Michael Smith

The plaintiffs sought court approval of a class action settlement agreement with the defendants, General Motors LLC and General Motors of Canada Limited, for $12 million to resolve claims related to alleged defects in automobile ignition switches.

They also sought approval of counsel fees of $4,397,500.

The court approved both the settlement, finding it fair and reasonable given the litigation risks and the absence of objections, and the counsel fees, noting they were negotiated separately and represented a reasonable contingency fee.

The accused was charged with four counts of sexual assault and sexual interference involving his two stepdaughters.

The court, after hearing testimony from the complainants, the accused, and the accused's wife, found the complainants' evidence unreliable due to numerous inconsistencies, contradictions, and a concerning possibility of collusion.

The accused's testimony was found to be convincing.

Applying the principles of reasonable doubt and credibility assessment, the Crown failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

This is a forfeiture application brought by His Majesty the King under s. 771 of the Criminal Code against Nehemiah Campbell and his three sureties (Greg Carter, Anwar Faza, and Sandre Bascoe) due to Campbell's failure to surrender for his appeal hearing.

The court ordered the full forfeiture of Campbell's $20,000 pledge, Carter's $50,000 pledge, and Faza's $10,000 pledge.

Sandre Bascoe's $10,000 pledge was partially forfeited, with $5,000 ordered forfeited, due to her limited financial means.

The decision emphasizes the importance of surety diligence and the 'pull of bail' in maintaining the effectiveness of the bail system.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and multiple firearms offences following the execution of search warrants at two apartments.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove constructive possession.

The court found the accused not guilty of the drug charges, as there was a reasonable doubt regarding his exclusive access to the stash house where the drugs were found.

However, the court found the accused guilty of possessing over $90,000 in proceeds of crime and a loaded restricted firearm found in the apartment where he was arrested, concluding that his guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The accused, P.T., was charged with multiple sexual offences against K.C., his great-niece, occurring between 2013 and 2015 when K.C. was a young child.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the accused.

The court applied the W.(D.) test, finding the complainant's testimony inconsistent and unreliable due to significant omissions in her initial police statement (e.g., anal penetration, biting the accused) and poor general recollection, despite allowances for her age.

The accused's denials were found credible.

Consequently, the court found the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on all counts.

In a voir dire during a first-degree murder trial, the defence challenged the admissibility of the accused's utterances upon arrest and his formal police statement, alleging breaches of s. 10(b) of the Charter and lack of voluntariness.

The court found that a five-minute delay in providing the right to counsel upon arrest was justified by specific officer and public safety concerns.

The court also held that the accused's spontaneous utterances and his subsequent formal statement to police were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, despite the accused being a youthful Indigenous offender and the interviewing officer making ambiguous comments about the accused's integrity and future prospects.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude evidence of his criminal record (including sexual assault and assault causing bodily harm) and to redact references to these convictions from an expert's forensic psychiatry report.

The court denied the application, finding that while the convictions were prejudicial, they formed a vital basis for the expert's opinion, particularly regarding potential antisocial conduct disorder or sexual paraphilia.

The court emphasized that the jury must have access to the full foundation of expert evidence to assess its weight, even considering Gladue principles for Indigenous accused.

At a case management conference in a class proceeding, certain defendants requested a timetable for a motion to dismiss the action for delay under s. 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiffs sought to file material, conduct written interrogatories, or summons witnesses to explore why other defendants took no position on the motion.

The court denied the plaintiffs' request for interrogatories and cross-examinations, finding them unnecessary, irrelevant, and likely to breach privilege.

Exercising its case management powers under s. 12, the court directed the motion to proceed in writing without cross-examinations and set a timetable.

The Crown applied for the forfeiture of two vehicles owned by the accused following his convictions for drug trafficking offences.

The court granted the forfeiture of a 2005 Chevrolet Malibu under s. 16(1) of the CDSA, finding on a balance of probabilities that it was used as a venue for a drug transaction and to store drugs.

However, the court dismissed the application regarding a 2017 GMC Sierra pickup truck.

Because the truck was not related to the offences for which the accused was convicted, s. 16(2) required the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was offence-related property.

The circumstantial evidence of short meetings with known drug users fell short of this standard.

The accused was convicted of intentionally discharging a firearm and several other weapons offences after firing 13 shots at a fleeing vehicle in downtown Ottawa.

At the time, he was bound by a recognizance prohibiting him from possessing firearms.

The Crown sought a 9-year sentence, while the defence sought 4 years plus credit for stringent bail conditions.

The court imposed a total sentence of 8 years imprisonment, finding the offence fell at the lower end of the range for serious firearms offences since no one was injured by the accused's shots.

