Rasha Mohamed Said El-Tawil

The plaintiffs brought a motion to adjourn an eight‑week civil trial scheduled on the running list while appeals were pending concerning a refusal to amend the statement of claim and to admit late expert valuation reports.

The defendants opposed the adjournment, arguing the appeals would not materially affect the trial and proposing procedural alternatives such as hearing evidence and awaiting appellate outcomes or bifurcating liability and damages.

Applying the principles governing adjournments, including the objective of deciding matters on their substantive merits and considerations of prejudice and fairness, the court found the pending appeals could significantly affect the pleadings and expert evidence at trial.

The court concluded that proceeding before those issues were resolved risked inefficient and potentially unfair proceedings.

The trial was therefore adjourned pending the appellate process.

The appellant obtained a civil judgment in excess of $1 million against the respondent for an unprovoked assault that caused permanent brain damage.

The respondent subsequently filed for bankruptcy.

The appellant moved for a declaration that the judgment survives bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(a.1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act as an award for bodily harm intentionally inflicted.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding no intent to injure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the respondent's act of punching the appellant in the head with a closed fist demonstrated the requisite intent to inflict bodily harm, and the judgment therefore survives the bankruptcy discharge.

The appellant, who was struck on the head with rollerblades by a fellow student in the schoolyard when she was six years old, appealed the dismissal of her negligence action against the school board.

She argued that the absence of an incident report and the presence of rollerblades contrary to school policy compelled a finding of negligent supervision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the incident occurred suddenly and without warning, and that the appellant failed to establish a breach of the duty of care owed by the school.

The appellant suffered a severe brain injury after being assaulted by an intoxicated patron outside a pub.

He sued the patron and the pub, relying on the civil liability provisions of s. 39 of the Liquor Licence Act.

At trial, the jury found the patron 100% responsible and dismissed the claim against the pub.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them that liability under s. 39 requires reasonable foreseeability of harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 39 requires a risk assessment and is breached only if a patron is over-served to the point where it is reasonably foreseeable they might injure another person.

The insured was injured in a motor vehicle accident and applied for a catastrophic impairment designation, which was denied by the insurer based on a CAT DAC assessment.

After the two-year limitation period expired, the insured submitted a new application based on an alleged change in condition.

The arbitrator found the limitation period applied but held that a change in condition could permit a reapplication.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate confirmed the arbitrator's finding that there was no factual change in condition, dismissing the insured's appeal.

However, on the insurer's appeal, the Delegate held that the arbitrator erred in law by finding an exception for changed conditions, ruling that under subsection 40(4) of the Schedule, a CAT DAC determination is binding and cannot be circumvented by a reapplication on the same criteria once the limitation period has expired.

Two tenants of a shopping plaza appealed the dismissal of their applications regarding parking covenants in their respective commercial leases.

Good Life Corporation argued its lease guaranteed unlimited access to all parking spaces and prohibited the landlord from granting exclusive spaces to other tenants.

Royal LePage argued its lease entitled it to 30 exclusive parking spaces.

The Court of Appeal held that Good Life's lease only guaranteed general access to the parking lot, but prohibited the landlord from reducing the number of available spaces by granting additional reserved spaces to other tenants after the lease commenced.

The Court also held that Royal LePage was only entitled to 6 reserved spaces, not 30.

Both appeals were allowed in part to issue declarations clarifying these rights.