ODC 2010

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $1,000 for altering Caribana costumes.

The trial judge found the respondent was entitled to $20 per costume for 50 costumes, despite the respondent claiming $40 per costume and the appellant claiming the work was voluntary.

The Divisional Court set aside the trial judge's decision regarding the costumes, finding the reasons insufficient to explain why a contract existed or how the $1,000 quantum was justified.

A new trial was ordered on the costume issue, while findings regarding a damaged windshield and costume credits were upheld.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for an interim preservation order regarding the matrimonial home pending appeal, the respondent sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court found that the respondent's offer to settle was more favourable than the judgment and that the applicant's conduct unnecessarily increased costs.

The court awarded the respondent costs fixed at $6,500 on a substantial indemnity basis, payable within 30 days.

The plaintiffs appealed a decision upholding the defendants' claim of litigation privilege over an expert engineer's file.

Before the appeal was heard, the defendants produced the expert's report and underlying file, rendering the appeal moot.

The Divisional Court awarded the plaintiffs $15,000 in costs for the appeal, the leave motion, and the appeal below, finding that the defendants' tactical delay in obtaining the report and claiming privilege unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings and increased costs, particularly given the defendants' spoliation defence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal finding that it was a 'builder' under the applicable consumer protection legislation.

The appellant argued the Tribunal erred by not using a quantitative analysis of the work and materials supplied.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal's preference for a qualitative or functional test over a quantitative test was not an error of law.

The Tribunal's conclusion that the appellant had primary control of the construction and was therefore a builder was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal regarding the calculation of his long-term average earnings.

The applicant, a drywall installer, argued his benefits should be based on his gross earnings.

The Tribunal concluded that, for fairness, his average earnings should be calculated based on the net income he declared for tax purposes, accounting for his business expenses.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal's decisions were reasonable and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Assessment Review Board (ARB), arguing the ARB lacked jurisdiction to determine the legality of omitted assessments.

The applicant contended this was a matter of liability for assessment, which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court pursuant to s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the issue was not one of liability or exemption, but rather the quantum of the assessment and the assessor's power to retroactively add value.

Therefore, the matter fell within the ARB's jurisdiction under the Assessment Act.

The defendants, who were successful at trial, brought a motion for security for costs of the plaintiff's appeal under Rule 61.06(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the plaintiff lacked sufficient assets in Ontario and that there was good reason to believe the appeal was frivolous and vexatious, as the trial judge had made strong adverse credibility findings against the plaintiff and rejected his expert evidence.

The court ordered the plaintiff to pay $10,000 into court as security for the defendants' costs of the appeal.

The applicant union sought judicial review of a Labour Arbitrator's decision interpreting a collective agreement provision on protective clothing.

The employer required metatarsal safety boots, which the union argued constituted an 'exceptional' working condition obligating the employer to provide them.

The Arbitrator found the requirement was merely an enhanced safety policy, not an exceptional working condition.

Applying the reasonableness standard of review from Dunsmuir, the Divisional Court held that the Arbitrator's contextual interpretation fell within a range of possible acceptable outcomes.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The TD defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiff's claims.

The plaintiff alleged that the TD defendants transferred her share of lottery winnings out of the jurisdiction at her ex-boyfriend's request, despite knowing of her interest and a court preservation order.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal solely on the issue of whether the plaintiff's claim for a declaration of contempt of court should be struck, finding reason to doubt the correctness of allowing such a claim in a civil action.

Leave to appeal was denied for the negligence, breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and preservation order validity issues.

The City of Toronto appealed an Ontario Municipal Board decision finding that Home Depot's application to develop a major retail store in an Employment Area did not constitute a 'conversion' under the Growth Plan.

The Divisional Court held that the standard of review for the Board's interpretation of planning documents is reasonableness.

The Court found the Board's conclusion—that major retail use was already contemplated in the Official Plan and thus not a conversion—was reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondents applied to the City of Toronto for demolition permits.

After 19 months without a decision, they appealed to the Ontario Municipal Board.

The City argued the appeal was out of time under section 3 of the City of Toronto Act, 1985.

The Board found it had jurisdiction, concluding that the time limits conflicted with section 33(4) of the Planning Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the City's appeal, finding no conflict between the statutes but holding that the time limit in section 3 was directory rather than mandatory, and that the appeal was filed in time.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision refusing to add a nurse and a private clinic as defendants in a medical malpractice action after the expiry of the limitation period.

The Master found the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the nurse's identity within the limitation period, and dismissed the motion to add the clinic without prejudice to bringing a new motion on proper material.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, finding no error of law in applying the Limitations Act, 2002, which prohibits adding parties after the limitation period expires.

The court allowed the cross-appeal in part, imposing a 30-day time limit for the plaintiff to bring the second motion regarding the clinic.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing his motion for an interlocutory injunction against the Canada Revenue Agency.

The motion judge had found that the Federal Court had exclusive jurisdiction and that the plaintiff failed to establish irreparable harm.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the plaintiff failed to satisfy the test under Rule 62.02(4) as there was no issue of broad general importance and it was not desirable to grant leave given the parallel proceeding in the Federal Court.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal from a Small Claims Court decision, the successful respondents sought costs.

The respondents, who were self-represented at trial but retained counsel for the appeal, claimed substantial indemnity costs of $7,611.62 or partial indemnity costs of $4,593.75.

The appellant conceded costs were payable but argued they should be fixed at $4,500.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Rule 57.01 and section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court fixed the respondents' costs at $5,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The applicant Children's Aid Society sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The Board had rescinded the Society's decision to refuse an adoption application by the respondent foster parents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board's mandate under s. 144 of the Child and Family Services Act allows it to make substantive determinations regarding the best interests of the child, rather than being limited to procedural fairness.

The Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness and found the Board's decision to place the children for adoption with the respondents was reasonable.

The appellant sought to appeal a final order striking her two Superior Court proceedings, which claimed damages of $8.2 million and $100,000.

The Divisional Court found that an appeal of a final order in these amounts falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal.

Consequently, the appeals were transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal regarding the administration and calculation of her entitlements under the Ontario Works Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that appeals under the Act are restricted to questions of law.

Because the appellant raised only administrative and factual complaints, the court found no error of law.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Securities Commission decision ordering the disclosure of his compelled evidence to co-respondents in a regulatory proceeding.

The applicant argued the evidence was privileged based on an undertaking from Commission staff and that the Charter applied due to the risk of quasi-criminal proceedings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commission's interpretation of the undertaking was reasonable and that the Charter did not apply to the administrative proceeding.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a FSCO Director's Delegate's decision.

The respondent was injured in an accident and subsequently filed an amended tax return reporting previously unreported income.

The Director's Delegate held that under s. 64.1(2) of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, the respondent was entitled to have his income replacement benefits adjusted to reflect the higher income reported in the amended return.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the standard of review was reasonableness and that the Director's Delegate's interpretation of s. 64.1(2) was both reasonable and correct.

During a summary judgment motion involving a mini-trial, the motions judge ordered that a paragraph in the self-represented respondent's affidavit be treated as a counterclaim for one million dollars against the appellant bank.

The bank appealed this order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal as premature, holding that an appeal of a ruling made during a summary judgment motion should normally await the completion of the motion, similar to rulings made during a trial.