Ren Bucholz

Following a successful appeal regarding the apportionment of damages, the court determined the costs of the appeal and cross-appeal.

The third parties were ordered to pay partial indemnity costs of $50,000 to the appellants and $75,000 to the respondents.

The appellants were ordered to pay $30,000 in partial indemnity costs to the respondents, as the respondents were required to address all issues initially raised by the appellants.

The parties agreed on the costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent costs fixed at $30,000 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The appellants, an engineering firm and its principal, appealed a trial judgment apportioning liability for damages between them and their insurers.

The trial judge found the appellants liable in negligence and breach of contract for errors and delays in engineering drawings for a construction project.

The trial judge apportioned 45% of the damages to the appellants and 55% to the insurers, based on an exclusion clause for delay.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that all delays were caused by the appellants' negligence in having to correct errors, which was covered under the policy.

The insurers' cross-appeal regarding the assessment of damages and the date used for foreign currency conversion was dismissed.

The respondent, a Canadian businessman, brought a libel action in Ontario against an Israeli newspaper regarding an article published online and in print.

The appellants moved to stay the action, arguing Ontario lacked jurisdiction, Israel was a more appropriate forum, and the action was an abuse of process.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding Ontario had jurisdiction based on the tort being committed in Ontario, and that Israel was not clearly a more appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.

The defendants moved to set aside service ex juris and stay a defamation action brought by an Ontario resident against an Israeli newspaper and journalists regarding an article published online.

The court held that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter because the alleged defamatory article was read by individuals in Ontario, establishing a presumptive connecting factor through the commission of the tort in the province.

The defendants failed to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction and did not demonstrate that Israel was a clearly more appropriate forum under the forum non conveniens analysis.

The plaintiff’s undertaking to limit damages to reputational harm suffered within Canada, the availability of jury trials in Ontario, and fairness considerations supported Ontario as the proper forum.

The court also rejected the argument that the action constituted an abuse of process due to minimal publication in Ontario.

Following the dismissal of two related civil actions, the successful defendants sought a costs order requiring the plaintiffs’ counsel personally to pay a portion of the trial costs associated with calling 22 witnesses.

The defendants argued that the evidence of those witnesses was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule and that counsel’s decision to call them wasted approximately ten days of trial time.

The court considered Rule 57.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s inherent jurisdiction to award costs against a solicitor.

The judge held that such orders should be made only in rare circumstances and typically require conduct approaching recklessness, abuse of process, or bad faith.

The court concluded that counsel’s decision to lead the evidence was not reckless or abusive and declined to order costs against counsel personally.

The applicant massage therapist sought judicial review of a caution issued by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee regarding her advertising practices.

The Divisional Court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the application, as the proceeding was initiated by a Registrar's report rather than a complaint, meaning no appeal lay to the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board.

On the merits, the Court dismissed the application, finding no denial of natural justice and concluding that the strongly worded caution was appropriate remedial guidance rather than an unauthorized disciplinary reprimand.

The appellant was struck by a car and suffered significant physical injuries that led to chronic pain and mental disorders.

She applied for enhanced statutory accident benefits, claiming a catastrophic impairment under s. 2(1.1)(g) of the SABS.

A designated assessment centre and an arbitrator found she met the criteria because she had a marked impairment in one category of daily living, and they included physical pain in their assessment of her mental disorder.

The director's delegate upheld this decision.

The Divisional Court overturned the delegate's decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by applying a correctness standard of review.

Applying the reasonableness standard, the Court of Appeal found the delegate's interpretation of s. 2(1.1)(g)—that a single marked impairment is sufficient and that physical pain can be considered cumulatively with a mental disorder—was reasonable.

In long‑running commercial litigation concerning an alleged oral agreement granting the plaintiffs a 50% interest in a casino development project, the parties brought pre‑trial motions addressing potential conflicts of interest involving defence counsel and issue estoppel relating to alleged spoliation of evidence.

The plaintiffs clarified that their spoliation allegations were directed only at the defendants and not at defence counsel, and that they would not seek to call defence counsel as witnesses.

The court treated these statements as binding admissions and issued declarations preventing the plaintiffs from alleging misconduct, spoliation, or false statements by defence counsel at trial.

Remaining issues, including whether issue estoppel barred certain spoliation arguments, were left for determination by the trial judge.