Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

A secondary market misrepresentation class action was brought against a coal mining company and its former CFOs and directors following the company's restatement of financial statements for 2010-2012.

The motion judge granted leave to proceed against the company but denied leave against the individual defendants, finding they had established a reasonable investigation defence.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the motion judge erred by treating the leave motion as a mini-trial and failing to consider significant credibility issues and gaps in the evidentiary record.

The court found that the defendants' position—that they should evade liability because they previously made material misrepresentations in the restatement but are now telling the truth—was inconsistent with fundamental securities regulation principles requiring scrupulous continuous disclosure.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment ordering the return of a $2,000,000 deposit to the respondent purchaser after a failed commercial real estate transaction.

The dispute centered on whether the respondent fulfilled its contractual obligation to apply in good faith to assume existing mortgages before rejecting the terms offered.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's interpretation of the contract and his conclusion that a formal application would have been an exercise in futility.

The appellant was successful in an oppression action against the respondents.

The respondents had served an offer to settle nine calendar days before trial, which technically amounted to fewer than seven days under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial judge treated the offer as a valid Rule 49 offer and awarded costs accordingly.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the 'no near miss' policy applies to the timing requirement under rule 49.03, meaning the offer was not a valid Rule 49 offer.

However, the Court upheld the costs award, finding that the trial judge was entitled to take the offer into account under his residual discretion pursuant to rule 49.13.

The appellants purchased a vehicle with a malfunctioning air conditioner and sued the selling dealer, the supplying dealer, and various individuals for over $400,000.

After settling with the selling dealer for a full refund plus additional compensation, the appellants continued their action against the supplying dealer and its manager.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the remaining claims, finding no contractual relationship, no evidence of negligence, and that any damages were already fully compensated.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a noting in default and default judgment.

The motion judge found that while the appellant had a triable defence, he failed to move expeditiously, waiting 28 months after the noting in default to proceed with the motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding ample evidence to support the conclusion on delay and confirming that the motion judge properly considered the prejudice to the parties and the appellant's litigation conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sued her insurer for caregiver benefits and extra-contractual damages.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding it was statute-barred because it was commenced more than two years after the insurer's clear refusal to pay benefits.

The trial judge also found the appellant failed to establish entitlement to caregiver benefits beyond the 104-week period and dismissed her claims for bad faith and mental distress.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, including his evidentiary ruling that medical reports in a document brief not referred to by witnesses were inadmissible for the truth of their contents.

The appellant, an investment advisor, appealed a decision dismissing his motion for summary judgment.

The respondent, his former employer, had sued him for indemnity under his employment agreement after settling a claim brought by former clients.

The appellant argued the claim was time-barred under s. 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, as it was commenced more than two years after the respondent was served with the clients' statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that s. 18 applies to all claims for contribution and indemnity, whether arising in tort or contract.

The action was dismissed as time-barred.

The appellant's claim for long-term disability benefits was denied in 1995.

She commenced an action in 2006, which was dismissed on summary judgment for being outside the two-year limitation period prescribed by her employee benefit plan.

On appeal, the appellant argued the term 'covered event' was ambiguous and that a rolling limitation period should apply.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the term 'covered event' was clear in context and occurred only once or twice, not monthly, precluding a rolling limitation period.

The appellant defaulted on a loan from a business associate, who subsequently assigned the debt to the respondent.

The respondent successfully sued the appellant for the balance of the loan.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the loan agreement was unenforceable due to the law against champerty and maintenance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the assignment of a debt is not a champertous transaction and is valid under section 53 of the Conveyancing and Law of Property Act.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's order for a re-trial, which was based on a finding that the jury's answers regarding damages were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the jury's answers were not inconsistent and that there was evidence to support their findings on past and future wage loss and general damages.

The jury's verdict was reinstated, and the issue of costs was remitted to the trial judge.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision to vary a consent stay order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge had the power to vary the order under Rule 59.06 due to changed circumstances.

The court upheld the finding that the appellants acted in bad faith during the arbitration and mediation process, precluding them from relying on the procedural protections of those provisions.

Costs of the appeal were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a decision declaring that a partnership did not exist between the parties under the Partnerships Act.

The parties had collaborated to develop and deliver continuing professional development programs.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in law by failing to analyze the provisions of the agreements and the circumstances in relation to the legal elements of the test for partnership.

Applying the correct test, the Court concluded that the parties were carrying on a business in common with a view to profit, and declared that a partnership existed.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court to determine the value of partnership assets.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to add two further plaintiffs to the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the two-year limitation period had expired and that this was an attempt to add new parties rather than correct a misnomer.

The appeal was dismissed, though the court noted that the validity of an assignment agreement between the appellants and a third party remained undetermined.

The appellants, organizations promoting traditional conceptions of morality, sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application challenging the constitutionality of prostitution provisions in the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed their motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, noting the appellants had a real, substantial, and identifiable interest and an important perspective distinct from the parties.

The appeal was allowed and the motion to intervene was granted.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a trial decision regarding the conversion of a commercial building into a residential condominium.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent Lomico was a 'declarant' under the Condominium Act, that a lease of HVAC equipment to the condominium corporation was null and void because the equipment formed part of the common elements, and that the developers breached the construction warranty by failing to substantially renovate the parking garage.

The Court dismissed the developers' cross-appeal, affirming that unit owners have an appurtenant property right to lease parking spaces at market rates.

Damages and market rates were directed to a reference.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application.

The respondent conceded that there were no issues of res judicata or issue estoppel arising from the lower court's decision.

The Court of Appeal agreed and dismissed the appeal, noting that the appellants were pursuing similar claims in a separate action and there was no basis to continue both proceedings.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed an order granting the respondent relief from forfeiture of a 10% interest in a land development project.

The respondent had acquired the interest from her former common-law husband through a matrimonial order, subject to the appellants' security interest for a loan.

After the husband defaulted, the respondent tendered full payment of the loan shortly after the deadline.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the respondent met the three-part test for relief from forfeiture, noting her conduct was reasonable and there was a substantial disparity between the value of the forfeited property and the damage caused by the breach.

The appellant portfolio manager appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for mismanaging the respondent's investment account by retaining excessive short-term investments and purchasing a speculative stock.

The trial judge had dismissed the main part of the respondent's claim but allowed these two specific claims.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because he incorporated large portions of the parties' facta, and challenged the findings on negligence, ratification, mitigation, and damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the trial judge's incorporation of facta was ill-advised, the reasons as a whole were sufficient for appellate review and the factual findings were supported by the evidence.

The insured municipality suffered a catastrophic bacterial infection of its water supply, leading to investigations and a class action lawsuit.

The municipality's insurer appointed counsel to defend the civil actions under a reservation of rights.

Dissatisfied with the appointed counsel's advice and the reservation of rights, the municipality retained independent counsel and sought reimbursement from the insurer.

The Court of Appeal held that an insurer is only required to surrender control of the defence and pay for independent counsel if there is a reasonable apprehension of conflict of interest.

As the reservation of rights was based on policy limits and exclusions rather than the insured's conduct, no conflict existed.

The insurer was not obliged to pay for the independent counsel.

The City of Kingston moved for leave to intervene in an appeal between the City of Sudbury and Union Gas Limited regarding the interpretation of a franchise agreement and the jurisdiction of the Ontario Energy Board under s. 10 of the Municipal Franchises Act.

Kingston argued there was a common question of law with its own pending appeal involving Union Gas.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the factual and legal contexts of the two proceedings were significantly different and that the disadvantages of permitting the intervention outweighed the advantages.