Richard P. Bowles

The appellant appealed a trial decision that dismissed his claim for spousal support and awarded no costs.

The parties had a significant income disparity, with the respondent earning substantially more.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge erred by failing to conduct an analysis of the means and needs of the parties and the impact of child support on the appellant's ability to support himself.

The court allowed the appeal, awarded spousal support of $800 per month based on the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, and awarded costs of the trial and appeal to the appellant.

Following a family law motion involving parenting issues, the applicant sought costs of $3,710 on a partial indemnity basis, representing approximately 60 percent of legal fees incurred.

The respondents argued that the motion result was mixed because the applicant sought supervised access for the father with the younger child, which the court did not order.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court considered the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs along with factors such as the reasonableness of the parties’ behaviour and the divided success on the motion.

The court concluded that the success on the motion was shared.

As a result, no costs were awarded.

Following family law motions in which success was divided between the parties, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The court found that neither party had behaved particularly reasonably during the proceedings.

Applying the discretionary principles governing costs in family law matters, the court declined to award costs to either side.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.

A father brought a motion alleging the mother was in breach of a prior access order after she unilaterally terminated his parenting time with the parties’ two children.

The mother argued that several incidents during access demonstrated the father’s anger issues and justified suspending access or imposing supervised access pending a psychiatric assessment.

The court reviewed recordings and evidence concerning four incidents of parental conflict and concluded that both parents contributed to escalating disputes but that the children were not placed in serious jeopardy.

The unilateral termination of access was not justified.

The existing access order was reinstated with additional conditions limiting parental interaction and requiring the parties to avoid involving the children in the conflict.

Costs decision following a family law motion and cross-motion concerning interim custody and access arrangements for the parties’ children.

The court considered the presumption of costs under Family Law Rule 24(1) and the relative success of the parties.

Although both parties advanced positions that were ultimately close to the interim arrangement ordered, the court found the moving party had the true measure of success because the order reflected the recommendations of the custody and access assessor.

Considering that the responding party acted reasonably, made an offer to settle, and succeeded on some points, the court moderated the award.

Costs of $1,500 all-inclusive were ordered payable to the moving party.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to change support obligations and the granting of the respondent’s cross-motion fixing child and spousal support arrears, ongoing spousal support, and security for support payments during default.

The court held that the consent order required the parties to be bound by the accountant’s calculation of income for support purposes and rejected the submission that a de novo review of financial circumstances was required.

The appellant’s argument based on the child no longer being a child of the marriage did not justify reducing spousal support in light of the wording of the consent order.

The order providing security for support was upheld, the cross-appeal was dismissed, and costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.

The court determined the issue of costs following a family law proceeding where the parties were unable to reach agreement.

Under Rule 24(1) of the Family Law Rules, the successful party is presumptively entitled to costs.

The applicant was wholly successful and sought recovery of her legal costs.

After considering the factors in Rule 24(11), including the complexity and importance of the issues, counsel’s rates, and time spent, the court concluded that partial indemnity costs were appropriate.

The court reduced the amount claimed after finding that some preparation time appeared excessive and fixed total costs at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant and respondent separated in 2006.

In 2009, the respondent, who suffers from bipolar disorder, drafted a separation agreement using an online template, which both parties signed without legal advice.

The applicant later sought to enforce the agreement, and the respondent sought to set it aside, arguing he lacked mental capacity due to his disorder and substance abuse, and citing a lack of financial disclosure and legal advice.

The court found no material non-disclosure, as the primary assets were known to both parties.

The court also found that the respondent was competent when he drafted the agreement, his vulnerability was not exploited by the applicant, and the agreement was not unconscionable.

The application to set aside the separation agreement was dismissed.

The self-represented father appealed a motion judge's order stipulating that his access to his 15-year-old daughter be only with her consent and prohibiting him from initiating contact with her.

The father argued the order was unjustified, that circumstances had changed, and that the motion judge was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias and holding that the motion judge properly focused on the best interests of the child, giving appropriate weight to the 15-year-old's expressed wishes to initiate contact herself.

The respondent father sought leave to appeal an interim order granting the mother interim custody and permitting her to move to Florida with the children, as well as staying the Ontario proceedings if Florida assumed jurisdiction.

The court found no conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the interim custody and mobility orders, applying the best interests of the child test.

However, the court granted leave to appeal solely on the issue of whether the Ontario action should be automatically stayed if a Florida court assumes jurisdiction, as this relief was not requested and full submissions were not heard.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his application to vary a consent custody order to seek joint custody and an equal parenting schedule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that there was no material change in circumstances.

The court also upheld the application judge's decision to increase the father's weekday contact rather than imposing an equal parenting schedule, noting the judge properly considered the relevant factors including enhancing contact between the child and the father's new family.

The respondents sought to enforce an arbitration clause in a Joint Use Agreement against the appellant, a successor in title, to resolve a snow removal dispute.

The motion judge appointed an arbitrator, finding the clause was an administrative covenant incidental to negative covenants.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitration clause was a positive covenant that did not run with the land and was therefore not binding on the appellant.

The court also found that the statutory exceptions under the Planning Act did not apply as they are limited to covenants enforced by a municipality.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision that interpreted a collective agreement's scope clause to include owner-operators in Cambridge, expanding the bargaining unit beyond the geographic parameters of the original Canada Labour Relations Board certificate.

The Divisional Court applied the pragmatic and functional approach, determining that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was subject to a standard of patent unreasonableness, while her interpretation of the Canada Labour Code was subject to a standard of reasonableness.

The court held that the arbitrator had jurisdiction to recognize a bargaining unit expanded by mutual agreement and that her interpretation was not patently unreasonable.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.