Ranjan K. Agarwal

The defendants in a motor vehicle accident claim moved for leave to amend their statement of defence to plead the inevitable accident defence, citing a blown tire.

The motion was brought nearly four years after the action commenced and shortly before the scheduled trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants' lengthy and unexplained delay in seeking the amendment resulted in presumed, non-compensable prejudice to the plaintiff that could not be remedied by costs or an adjournment.

The applicant moved for a penalty after the respondent was found in contempt for failing to obey parenting and costs orders.

The respondent had denied the applicant parenting time with their 6-year-old son for over three years.

The court ordered immediate unsupervised parenting time for the applicant, temporarily changed the child's primary residence to the applicant, authorized police enforcement, and ordered the respondent to pay $11,900 in full indemnity costs.

During a trial for damages and statutory accident benefits arising from a motor vehicle accident, the self-represented plaintiff sought to introduce a medical report for the truth of its contents without calling the authoring doctor to testify.

The defendants objected on the basis of hearsay and failure to comply with the Evidence Act and Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court ruled the report inadmissible, holding that without the opportunity for cross-examination, the hearsay content could not be admitted.

The court also provided guidance on best practices for self-represented litigants regarding expert evidence.

The applicant moved for an order compelling the respondent to provide financial disclosure.

The respondent brought a cross-motion seeking a declaration that the parties' last common habitual residence was the United Arab Emirates, arguing that UAE law does not provide for equalization of net family properties and therefore the requested disclosure was irrelevant.

The court declined to determine the issue of common habitual residence on an interlocutory motion due to conflicting affidavit evidence, finding that a trial was necessary.

Both parties were ordered to provide specific items of financial disclosure.

The applicant sought equalization of net family property, claiming the parties separated in 2017 and that the respondent's property was a matrimonial home.

The respondent argued they separated in December 2004, before she purchased the property.

Following a focused hearing to determine the date of separation, the court applied the factors from Al-Sajee v Tawfic and found that the parties separated in December 2004.

The court accepted the respondent's evidence that she allowed the applicant to stay at the property to foster a relationship with their children and convalesce after brain surgery, but that there was no marital relationship.

The defendant contractor moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff municipality's claim for construction defects was time-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff discovered roof leaks in January 2015 but did not receive an engineering report confirming the cause until March 13, 2015.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence and could not have drawn a plausible inference of liability until receiving the expert opinion.

The limitation period did not begin to run until March 13, 2015.

The applicant withdrew his family law application against the respondent's family members (the Gandhis) prior to trial.

The Gandhis and the respondent moved for costs of the withdrawn proceeding under Rule 12(3) of the Family Law Rules.

The applicant argued that only the trial judge had jurisdiction to award costs.

The court held that a motion judge has jurisdiction to award costs when an application is withdrawn against co-parties.

Finding that the applicant had a bona fide claim but acted unreasonably by persisting with it long after receiving disclosure, the court awarded costs to the Gandhis and the respondent.

The applicants, claiming to be the rightfully elected directors of a temple, applied for an order appointing a monitor over the temple's affairs and freezing its assets.

They alleged that the respondent former directors misappropriated funds and failed to hold lawful elections.

The court found the applicants' allegations of breach of trust were unsubstantiated and did not raise a serious issue to be tried.

The application was dismissed, as there was no basis to impose a monitor under the court's equitable jurisdiction.

The applicant father and respondent mother sought an order for decision-making responsibility for their 6-year-old child.

The parties had resolved parenting time but remained in high conflict over health and education decisions, largely driven by the father's disproportionate anxiety regarding the child's health.

The court ordered that the mother have sole decision-making responsibility for health and education to reduce conflict and ensure stability.

The parties were granted shared decision-making responsibility for culture, language, religion, and significant extracurricular activities, as they demonstrated an ability to cooperate in these areas.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' $20 million claim arising from the revocation of the plaintiff's aviation delegation.

The court struck the claims for conspiracy, breach of contract, injurious falsehood, negligence, wrongful dismissal, and intentional interference with contractual relations for failing to plead necessary elements, but granted leave to amend.

The court declined to strike the claim for misfeasance in public office, finding it adequately pleaded, and dismissed the defendants' motion to strike portions of the claim as scandalous or an abuse of process.

The applicant builder commenced construction on several blocks of a housing development without building permits.

The City's Chief Building Official issued Orders to Comply and Stop Work Orders.

The applicant appealed the orders under section 25 of the Building Code Act, arguing they were impossible to comply with due to the City's delays in issuing permits.

Although the appeal was moot because the orders had since been cleared, the court exercised its discretion to hear it.

The court affirmed the Orders to Comply, finding they reasonably required the applicant to stop illegal construction immediately.

However, the court rescinded the Stop Work Orders because the Act requires a breach of an Order to Comply before a Stop Work Order can be issued, which had not occurred.

The respondent father brought a motion for an interim variation of an arbitral child support award, arguing that his child support obligations should be reduced to 'summer support' because two of the adult children were attending post-secondary school away from home.

The court treated the motion as one for an interim variation of a final support order, requiring the father to show a strong prima facie case, a clear case of hardship, urgency, and clean hands.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the father failed to provide evidence that the mother's household expenses were significantly reduced or that the table amount produced a windfall, and therefore failed to establish a strong prima facie case that the standard Guidelines approach was inappropriate.

The defendant moved for a stay of proceedings or an indefinite adjournment of the trial pending a Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT) Right to Sue Application.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim might be barred under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant had delayed raising the defence for years, had previously represented that the WSIAT application would not delay the trial, and that an adjournment would cause significant prejudice to the plaintiff who was ready for trial.

The applicant mother sought an urgent motion to travel to India with the parties' 4-year-old child for a 15-day Hindu religious ritual following her mother's death.

The respondent father opposed the travel, citing a risk that the mother would not return the child to Canada, as India is not a signatory to the Hague Convention.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the mother's lack of ties to Canada and failure to attorn to Ontario's jurisdiction created a plausible risk of abduction that outweighed the child's interest in participating in the religious ritual.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary orders regarding decision-making responsibility for the parties' twin children.

While most issues were settled, the parties disputed decision-making for the children's religion and spirituality.

The mother sought sole decision-making to allow the children to participate in Catholic sacraments, including First Communion, while the father objected based on unparticularized concerns about the Catholic faith.

The court granted the mother temporary sole decision-making responsibility for religion and spirituality, finding it in the children's best interests to maintain the status quo of their religious upbringing and participate fully in their faith.

The plaintiff bank sued the defendant for an unpaid credit line, and the defendant counterclaimed.

Ahead of a summary judgment motion, the defendant served a summons to examine the plaintiff's lawyer and sought to cross-examine the plaintiff's affiant on a newly filed affidavit.

The plaintiff moved to quash the summons, and the defendant moved to compel the cross-examination.

The court quashed the summons as an overly broad fishing expedition and an abuse of process, but permitted a brief, 30-minute cross-examination of the affiant limited to the new matters raised in her recent affidavit.