Rebecca De Filippis

The defendant, L.R., faced two charges of sexual assault.

The first count involved sexual intercourse where the complainant alleged intoxication and lack of consent, while the defendant asserted consent.

The second count involved an alleged attempt to force oral sex.

The court analyzed the complainant's capacity to consent, considering her alcohol tolerance, a pre-existing sleep disorder, and video evidence.

The court found the complainant had the capacity to consent and did, in fact, consent to the sexual activity in the first count.

The court also found the second allegation highly improbable.

Consequently, both charges were dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence of six months' custody, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing "real" custody instead of the agreed-upon "pre-sentence custody" as part of a joint submission.

The joint submission aimed to replicate a global resolution with prior charges, ensuring the appellant's time in custody was not extended.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge made an inadvertent error in principle by deviating from the reasonable joint submission.

Paul Tranter, a Staff Sergeant with the Waterloo Police Service, was charged with assault causing bodily harm to Jamie McFadyen during a booking process.

The defense argued the force used was justified under section 25 of the Criminal Code to prevent injury to another officer.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the force used was objectively unnecessary, unreasonable, or disproportionate, considering the volatile circumstances and the perceived threat to the officer.

Tranter was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with willfully promoting hatred against gay men under s. 319(2) of the Criminal Code after distributing anti-gay flyers at the 2016 Toronto Pride Parade.

The flyers contained graphic images and medical claims about the dangers of the 'homosexual lifestyle', alongside religious messaging.

The court found that while the flyers were offensive and contained exaggerations, they fell into the 'grey zone' between legitimate expression and hate speech, lacking the hallmarks of extreme vilification.

The court also found a reasonable doubt regarding the accused's specific intent to promote hatred, resulting in an acquittal.

The appellant, a police officer, pleaded guilty to assaulting a handcuffed suspect and falsifying his notes and use of force report.

He was sentenced to 30 days intermittent custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by treating the use of a taser and the false reports as aggravating factors, and by failing to adequately consider the collateral consequence of his inevitable job loss.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding that the sentence was not manifestly unreasonable given the serious breach of trust.

The appellant, Sakhi Alekozai, appealed his convictions for internet child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a person under 18, which arose from a police sting operation.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's application of mens rea standards, particularly regarding the distinction between recklessness and actual belief or wilful blindness, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Morrison.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had correctly determined that the appellant subjectively believed the collocutor was underage, and that the "reasonable steps" defence was not available.

The accused brought a pre-trial motion seeking a stay of proceedings, alleging a violation of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the anticipated end of trial was 99 months.

The court found that the accused had actively evaded arrest in Central America for over four years, characterizing this pre-extradition period as defence delay.

Further deductions were made for defence-requested adjournments and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The net delay was calculated at 24 months, which fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The Crown applied to qualify an expert witness to testify on the history and tropes of anti-gay discrimination in the trial of the accused for willful promotion of hatred.

The accused had distributed flyers at the Toronto Pride Parade.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and found that while the expert was qualified and capable of giving unbiased evidence despite his advocacy background, the evidence was not necessary.

The court held that a properly instructed jury could determine whether the flyer constituted hate speech without expert assistance.

Furthermore, the court found that the cost-benefit analysis favoured exclusion due to the high risk of distracting the jury with debates over religious beliefs and political values.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault and acquitted of transmitting an intimate image without consent after the trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal on the latter charge.

The trial judge ruled that a FaceTime call was not a 'visual recording' under s. 162.1 of the Criminal Code because it lacked the capability for reproduction.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, and the accused appealed the conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the ordinary meaning of 'visual recording' includes a FaceTime call and does not require the image to be capable of reproduction.

The accused's appeal against conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge made no reversible errors in her jury instructions on consent or in handling objections to the Crown's closing address.

A new trial was ordered on the intimate image charge.

The applicant, convicted of serious sexual offences against a child in foster care, applied for bail pending appeal of his conviction.

The Court of Appeal considered the three criteria under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code: whether the appeal is not frivolous, whether the applicant will surrender into custody, and whether detention is necessary in the public interest.

While the first two criteria were met or conceded, the court focused on public confidence in the administration of justice, balancing the public interest in reviewability against enforceability.

Given the gravity of the offences, the aggravated circumstances, the lengthy sentence, and the weakness of the grounds of appeal (which did not "clearly surpass" the not frivolous standard), the court found that the interest in immediate enforcement outweighed the interest in release.

The application for bail pending appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought an application to introduce flyers distributed by the accused in Saskatchewan in 2000 and 2001 as evidence of motive in a hate speech trial.