The court also granted 12 months of enhanced credit for the restrictive house arrest and curfew conditions the accused endured while on bail.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including police surveillance of two residences and the subsequent seizure of large quantities of drugs and cash.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had knowledge and control of the prohibited substances and property, as other individuals had access to the residences and the items were not in plain view.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a suitable sample of breath to enable a proper analysis by an approved screening device at the roadside, contrary to section 320.15(1) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant did not contest the lawfulness of the demand but argued he lacked the necessary mens rea because he requested to speak to a lawyer before complying.

The court found that the Crown proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant's desire to consult counsel before providing a sample does not constitute a reasonable excuse for refusing an immediate demand.

The court convicted the defendant.

The Crown sought to admit portions of Jill Gil's bail hearing testimony under the principled approach to hearsay.

Jill Gil, the grandmother of accused Marcus Gil, was unavailable to testify at trial.

The court found that while the necessity criterion for hearsay was met due to her unavailability, the threshold reliability was not established.

The court also determined that the Crown's cross-examination of Jill Gil at the bail hearing was primarily a discovery mechanism, which was improper and would render the admission of such evidence unfair to the accused.

Consequently, the court ruled against the admission of Jill Gil's bail hearing testimony.

This was a preliminary inquiry into 30 counts of criminal offences involving drug trafficking and firearm possession.

The Crown alleged that the two accused were engaged in a joint enterprise to traffic in street drugs over a two-month surveillance period.

The court examined whether there was sufficient evidence to commit the accused to trial on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking, firearm offences, breach of recognizance, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The key issues were whether the evidence supported reasonable inferences of possession and control over drugs and cash found at various locations, and whether the accused had knowledge of and control over a handgun found at one accused's residence.

The accused, Andrea Alexis Long, was charged with defrauding Ontario Works of over $5,000 by deceit, falsehood, or other fraudulent means, contrary to section 380(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The allegations stemmed from her failure to report income from Rogers Communications Inc. while receiving OW benefits in 2007 and 2009.

The court found that Ms. Long deliberately concealed her income, understanding her obligation to disclose it, and that her testimony was contradictory and lacked credibility.

The Crown proved all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to a conviction for fraud over $5,000.

The respondent, Claudette Ann-Marie Miller, brought a motion under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to enforce an offer to settle made by the applicant, David Anthony Martin, on September 2, 2015, which she claimed to have accepted on March 13, 2017.

The applicant argued that the offer was implicitly withdrawn by earlier rejections, subsequent oral discussions, and changed circumstances involving other court proceedings.

The court, relying on Rule 49 and appellate precedent, held that a Rule 49 offer can only be withdrawn in writing and is not terminated by rejection or counter-offers.

The court found the respondent's acceptance valid and granted judgment in terms of the accepted offer, dismissing the applicant's arguments as speculative.

The parties attended a case conference regarding the plaintiff's summary judgment motion.

The defendants raised issues with the plaintiff's materials, including the need for certified translations of Spanish documents and potential defects in the commissioning of an affidavit.

The court directed the plaintiff to provide certified translations and correct certain exhibits.

The court also directed the parties to schedule a three-hour hearing to address the defendants' anticipated motions to strike portions of the plaintiff's affidavit and to strike the statement of claim for failure to pay an outstanding costs award.

The defence counsel for Gurpreet Ronald sought to prohibit her former counsel, Mr. Bruce Engel, from testifying for the Crown, asserting solicitor-client privilege.

The court examined the validity of two waivers of privilege: a verbal waiver given on August 6, 2014, and a written waiver given on August 21, 2014, after consultation with independent counsel.

The court found the verbal waiver invalid due to the lack of independent legal advice but upheld the written waiver as valid and irrevocable, as the information had already been disclosed.

The court also clarified the scope of solicitor-client privilege, ruling that it covered communications between Ms. Ronald and Mr. Engel but not the content of Mr. Engel's subsequent conversation with co-accused Mr. Gill.

The application to prohibit testimony was dismissed.

The court issued two rulings during a murder trial.

First, it rejected the defence's argument that if one co-accused was acquitted, the other must also be acquitted based on conspiracy law, clarifying that the old common law rule for conspirators is no longer valid and, in any event, the accused were charged with murder, not conspiracy.

Second, the court denied the request to leave second-degree murder as an included offence to the jury, finding no air of reality in the evidence to support a conclusion of intentional but spontaneous killing, given the pre-meditated actions of the assailant.

The accused sought an order permitting challenges for cause of prospective jurors based on race, religion, pre-trial publicity, marital infidelity, and employment bias.

The court permitted challenges for cause on the grounds of race, religion (by agreement), and pre-trial publicity, finding a realistic potential for bias that might prevent jurors from being impartial despite judicial instructions.

However, the court denied challenges for cause based on marital infidelity and employment bias, as the applicants failed to demonstrate widespread community bias or that potential jurors would be incapable of setting aside such biases.