Neil Michael Abramson

The appellants appealed a contempt sentencing order from the Superior Court.

The respondent had brought an action claiming monies advanced to the appellants were not properly disbursed and that the appellants lacked a proper accounting system.

An interim order required the appellants to account for monies received, disclose documents to an appointed accounting firm, and pay unpaid accounts.

The appellants were found in contempt for failing to comply with the accounting and disclosure requirements.

On appeal, the appellants did not contest the contempt finding but challenged the sentencing as based on an erroneous finding that they had not purged their contempt and as disproportionate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred in refusing to admit fresh evidence regarding purge of contempt, and that the sentence was disproportionate.

A pharmacist challenged the Ontario College of Pharmacists' jurisdiction to prosecute discipline charges after the College failed to comply with mandatory statutory timelines for processing a written complaint under section 25 of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

Instead, the College accepted the complainant's withdrawal and proceeded with a registrar-initiated investigation under section 75.

The Divisional Court quashed the charges, finding the College lost jurisdiction through non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that written complaints may be withdrawn when the College agrees and the matter proceeds through another statutory process with full procedural safeguards.

The court balanced the public interest in regulating the profession against the accused member's fair hearing rights, finding no procedural unfairness or prejudice to the respondent.

In a dental discipline proceeding, the member admitted allegations of unnecessary dental services, excessive or unreasonable fees, recordkeeping deficiencies, and improper insurance claims affecting multiple patients over many years.

The panel accepted an agreed statement of facts and found professional misconduct under the governing health-professions legislation and regulations.

On penalty, the panel raised concerns about the member’s prior discipline history, the remediation evidence, and the proposed suspension length, but ultimately applied the joint-submission standard from Anthony-Cook and accepted the proposed sanction.

The order imposed a reprimand, a two-month suspension, education in recordkeeping and billing, practice monitoring, suspension-related restrictions, and $5,000 in costs.

In a dental discipline proceeding, the member admitted professional misconduct arising from diagnosing and providing unnecessary restorative treatment, failing to use appropriate radiographic technique, prescribing antibiotics without adequate diagnostic foundation, failing to identify substandard restorations performed under supervision, and deficient recordkeeping.

The panel found the admissions voluntary, informed and unequivocal, and was satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the misconduct was established.

The panel accepted a joint submission on penalty and costs, emphasizing public protection, specific and general deterrence, and rehabilitation.

A one-month suspension, remedial coursework, practice monitoring, reprimand, and $3,000 in costs were ordered.

A discipline panel found a dentist guilty of professional misconduct after he admitted failing to complete a specified continuing education or remediation program ordered by the complaints committee and failing to respond appropriately to repeated regulatory communications.

The panel held that the admitted facts established both a failure to reply within a reasonable time to a written enquiry and conduct that would reasonably be regarded by members as unprofessional.

Accepting a joint submission on penalty and costs, the panel imposed a reprimand, 24 months of practice monitoring, counselling at the member's expense, and costs.

The panel emphasized public protection, deterrence, rehabilitation, and the importance of compliance with regulator-ordered remediation.

The applicant dentist sought judicial review of an interim order by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) suspending his licence without a hearing.

The suspension followed criminal charges in Florida for indecent exposure.

The Divisional Court quashed the suspension, finding the ICRC's decision unreasonable because there was no evidence that the applicant's conduct was likely to expose his patients to harm, the ICRC improperly relied on a 1994 complaint, and it failed to provide reasons for rejecting uncontradicted expert psychiatric evidence and the applicant's offer of a monitoring term.

In a professional discipline proceeding, the member admitted allegations arising from delayed diagnosis and inadequate management of a patient’s cancerous oral lesion, together with deficient recordkeeping.

The panel accepted the agreed statement of facts and found professional misconduct under the Health Professions Procedural Code and the applicable dentistry regulations.

Accepting a joint submission, the panel imposed a reprimand, a one-month suspension, practice conditions including monitoring and inspections for up to twenty-four months, and costs.

A publication ban protected the identity of the patient.

The applicant pharmacist sought judicial review of a decision by the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Pharmacists dismissing his motion to quash disciplinary charges.

The charges arose from a complaint that the College failed to process according to the mandatory statutory requirements under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

Instead of following the complaint process, the College invited the complainant to withdraw her complaint in favour of a Registrar's investigation under s. 75(1)(a).

The Divisional Court held that the College's failure to strictly comply with the statutory complaint procedures deprived it of jurisdiction to refer the matter to discipline.

The application for judicial review was granted, the Panel's decision was quashed, and the College was prohibited from prosecuting the charges.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board.

The Board had directed the Inquiry, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) to reconsider whether the applicant breached s. 7 of the Advertising Regulation regarding steering.

The Divisional Court found that the Board unreasonably focused on only one of the ICRC's reasons for deferring consideration of s. 7, ignoring the ICRC's valid conclusion that a caution for other advertising breaches was a sufficient disposition.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the Board's direction was set aside.

