evidence unreliable due to his extreme intoxication (blood alcohol over 0.240) and inconsistencies in his testimony.

The Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt, and the charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with driving with excess blood alcohol (over 80) and driving without a valid license.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of evidence on Charter grounds, arguing his s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated.

The court found the defendant explicitly waived his right to counsel on multiple occasions despite police efforts to facilitate contact with duty counsel.

The defendant's statements were found to be voluntary.

On the trial proper, the court found the defendant was driving within two hours of the first breath test, satisfying the statutory requirement for the presumption of identity.

The defendant was convicted on both charges.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a traffic stop.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging that the police failed to make an approved screening device demand forthwith after forming reasonable suspicion, contrary to s. 254(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, and that the delay infringed ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found several unexplained delays in the investigation and concluded that the officer did not act promptly, rendering the seizure of the roadside breath sample unconstitutional and requiring exclusion of the Certificate of Analysis.

The court further held that, even absent the Charter breach, the accused’s “last drink” defence supported by corroborating testimony and expert toxicology evidence raised a reasonable doubt about the accused’s blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol contrary to section 253(a) of the Criminal Code, and with having consumed alcohol in such quantity that the concentration in her blood exceeded 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 253(b).

Following a serious single-vehicle collision, the accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The trial proceeded on a blended voir dire basis.

The court found that the Crown failed to establish the chain of continuity of the blood sample and that the toxicologist's opinion was undermined by discrepancies in the time the blood was drawn.

The court also found that while the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol, as the observed signs of impairment could be attributed to trauma and injuries from the collision.

The accused was charged with over .08 and impaired operation following a motor vehicle collision.

The defence sought to exclude breath test results on the grounds that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds to make the breath demand and that the officer breached the accused's Charter rights by delaying the provision of rights to counsel.

The court found that the nature of the accident combined with evidence of alcohol consumption provided an objective basis for the breath demand.

The court also found that a five-minute delay in providing rights to counsel did not constitute a breach of s. 10(b) rights.

The application for Charter relief was dismissed and the breath tests were admitted as evidence.