R. Steven Baldwin

The main action for a motor vehicle accident settled before trial, but the third party refused to contribute, leading to a jury trial on liability apportionment.

The jury found the third party 35% liable.

The defendant sought costs of the third party action, relying on an offer to settle that the third party had rejected.

The third party argued the costs claimed were disproportionate to the damages.

The court rejected the proportionality argument, noting the third party's intransigence in forcing a trial over a low-value claim, and awarded the defendant $75,000 in costs on a partial and substantial indemnity basis.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' personal injury action on summary judgment, the court determined the costs payable.

The defendants sought costs from the plaintiffs and argued the plaintiffs should also be liable for the costs of the third parties, whom the defendants had joined.

The court applied the general rule that an unsuccessful plaintiff is not responsible for the costs of third parties they did not sue, finding no exceptional circumstances to depart from this rule.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendants $44,000 in partial indemnity costs, while the defendants were ordered to pay the full costs claimed by the various third parties, totaling over $133,000.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' personal injury action on summary judgment, the court determined the costs payable.

The defendants sought costs from the plaintiffs and argued the plaintiffs should also be liable for the costs of the third parties, whom the defendants had joined.

The court applied the general rule that an unsuccessful plaintiff is not responsible for the costs of third parties they did not sue, finding no exceptional circumstances to depart from this rule.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay the defendants $44,000 in partial indemnity costs, while the defendants were ordered to pay the full costs claimed by the various third parties, totaling over $133,000.

Following a 17-day trial resulting in a net judgment of approximately $472,000 for the plaintiffs, the court assessed costs.

The plaintiffs sought over $445,000 in fees and disbursements.

The court reduced the senior counsel's hourly rate, applied a 60% partial indemnity rate, and deducted amounts for unsupported time and disbursements.

The court declined the defendants' request to impose a $40,000 remedial penalty on the plaintiffs for refusing to mediate, noting such penalties should be proportionate to a party's financial strength.

Costs were fixed at $204,811.50 for fees and $42,545.30 for disbursements, plus HST.

The defendant children's aid society and its employees brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff father's claim for negligent investigation and bad faith.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants conducted a biased and negligent investigation into allegations of sexual abuse, leading to unwarranted child protection proceedings.

The court reviewed conflicting jurisprudence on whether a children's aid society owes a duty of care to a parent under investigation.

Applying the Anns test, the court found it was not plain and obvious that no duty of care existed or that the defendants' alleged conduct fell within the statutory immunity for good faith actions.

The motion to strike was dismissed, allowing the claim to proceed to trial.

Following a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision involving a cyclist, the court addressed post-verdict issues including the statutory threshold for recovery of non-pecuniary damages, the applicable statutory deductible, and the appropriate rate of pre‑judgment interest.

The court found that the injured plaintiff established a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function under the Insurance Act threshold.

The court further held that the increased statutory deductible introduced by O. Reg. 221/15 applied to pending actions, characterizing the deductible as procedural in nature and applicable to quantification of damages.

However, the court concluded that entitlement to and quantification of pre‑judgment interest are substantive matters and therefore the amended Insurance Act provisions did not apply retrospectively.

Pre‑judgment interest was therefore calculated under Rule 53.10 until December 31, 2014 and under s. 128(1) of the Courts of Justice Act thereafter.

The defendants sought summary judgment dismissing claims arising from a motor vehicle accident following a cottage birthday party where alcohol was consumed.

The plaintiffs alleged the property owners were liable as social hosts and as occupiers of premises, arguing they failed to prevent intoxicated driving and failed to address rocks allegedly obstructing a right-of-way.

The court held the property owners were not social hosts because they neither organized nor participated in the party and did not serve alcohol.

The accident also occurred off their property, and their limited right to use a shared right‑of‑way did not make them occupiers responsible for its condition.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court dismissed the action and cross‑claims against them.

Following an 18‑day personal injury trial and subsequent judgment, the court issued supplementary reasons addressing calculation of net past income loss damages and the costs award.

The court interpreted ss. 267.3, 267.5, and 267.8 of the Insurance Act together with s. 3 of the Negligence Act and held that statutory accident benefits deductions must be applied after apportionment of liability and contributory negligence.

