Philip M. Epstein

The parties were not married or living together when their child was born.

The mother registered the child's birth using her surname and did not acknowledge the father on the Statement of Live Birth, pursuant to s. 10(3)4 of the Vital Statistics Act.

The father applied for an order requiring the mother to execute a joint election form to change the child's name to a hyphenated surname.

The application was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the Act allows a mother to know the identity of the father but choose not to acknowledge him for the purpose of birth registration, thereby giving the child her surname.

Following the release of the court's judgment, the appellant failed to file written submissions regarding the remaining property issues affected by the respondent's bankruptcy.

Consequently, the appeal with respect to all remaining issues was dismissed as abandoned.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal payable to the respondent at $12,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The appellant husband appealed the dismissal of his motion for judgment based on an alleged settlement between the parties.

The Court of Appeal found that the wife's Offer to Settle and the husband's acceptance did not constitute a binding contract, as the offer left open the future negotiation of a shareholders agreement and was conditional upon further documentation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The father appealed a trial judgment regarding child support arrears and custody, while the mother cross-appealed a condition requiring her to relocate to Ottawa to retain custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the father's appeal, upholding the reduction in support arrears and the award of custody to the mother.

The Court allowed the mother's cross-appeal, striking down the condition that she return to Ottawa, finding that uprooting the children from their established environment in Stoney Creek was not in their best interests.

The appellant mother appealed an order varying a consent order and awarding custody of her seven-year-old son to the respondent father.

The trial judge had found a material change in circumstances based on the father disclosing the child's existence to his wife, and relied on an assessor's report criticizing the mother's attitude towards the father.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the disclosure did not constitute a material change in circumstances.

Furthermore, the Court held that the trial judge erred by placing undue emphasis on the mother's conduct without sufficient evidence that it had a detrimental effect on the child, who was developing well.

Custody was restored to the mother with generous access to the father.

The parties separated and signed a separation agreement containing a release of spousal support, alongside a consulting agreement providing the wife with income.

When the husband terminated the consulting agreement, the wife applied for spousal and child support.

The trial judge awarded spousal support for five years, finding the consulting agreement was disguised support.

The husband appealed the support and custody orders, alleging trial unfairness.

The wife cross-appealed the five-year limit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the husband's appeal and allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the strict Pelech trilogy test for varying support agreements does not apply under the 1985 Divorce Act.

Instead, a material change in circumstances threshold applies.

The wife's ongoing childcare responsibilities and the termination of the consulting agreement constituted a material change justifying ongoing, indefinite spousal support.

The appellants challenged an order dismissing their motion to set aside an earlier order under rule 37.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in finding herself functus and further erred in concluding there were no grounds to set aside the prior order.

On the uncontradicted evidence concerning discussions about outstanding costs and the absence of any further demand for payment, the earlier order ought not to have been made.

The appeal was allowed, the order below was set aside, the relief sought on the motion was granted, and costs of both the motion and the appeal were fixed at $5,000 each.

The applicant wife brought a motion to quash an order of the Supreme Court of Canada, arguing the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the respondent husband's appeal.

She contended that because the husband did not obtain leave to appeal or an extension of time within the 30-day period prescribed by section 18(2) of the Divorce Act, the Court had no jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court dismissed the motion, holding that because the Court had fixed a date for the leave application hearing within the 30-day period, this act constituted an extension of time and properly brought the case before the Court.