Four optometrists faced allegations of professional misconduct related to inadequate eye examinations, poor record keeping, and improper record storage while participating in a School Vision Care program.

The members pled guilty to the allegations and submitted an Agreed Statement of Facts.

The Discipline Committee accepted a joint submission on penalty, which included a reprimand, a two-week suspension (which could be suspended upon completion of an essay), continuing education requirements, practice inspections, and costs of $5,000 per member.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a requirement that he be cautioned in person regarding his advertising practices.

The complaints committee found that the applicant's advertisements for weight loss clinics did not constitute 'the member's medical services' under the regulations, as he had no therapeutic relationship with the patients.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the committee's interpretation of its own regulations to be reasonable and declining to address a newly raised Charter challenge due to the lack of an evidentiary record.

The appellant pharmacist challenged the constitutional validity of the mandatory revocation provisions of the Health Professions Procedural Code after engaging in a consensual sexual relationship with a patient.

He argued the provisions intruded into federal criminal law jurisdiction by regulating morality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the provisions are in pith and substance the regulation of health care professionals under provincial jurisdiction, aimed at protecting the public and maintaining the integrity of the professional-patient relationship.

Following a defamation trial where the plaintiff was awarded $10,000 in general damages, both parties sought costs.

The plaintiffs claimed over $417,000 in substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant sought over $165,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court noted the exorbitant legal fees incurred by both sides, totaling nearly $800,000, and emphasized the principle of proportionality.

Considering the plaintiff's modest success, the failure to move the action to the simplified procedure, and the defendant's mixed success in defending the claims, the court concluded that the outcome was close to a draw.

Consequently, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

In a defamation action between competing physicians operating weight-loss practices, the plaintiffs challenged statements in a diet book, website extracts, and a television interview criticizing the plaintiff physician's diet program.

The court held that most of the impugned comments were expressions of opinion on a matter of public interest and were protected by fair comment, but found liability for comments implying false claims about metabolism-boosting injections and for remarks in a Cantonese television interview disparaging the plaintiff's medical role.

Responsible communication was found inapplicable, and justification was not established absent expert evidence.

General damages of $10,000 were awarded to the individual plaintiff only, with no aggravated or punitive damages.

A pharmacist challenged the constitutionality of mandatory licence revocation provisions under the Health Professions Procedural Code after pleading guilty to sexual abuse of a patient based on a consensual sexual relationship.

The applicant argued the provisions were ultra vires the province because, in pith and substance, they regulated sexual morality and therefore fell within Parliament’s criminal law power.

The Superior Court held that the dominant purpose of the provisions was the protection of the public through the regulation of professional standards governing health care practitioners.

The provisions were therefore within the province’s jurisdiction over property and civil rights under s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court also held the Attorney General was estopped from challenging the court’s jurisdiction because the issue had already been determined in earlier proceedings.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee dismissing a motion to reconsider its order suspending the mandatory revocation of the respondent pharmacist's certificate of registration for sexual abuse.

The appellant argued the Committee lacked jurisdiction to suspend a mandatory revocation under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

Applying a reasonableness standard of review, the Divisional Court held that the Committee's interpretation of its home statute was reasonable.

The Court found that the mandatory revocation provision did not preclude the Committee from exercising its general power to suspend penalty orders.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General moved under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside a motion judge's order refusing to consolidate a pharmacist's constitutional challenge in the Superior Court with his professional misconduct appeal in the Divisional Court.

The Attorney General sought to have the consolidated proceeding stayed and the constitutional issue remitted to the College's Discipline Committee.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no error of law and no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that exceptional circumstances justified allowing the constitutional challenge to proceed in the Superior Court, particularly given the Discipline Committee's inability to grant a general declaration of invalidity.

The Attorney General brought a motion to consolidate a Superior Court constitutional application and a Divisional Court appeal regarding the mandatory revocation of a pharmacist's license for professional misconduct.

The Attorney General also sought to remit the constitutional challenge to the Discipline Committee.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Divisional Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the constitutional application at first instance.

The court also declined to remit the matter to the Discipline Committee, holding that exceptional circumstances justified early judicial intervention given the Committee's lack of expertise and inability to issue a general declaration of invalidity.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's refusal to dismiss the respondents' civil action based on statutory immunity under s. 38.1 of the Independent Health Facilities Act and abuse of process.

The respondents cross-appealed the striking of allegations relating to investigations under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeals and the cross-appeal, holding that while s. 38.1 provides immunity for losses resulting from specific regulatory orders, factual findings at trial are required to determine if any claimed losses fall outside this protection.

The abuse of process arguments were also left open for trial.

The applicants, pharmacists facing discipline proceedings, sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Discipline Committee denying their motion for extensive disclosure of third-party medical and billing records.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the application, finding it premature.

The court reiterated that judicial review of interlocutory administrative decisions is only available in exceptional circumstances or where jurisdiction is irretrievably lost.

Finding no denial of natural justice and noting that extensive disclosure had already been provided, the court quashed the application.