In an addendum to previous reasons, the court held that while two of the flyers were capable of showing animus towards gay people, their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The Crown's application to introduce the Saskatchewan flyers was dismissed.

In a criminal trial for wilfully promoting hatred, the Crown sought to introduce various blog posts and internet articles as "proposed motive evidence" to demonstrate the accused's animus towards gay people.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding that the proposed evidence was not capable of demonstrating the intense and extreme hatred required for motive.

The court ruled that the prejudicial effect of admitting such evidence, which risked distracting the jury with debates over the accused's political and religious views rather than the elements of the offence, significantly outweighed its limited probative value.

The applicant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment followed by 2 years of probation.

He sought bail pending appeal.

The trial judge's conviction turned on credibility findings, relying heavily on video evidence of the complainant's demeanour immediately after the alleged assault.

The applicant argued the trial judge improperly relied on demeanour evidence contrary to Supreme Court precedent and failed to adequately address serious credibility issues with the complainant's testimony.

The motion judge granted bail pending appeal, finding the grounds of appeal were not frivolous and that detention was not justified based on the applicant's bail compliance history and surety plan.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that allowed the respondent's appeal from sentence for assault against his wife.

The respondent had pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife in 2016 and had received an absolute discharge in 2011 for a previous assault on the same victim.

The trial judge refused to grant a second discharge, citing the first discharge's failure to deter the respondent.

The appeal court allowed the respondent's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in considering the discharge, which was protected from disclosure under the Criminal Records Act.

The appeal court remitted the matter for a new sentencing hearing.

The Crown appealed on two grounds: the interpretation of the Criminal Records Act and the appeal court's authority to remit the matter.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a sentence of 30 months custody (21.5 months effective) imposed after conviction for robbery of a gas station convenience store.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred in characterizing his prior sentences as lenient and that the sentence was demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal found that while the characterization of prior sentences as lenient was inappropriate, it had no impact on the sentence imposed.

The court upheld the sentence as fit, noting the appellant's extensive criminal record, ineffective probation orders, 14 convictions for breaching court orders, and substance abuse issues.

The court emphasized the vulnerability of convenience store clerks working alone late at night.

Appeal from a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice on April 21, 2017 for historical sexual assault offences.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's evidence, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence by failing to consider whether the complainant's testimony was the product of life experiences and an after-the-fact reconciliation of dreams with actual events, and by improperly considering rumours evidence.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments, finding that the trial judge carefully considered and properly rejected the appellant's submissions.

The court determined that the appellant's arguments constituted a challenge to the reasonableness of the verdicts, which were not unreasonable given the trial judge's assessment of credibility and the application of the burden of proof.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial where the sole issue was whether the complainant had the capacity to consent and whether she in fact consented to sexual intercourse.

The complainant was a self-described alcoholic who had consumed significant alcohol in the 48 hours preceding the incident.

The appellant did not testify at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant was denied effective representation by trial counsel, resulting in a miscarriage of justice.

The court determined that trial counsel prevented the appellant from testifying or making his own decision about whether to testify, failed to conduct an effective cross-examination of the complainant, and failed to introduce an expert toxicologist's report that was part of Crown disclosure.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

Crown appeal from a successful defence summary conviction appeal.

The respondent was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the respondent based on circumstantial evidence including observations of impairment, prescription pill bottles found in the vehicle, and the effects of the drugs matching the respondent's behaviour.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the conviction and entered an acquittal, finding insufficient evidence that the pill bottles contained the drugs on their labels or that those drugs were in the respondent's system.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the summary conviction appeal court erred in applying an incorrect standard of review and substituting its opinion for that of the trial judge.

The conviction was restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault entered by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The appellant had bitten off the complainant's ear during an altercation at the complainant's residence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: first, that the trial judge failed to resolve material inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence regarding the description of the attack and his drinking habits; and second, that the trial judge impermissibly speculated about the cause of the injury without expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly assessed the complainant's credibility, that any inconsistencies were minor and did not undermine the core allegations, and that the trial judge did not speculate but rather accepted the complainant's uncontradicted testimony.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for criminal harassment.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but sought leave to introduce fresh evidence and to appeal his sentence on the grounds that it was imposed without consideration of collateral immigration consequences that arose from amendments to federal immigration legislation introduced after sentencing.

The Crown conceded that had these consequences been known at sentencing, they would have affected the result.

The court granted the fresh evidence application, granted leave to appeal sentence, and allowed the appeal, imposing a suspended sentence with credit for six months less one day of pre-sentence custody and two years' probation.