OCA 2007

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding her jointly and severally liable for general damages and solely liable for exemplary damages arising from historical sexual assaults committed by her ex-husband against the respondent.

The trial judge found the appellant was present during the abuse, owed a fiduciary duty to the respondent, and failed to protect her.

The Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability and general damages, but set aside the exemplary damages award, finding the trial judge failed to assess whether the general damages were insufficient to achieve the goals of punishment and deterrence.

The applicant sought to reopen appeals from 2005 and 2006 Ontario Review Board dispositions that had been dismissed as moot.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to reopen, noting the applicant had an outstanding appeal against his current 2007 disposition that raised the identical issues.

However, the Court granted the applicant's motion to appoint counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for his pending appeal, finding it desirable in the interests of justice.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding that the parties had reached a binding settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal found that there was a triable issue as to whether an agreement was reached, as the appellant had insisted on personal releases from other shareholders which were never provided, and subsequent correspondence from the respondent introduced new terms such as a non-competition clause.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment below set aside.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its claims for negligent misrepresentation and intentional interference with economic relations arising from a timber allocation dispute under an Overlapping Licence Agreement.

The appellant also raised a new claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, declining to hear the new fiduciary duty claim and upholding the trial judge's factual findings that the appellant did not reasonably rely on the alleged misrepresentations and that the respondent had no intention to injure the appellant's economic relations.

The motions judge ordered the Children's Lawyer to provide reasons for declining to prepare a further report in a custody and access dispute, and to show cause why it should not be found in contempt.

The Children's Lawyer appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under the Courts of Justice Act, the Children's Lawyer has absolute discretion to decide whether to participate or provide a report.

Applying the Baker factors, the Court found no statutory or common law duty for the Children's Lawyer to provide reasons for its decision.

The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of importing cocaine, the second of which was committed while on judicial interim release for the first.

He was sentenced to a total of 70 months' imprisonment based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued the sentence did not sufficiently reflect his cooperation with authorities and was based on an incorrect sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with a sentence imposed following a joint submission, especially given the aggravating factor of committing the second offence while on release.

The appellant was convicted of various assault and firearms-related offences arising from a robbery and shooting at an auto repair shop.

He appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury on the permissible uses of out-of-court statements made by the victim and his brother, and that the trial judge's review of the appellant's statement on arrest was unfair.

He also appealed his seven-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions, which were responsive to the defence's position at trial.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the brutal nature of the shooting and the appellant's lengthy criminal record.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their action for a declaration of ownership or an easement over a small triangle of land on a shared driveway.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the respondents had established adverse possession, noting the finding was based on a reasonable assessment of witness testimony.

The Court also upheld the conclusion that no prescriptive easement was acquired, as there was no evidence the appellants were prevented from accessing their utility fixtures.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown conceded that the appeal must be allowed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an application for certiorari to quash a committal for trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the appellant knew death was a likely consequence of the bodily harm inflicted.

The committal for second degree murder was quashed and a committal for manslaughter was substituted on consent.

The appellant appealed from an order upholding a committal order made by a preliminary hearing judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for the reasons given by the reviewing judge, while endorsing the reviewing judge's remark that the extent of the preliminary hearing judge's questioning of witnesses was difficult to understand or condone.

The appellant appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and possession offences, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements made by an alleged co-conspirator to an undercover police officer.

The Court of Appeal held that the co-conspirator's statements fell within the 'rare case' exception where a traditional hearsay exception must yield to the principled approach.

Because the co-conspirator was available to testify and the statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability, the necessity and reliability requirements were not met.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a judgment holding them liable as guarantors of a line of credit extended to an automobile dealership.

They argued that a forged Acknowledgement provided to the bank vitiated their earlier guarantees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the bank never sought to enforce the forged document, the appellants suffered no prejudice, and the guarantor knowingly provided subsequent valid Acknowledgements.

Arguments regarding breach of a side agreement and lack of independent legal advice were also dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's refusal to reconsider a previous decision to surrender the applicant for extradition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, holding that the Minister's decision was entitled to significant deference.

The court found the Minister reasonably concluded that the applicant raised no new substantive issues and appropriately prioritized the need for finality in the extradition context.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by removing the possibility of an acquittal from the jury's consideration and directing them that they must, at a minimum, convict him of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, relying on Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence establishing that a trial judge cannot direct a jury to convict absent a formal admission of all essential elements of an offence.

Since the appellant's formal admissions did not cover all essential elements of manslaughter, he was deprived of his right to a jury trial.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample support in the record for the motion judge's conclusion that the appellants had failed to comply with previous court orders.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $7,500.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal noted that the sentencing judge's reasons were not helpful and failed to address mitigating factors such as the guilty plea and rehabilitative efforts.

However, the Court ultimately concluded that the total sentences imposed were fit in all the circumstances and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant, who was adopted as an infant, sought to discover the identity of her birth father.

She challenged the constitutionality of the disclosure provisions of the Child and Family Services Act and the Vital Statistics Act, arguing they violated her rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the provisions did not violate equality rights as they did not make stereotypical assumptions, nor did they infringe section 7, as unconditional disclosure of third-party identifying information is not a principle of fundamental justice.

The appellant, an African-American man who fled to Canada in 1969 after being charged with the attempted murder of a Chicago police officer, appealed his committal for extradition and sought judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

He argued that the extradition judge failed to properly assess the reliability of inconsistent witness statements and that his surrender would be unjust and oppressive due to systemic racism in the Chicago justice system.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and the application for judicial review, finding that the evidence met the threshold for reliability and sufficiency, and that the Minister reasonably concluded the appellant would not face persecution or be denied a fair trial if returned to the United States.

The appellants made an offer to settle that was stated to be irrevocable until one minute after the commencement of trial.

Before the respondent accepted the offer, the appellants revoked it and made a new offer.

The respondent sought to enforce the original offer, and the motion judge granted the request, finding that Rule 49.04(1) was subject to the irrevocability provision.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that Rule 49 is a self-contained scheme and Rule 49.04(1) expressly permits an offer to settle to be withdrawn at any time before it is accepted, regardless of whether it is stated to be irrevocable.