Family and Matrimonial Law - ODC

The appellant father brought an urgent motion to stay an interim order permitting the respondent mother to relocate with their two young children to Winnipeg.

The motion judge had released a 'bottom-line decision' with reasons to follow.

The Divisional Court granted the stay, finding that the lack of reasons and vague terms of the order raised a serious issue for appeal, and that the children would suffer irreparable harm to their relationship with their father if they moved before the appeal was determined.

The balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo pending the motion for leave to appeal.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a lower court decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Healey J. dated June 15, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The self-represented appellant mother sought an urgent stay of a parenting order pending appeal, specifically to prevent the respondent father from changing the children's school.

The request was made just days before the new school term commenced.

The court noted that the father had final decision-making authority under the existing order and that a similar urgent request had recently been denied by another judge.

The court denied the request for an urgent stay, finding that the timing made it impossible to properly and fairly consider the request prior to the beginning of the school term.

The moving party sought an extension of time to seek leave to appeal a temporary order granting the responding party sole care of their child pending further agreement or order.

The moving party missed the original hearing due to communication issues after insisting on receiving materials by mail or fax.

The court applied the test for extending time and found that the moving party did not form an intention to appeal within the required period, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit as it did not meet the high threshold for leave to appeal an interlocutory order.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding party.

The moving party sought a stay of two endorsements made by a case management judge pending a motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The underlying endorsements had dismissed several of the moving party's appeals as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found no serious issue to be tried, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience did not favour a stay.

The motion for a stay was dismissed.

The moving party father sought an extension of time to file a notice of motion for leave to appeal a temporary order granting decision-making responsibility, primary residence, and child support to the respondent mother.

The father served his notice of motion outside the 15-day period required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court applied the test for extending time and found that the father had not formed an intention to appeal within the relevant period, offered no explanation for the delay, and his proposed appeal lacked merit.

The motion for an extension of time was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis.

The applicants, two Indigenous representative groups, brought motions for a stay of a Minister's Directive and Designations that authorized three children's aid societies to provide child and family services in Thunder Bay.

The applicants argued the Directive interfered with their inherent right to self-government and was issued without proper consultation or statutory compliance.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicants failed to establish irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motions for a stay were dismissed.

The respondent children's aid society brought a motion to dismiss the parents' appeal of a Crown wardship order for delay.

The parents had failed to order transcripts or perfect their appeal within the required timelines under the Family Law Rules, instead engaging in numerous other unsuccessful legal proceedings.

The Divisional Court applied the factors for dismissing a child protection appeal for delay, finding that the parents had no prospect of ordering the transcripts, the delay prejudiced the children's need for permanency, and the appeal lacked merit.

The motion was granted and the appeal was dismissed.

The children's aid society and the prospective adoptive parents sought judicial review of decisions by the Child and Family Services Review Board regarding the adoption placement of a child.

The Board had rescinded the society's decision to refuse another foster family's adoption application and confirmed the termination of the prospective adoptive parents' adoption placement.

The Divisional Court allowed the applications for judicial review, finding that the Board's conduct during the hearing, including uneven treatment of the foster families and inappropriate questioning of witnesses, gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court set aside the Board's decisions and ordered a new hearing before a newly constituted panel to determine the child's current best interests.

The husband sought leave to appeal an interlocutory family law order that dismissed his motion for temporary sole custody of the parties' special needs children and granted the wife's motion regarding the transfer of the matrimonial home.

The husband argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the motion judge erred in calculating his share of the home's equity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, noting the husband had failed to follow court directions regarding the children's lawyer and that the financial calculations were appropriate.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion in writing for leave to appeal a final child support order made under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002.

The Divisional Court held that leave to appeal was not required because the order was final, not interlocutory.

However, the applicant was out of time to file the appeal.

Rather than dismissing the motion, the court stayed it and granted the applicant leave to amend the motion to proceed as a motion for an extension of time to file an appeal.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to change child and spousal support.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the children did not spend 40% of their time with him and in her assessment of his income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings regarding the parenting schedule, the imputation of income, and the lack of a material change in circumstances.

The husband sought leave to appeal an interim order granting the wife exclusive possession of a condominium located in Florida for one week per month, and a stay of that order pending appeal.

The court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the order because the Family Law Act limits exclusive possession to matrimonial homes situated in Ontario, and the motions judge did not fully consider whether the court could exercise in personam jurisdiction over foreign property.

However, the court dismissed the motion for a stay pending appeal, finding the husband would not suffer irreparable harm.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal to the Divisional Court on the basis that the appellant failed to comply with previous court orders requiring financial disclosure and payment of costs.

Applying the three-part test under Family Law Rule 14(23), the court declined to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying appellant given her history of non-compliance.

However, recognizing the importance of the core issue on appeal, the court ordered that the appeal would be quashed only if the appellant failed to pay the outstanding costs and provide the required disclosure by specified dates.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Director of Adoption Services to place their international adoption on hold.

The hold was initiated after the estranged sister of one of the applicants made historic sexual abuse allegations just days before the applicants were scheduled to travel to finalize the adoption.

The Director placed the hold and required a new home study without providing the applicants an opportunity to respond or detailing the allegations.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the Director breached procedural fairness by failing to give the applicants a meaningful opportunity to respond.

The court also found the requirement for a further home study unreasonable given the unchallenged expert evidence refuting the risk.

The Director's decision was quashed and the original approval was reinstated.

The father sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that permitted the mother to travel to Turkey with their four-and-a-half-year-old child for several months.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order, which was based on the best interests of the child, and noting that the issue did not involve matters of public importance as required by Rule 62.02(4).

The appellant wife appealed an interim order restraining her from sending scurrilous letters to third parties about her husband, and a sealing order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that such letters can constitute harassment under section 46 of the Family Law Act.

The court held that while the order infringed the appellant's freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter, it was justified under section 1 as a proportionate measure given its narrow scope and limited duration.

The sealing order was also upheld.

The appellant husband appealed an order varying spousal support.

The parties separated in 1970 and spousal support was increased by consent in 1983 after the respondent wife was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis.

In 1991, the wife became totally disabled, and the motion judge found this constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Bracklow v. Bracklow, and held that the wife was entitled to support given the disadvantage imposed by the marriage breakdown, her need, and the husband's ability to pay.

The appellant appealed a decision appointing the deceased's spouse and another individual as estate trustees.

The Divisional Court held that under s. 6(8) of the Family Law Act, a surviving spouse who elects to take their share under the Act rather than the will cannot act as an executor, as the will is interpreted as if they had predeceased the testator.

Furthermore, due to conflict between the parties, the court found it preferable to appoint an independent executor.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment varied to appoint an independent estate trustee.