After accounting for accident benefit credits and the plaintiff’s 10% contributory negligence, the municipal defendants’ liability for past income loss was fixed at $50,292.50 plus prejudgment interest.

The court also determined the scope of recoverable costs following a prior appeal that set aside the first trial, permitting recovery of preparation costs for the first trial but excluding the trial costs themselves.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded from the date following a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The plaintiffs' insurer brought a subrogated action against the defendant, the plaintiffs' son, after his negligence in repairing his vehicle caused a fire that destroyed the plaintiffs' garage.

The defendant was an unnamed insured under the plaintiffs' homeowner's policy.

The court found that the defendant was negligent in his use of a battery charger, which caused the fire.

However, the subrogated claim was dismissed because an insurer cannot subrogate against its own insured for losses paid out under the same policy.

The plaintiffs were awarded $8,000 for their uninsured losses.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial in which the plaintiff recovered damages against the municipal employer but failed against several individual defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences.

Applying Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of his settlement offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter because the judgment exceeded the offer.

The court assessed reasonable hourly rates for counsel and reduced excessive paralegal time and rates while disallowing law clerk administrative costs.

The successful individual defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs for their defence.

A Sanderson order was granted requiring the municipal defendant to pay the costs of the successful individual defendants given the unusual and confusing factual circumstances that justified joining all defendants in the action.

Following a jury verdict finding a former teacher liable for sexual assault and the school board negligent, the plaintiff sought a ruling that the school board was vicariously liable for the teacher's actions.

The court applied the Salmond test as articulated in Bazley v. Curry, finding that the school board's enterprise and empowerment of the teacher materially increased the risk of harm.

The school board had sanctioned the teacher's operation of a mini-zoo in his classroom and provided him with a key, creating special opportunities for wrongdoing.

The court held the school board vicariously liable for the teacher's intentional torts.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a costs order awarding substantial indemnity costs against it after its unsuccessful motion for summary judgment.

The underlying motion involved a dispute over an alleged energy supply contract and claims of overcharging, where the plaintiff’s affidavit evidence conflicted with recorded telephone evidence and cross-examination testimony.

The motions judge had found the plaintiff acted unreasonably by bringing the summary judgment motion prematurely and by advancing misleading and contradictory affidavit evidence, warranting substantial indemnity costs under Rules 20.06 and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

On the leave motion, the court held the plaintiff failed to meet the criteria in Rule 62.02(4) because there was no conflicting authority and no reason to doubt the correctness of the costs ruling.

Leave to appeal the costs order was therefore refused.

Former unmarried partners disputed beneficial ownership of a house and family farm that had been transferred into joint title during their relationship.

The applicant argued the respondent held her registered interest in trust and that title had been transferred only to protect her anticipated financial contributions.

The court applied resulting trust, constructive trust, and unjust enrichment principles following Kerr v. Baranow and Pecore v. Pecore.

It concluded the transfers were not intended as a gift of beneficial ownership and that the respondent held title in trust for the applicant subject to compensation for her financial and labour contributions.

Title was ordered vested in the applicant upon payment of a monetary award reflecting the respondent’s contributions.

Following competing summary judgment motions in a civil commercial dispute, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiff’s summary judgment motion had previously been dismissed, while the defendant’s cross‑motion was found premature and allowed to be brought again after discoveries.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant should not receive costs because it withdrew one cross‑motion and the remaining motion was premature.

The court found that misleading and contradictory evidence advanced by the plaintiff undermined the litigation process and forced the defendant to bring the cross‑motions.

Considering the factors in Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court awarded the defendant substantial indemnity costs.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim as statute-barred under both the former and current Limitations Act regimes.

The moving party argued that, even accepting the plaintiff’s evidence at its highest, the limitation period had expired.

The court acknowledged that the limitation argument had merit but found that credibility issues and the incomplete evidentiary record made summary determination inappropriate.

The court held that a full trial and discoveries were necessary for the trier of fact to properly assess the evidence and refine the issues.

The motion was adjourned sine die with leave to renew the limitation argument on notice.