Workers' Compensation - OCA

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing her action against the respondents under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure without leave to amend.

The appellant alleged that the respondents breached a settlement agreement by: (1) appealing her WSIB benefits claim in violation of a release clause, and (2) breaching confidentiality provisions by disclosing settlement agreement information in an affidavit filed in a class proceeding.

The motion judge struck both claims and dismissed the action against the individual respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claims could not succeed, and granted leave to amend the claim against the individual respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application for judicial review against the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal.

The application concerned the denial of reimbursement for non-prescription pain medication, cessation of coverage for prescription medication, and denial of benefits for certain dates in 1998.

The application judge found no urgency as required by the Judicial Review Procedure Act and dismissed the application as premature, as the appellant had not exhausted the administrative appeal process.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no legal error in the application judge's analysis regarding the reasonableness of the WSIB's request for updated medical information.

The appellant, injured in 1997 while unloading goods from a truck, brought a civil action against the Workplace Safety & Insurance Board and the Workplace Safety & Insurance Appeals Tribunal seeking compensatory damages of $1,710,455 and punitive damages of $15 million.

The respondents moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and to strike the pleadings as disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The motion judge granted the motions, holding that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over claims against these bodies and that relief must be sought through judicial review.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction and in striking the pleadings for failing to disclose a cause of action for bad faith or misfeasance in public office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory scheme under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act vests exclusive jurisdiction in the Board and Tribunal, and that circumventing this scheme through a civil action constitutes an abuse of process.

The court also held that bad faith is not independently actionable and that the pleadings failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for misfeasance in public office.

The appellant sought long-term disability (LTD) benefits from the respondent insurer following a motor vehicle accident while working.

The appellant initially collected Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) benefits but retroactively elected to pursue a tort action against the other driver.

The respondent sought to offset LTD benefits by the amount of WSIB benefits for which the appellant was eligible, rather than the amount actually received.

The motion judge granted summary judgment for the respondent, finding no meaningful distinction from the precedent in Richer v. Manulife Financial.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, dismissing the appeal with costs.

A proposed class action brought by injured workers who were denied full non-economic loss benefits under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act on the basis of asymptomatic pre-existing conditions.

The plaintiff alleged that the denials resulted from an internal policy illegally adopted to save money.

The action was pleaded in misfeasance in public office, bad faith, and negligence.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim as disclosing no cause of action, finding the claims fell within the privative clause.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the misfeasance in public office and negligence claims were properly pleaded and not plainly barred by the privative clause.

Bad faith was found not to be a free-standing cause of action but rather an element of misfeasance in public office.

The appellant union filed grievances claiming damages for employees' exposure to second-hand smoke in correctional facilities.

The Grievance Settlement Board determined it lacked jurisdiction to award damages for injuries compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act or the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, regardless of whether the claim was framed in tort or contract.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the substance of the claim precludes the Board from awarding damages for compensable injuries.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion under Rule 59.06 to set aside a previous decision dismissing his action for abuse of process.

He argued that under s. 31 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, only the Appeals Tribunal could determine whether his right to maintain a lawsuit could be taken away.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the previous dismissal of his action was upheld on the alternate ground of abuse of process, as he had claimed compensation from the Board, was denied, and had a right of appeal under the Act which he had not pursued.

The court held he could not circumvent his statutory appeal right by suing in court.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action against the respondent employer.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellants' claim was a separate and independent tort of negligent misrepresentation regarding the process to be followed in pursuing a claim, rather than a claim arising in respect of a worker's injury.

The order dismissing the action was set aside.

The respondent was denied workers' compensation benefits by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal, which found no causal link between his 1979 workplace back injury and his current back problems.

The Divisional Court allowed the respondent's application for judicial review, finding the Tribunal's decision patently unreasonable.

The Tribunal appealed.

Applying the newly established Dunsmuir standard of reasonableness, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the Tribunal's decision, holding that the Divisional Court erred by reweighing the evidence and that the Tribunal's factual findings were supported by the record and entitled to deference.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their negligence claims against the respondent employer.

The claims arose from the employment of one of the appellants and alleged failure to provide a safe working environment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the tort claims as framed were barred by the Workers Compensation Act, though noting that any wrongful dismissal claim could proceed.

The respondent was assaulted at work and claimed benefits for traumatic vertebrobasilar ischemia (TVBI).

The Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denied the claim, preferring medical evidence that the assault did not cause TVBI.

The Tribunal later upheld its decision on reconsideration after reviewing new evidence from a co-worker.

The Divisional Court quashed the reconsideration decision as patently unreasonable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and reinstated the Tribunal's decision, finding that the Tribunal had properly considered the evidence, resolved the conflicting medical opinions, and reached a reasonable conclusion.

The appellants appealed a decision dismissing their motion on the basis that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction because the matter was in the nature of a judicial review application.

The appellants argued the Superior Court had inherent jurisdiction to decline to approve a settlement by the Workers' Compensation Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision to compromise the action was an exercise of a statutory power of decision, and any challenge must be brought by way of judicial review before the Divisional Court.