Rocco DiPucchio

The plaintiff brought motions for leave to appeal two orders of a motion judge: one adding a competing car dealership as a party defendant, and another dissolving an interim interlocutory injunction that had restrained the defendant manufacturer from appointing an additional dealer in the plaintiff's market area.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decisions and no issues of general importance to the administration of justice.

The appellants, having been successful in their appeal which struck the respondent's counterclaim and third-party claim, sought their costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court fixed the costs for both appellants but declined to include any fees or disbursements related to a voluntary mediation.

The court held that voluntary mediation is not a step authorized by the Rules of Civil Procedure, and as a matter of policy, the costs of voluntary mediation should be borne equally by the parties to encourage settlement efforts without fear of increased costs if unsuccessful.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motions under Rules 20 and 21 to strike the respondent's claims for constructive dismissal and related torts as statute-barred.

The motion judge had found that the claims could have been discovered before the respondent resigned, potentially triggering the six-year limitation period under the transitional provisions of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a cause of action for constructive dismissal arises only when the employee resigns.

As the resignation occurred in May 2004, the two-year limitation period applied and the claims were statute-barred.

The court also held that the motion judge erred in linking the Rule 20 and Rule 21 motions, and found no triable issue regarding promissory estoppel or acknowledgment of liability.

The appellant and her sisters retained the respondent law firms for estate litigation.

By agreement, the law firms' accounts were paid by a corporation owned by the sisters.

The appellant later discovered the accounts contained substantial undisclosed premiums and sought to have them assessed.

The motion judge dismissed the request, finding the appellant lacked standing as the corporation paid the bills.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appellant was the true client and had standing.

Furthermore, the Court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to order an assessment because the solicitors failed to disclose the premiums or advise the clients of their right to an assessment.

The appellant supplied construction materials to the respondent and signed an agreement acknowledging full payment.

The appellant later discovered it had failed to bill for several deliveries and sought to recover the outstanding amount, arguing the agreement should be set aside for common mistake.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the agreement allocated the risk of mistake to the appellant, the mistake was the appellant's fault, and the respondent had altered its position.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction granted by Lederman J., which included the re-instatement of the plaintiff's employment based on a finding of a serious issue of oppression.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the decision and noting that the re-instatement of employment, while rare, was within the judge's discretion under the oppression remedy.

The court also held that the failure to provide an undertaking did not automatically preclude the injunction and that no principle of broad importance was involved to justify granting leave.

The appellant pharmaceutical company sued the respondents for defamation arising from radio and internet broadcasts, as well as statements made in the House of Commons.

The appellant failed to serve a notice of defamation prior to commencing the action, as required by s. 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the defamation claims, confirming that the notice requirement applies to non-media defendants and that failure to provide notice is an absolute bar to the action.

The Court also upheld the striking of claims based on statements made in Parliament due to absolute parliamentary privilege.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motions to strike portions of the plaintiff's statements of claim in two related defamation actions.

The primary issue was whether the plaintiff could salvage a defamation claim regarding radio broadcasts by commencing a second action after failing to provide the required Section 5 notice under the Libel and Slander Act prior to the first action.

The court granted leave to appeal the refusal to strike the paragraphs in the second action relating to the radio broadcasts, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and noting the issue's importance to the administration of justice.

Leave to appeal was denied on the other grounds.

The appellant lawyer sued his former law firm and its managing partner for defamation based on comments published in a legal newspaper following his departure from the firm.

The defendants successfully moved to strike the statement of claim on the basis that the words were not reasonably capable of bearing the defamatory meanings alleged.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the impugned words, when construed in context and according to their natural meaning, were not capable of meaning that the appellant was forced out, unable to work as a team, selfish, or unprofessional.

The appeal and a motion for leave to appeal costs were dismissed.

The respondent resigned as a partner from the appellant law firm and commenced an action asserting financial claims, a claim regarding the transfer of client files, and a dispute over a non-competition clause.

The appellant moved to stay the claims on the basis that they were subject to mandatory arbitration under the partnership agreement.

The motion judge declined to order a stay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the arbitration clause, which covered any dispute 'in connection with' the agreement, was broad enough to encompass all of the respondent's claims.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered that the action be stayed.

The respondents sought leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act to commence a derivative action.

The appellants, who were the intended defendants in the proposed action, moved to intervene in the leave application.

The motions judge dismissed the motion to intervene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 246 permits the proceeding to be brought by application rather than motion, and that the motions judge did not err in exercising his discretion to deny intervention, as the intended defendants' rights would be fully protected once the action was commenced.