Michael Bordin

In a costs-only decision following trial reasons, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $53,000 plus disbursements after partial success on breach of contract and failure on negligent misrepresentation.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and r. 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, emphasizing reasonableness, proportionality, divided success, and litigation conduct.

Although the plaintiff was nominally successful at trial, the court found the plaintiff recovered only a fraction of its claim, overclaimed legal time, and engaged in concerning conduct, including issues around a purported licence and HST-related purchase price misstatement.

The court held substantial indemnity was unwarranted and ultimately declined to award any costs to the plaintiff.

The court determined a breach allegation under s. 742.6 of the Criminal Code in relation to a conditional sentence order containing no-contact conditions with persons under 16 years of age.

On admitted facts, the court found multiple wilful and flagrant breaches without reasonable excuse and held the offender failed to rebut the presumption that the remainder of the sentence should be served in custody.

The court rejected submissions that supervision exceptions, health concerns, or delay during suspension justified continuation of the conditional sentence or credit under s. 742.6(16).

Applying the governing authorities, the court terminated the conditional sentence and ordered the unexpired portion served in jail.

A custodial no-contact order was also imposed.

The Local Administrative Judge in Hamilton raised, sua sponte, the issue of whether a civil action for recovery of investment funds had any rational connection to Hamilton.

Neither the parties, the property, the subject matter, the events, nor the lawyers had any connection to Hamilton; all connections were to the Central West and Toronto Judicial Regions.

The plaintiffs argued they had legitimate concerns about fairness in Central West due to the defendants' significant local presence and over fifty similar actions in the region, but the court rejected the allegations of bias as without foundation.

Relying on the court's inherent jurisdiction to control its own process and the Consolidated Civil Provincial Practice Direction, the court found the plaintiffs' venue choice was not a legitimate exercise of procedural rights and ordered the plaintiffs to bring a written motion to the RSJ in Central West for transfer of the proceeding.

The action was stayed pending that determination.

The plaintiff vendor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant purchaser for breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The defendant claimed she did not sign the agreement and was unaware of its terms, particularly that it lacked a financing condition.

The court found the defendant ratified the agreement through her conduct, including paying a deposit, retaining counsel and a mortgage broker, and taking steps toward closing.

The defendant failed to repudiate the agreement before the closing date.

Summary judgment was granted in favor of the plaintiff for the difference in sale price and carrying costs.

The applicant sought fourteen substantive heads of relief including declarations of trust, fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, production of records, and claims for general, punitive, aggravated and exemplary damages under the Business Corporations Act and Substitute Decisions Act.

The court found the application was improperly prepared with excessive materials, non-compliant factums, missing compendium, and unrealistic time estimates.

The court granted limited relief: an order requiring the respondent to account for her time as power of attorney for property, production of corporate books and records by both parties, and monthly disclosure obligations.

The court declined to remove the respondent as director and declined to declare a purchase money resulting trust, finding credibility issues could not be resolved on the paper record.

The remaining relief was adjourned and the court noted a trial may be required.

The applicant bank sought to appoint a receiver over two residential properties in Burlington owned by the respondent corporations, which had defaulted on a loan agreement.

The respondents challenged the venue, arguing the application should be transferred from Hamilton to the Central West Region where the properties and respondents were located.

The court addressed procedural issues regarding venue transfer motions under the Rules of Civil Procedure and Practice Directions, finding that the parties had improperly circumvented the prescribed transfer process.

On the merits, the court appointed a receiver, finding that the respondents were in material default, had failed to cure defaults despite multiple opportunities, and that appointment was just and convenient under the applicable statutory framework.

The accused was charged with sexual assault arising from events that occurred in his bedroom after a high school prom on June 8, 2022.

The Crown alleged that the complainant was asleep and did not consent to sexual activity.

The defence contended that the sexual activity was consensual and that the complainant fabricated the allegation to counter the accused's allegation that she had been cheating on him.

The court found significant credibility issues with the complainant's evidence, including contradictions, inconsistencies, and conflicts with other evidence.

The accused's evidence, while containing some minor inconsistencies, was generally forthright and consistent.

The court found that the complainant's version of events could not be accepted beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the accused's evidence raised more than a reasonable doubt about whether the complainant was asleep and did not consent.

The accused was acquitted.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for a declaration that they are the beneficial owners of the deceased mother's interest in a jointly-owned Hamilton property, relying on doctrines of part performance, proprietary and promissory estoppel, resulting trust, and unjust enrichment.

The defendant trustee sought summary judgment for partition and sale of the property.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that material factual and evidentiary issues remained unresolved, including the formation and terms of the alleged agreement, the reliability of hearsay evidence regarding the deceased's understanding, and the adequacy of financial documentation.

The court determined that a trial was necessary to resolve these live issues.

This decision concerns the allocation of costs following the dismissal of a claim in a long-running personal injury action.

The court addresses the entitlement to costs between the parties, the impact of delay and procedural history, and whether costs should be awarded personally against counsel.

The court ultimately awards partial indemnity costs to the defendant, Terrence John Brake, but declines to order costs against the plaintiff's lawyers personally.

The applicant, Deanna McKinlay, sought a declaration that a document she wrote and the deceased signed was a valid testamentary instrument for the estate of Virginia Beecroft.

In the alternative, she sought a declaration that the deceased’s 2020 Will and Codicil should govern.

The court found the proffered document was not a valid will, as it was not a fixed and final expression of the deceased’s testamentary intentions, and ordered the estate to be administered in accordance with the 2020 Will and Codicil.

The decision addresses procedural compliance in civil motions, focusing on the parties' failures to follow the Rules of Civil Procedure, practice directions, and the Notice to the Profession.

The court reviews the improper organization and filing of motion materials, factums, and compendiums, and the consequences of these failures.

The court also considers and dismisses a motion for leave to file a further affidavit under rule 39.02(2), emphasizing the high threshold for such leave and the need for parties to put forward all relevant evidence before cross-examinations.

Orders are made to ensure proper organization and compliance before the cross-motions on jurisdiction and forum can proceed.

The plaintiff, Tiffany Longarini, sued four lawyers for breach of confidence after a settlement email she sent was disclosed to the Crown in a related criminal proceeding.

The court found that the email was not protected by settlement privilege due to its content and the context of its use, and that even if it were, disclosure was justified by the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.

The claim was struck without leave to amend.

The court considered whether questions regarding past loss of income, future loss of income, and loss of competitive advantage should be put to the jury in a personal injury action.

The court found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider past loss of income and loss of competitive advantage, but not future loss of income, as the evidence for the latter was speculative and insufficient.

The ruling reviews the legal standards for submitting damages questions to a jury and the evidentiary requirements for each head of damages.

The court considered a motion by the defendants to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim, which alleged a conspiracy by the defendants to cause the plaintiff to lose his business and property through the misuse of regulatory and legal proceedings under the Retirement Homes Act, 2010.

The court found that most of the plaintiff’s claims were barred as an abuse of process, collateral attack, or because they relied on inadmissible evidence under the Act.

The court also found that the claims did not properly plead bad faith or conspiracy with sufficient particulars, and that the statutory immunity provisions protected the defendants for actions taken in good faith.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety, with leave to amend denied.

The appellant landlord appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) order that found the tenant’s use of parking spot 69 was an implied term of the lease and denied the landlord’s application to terminate the tenancy.

The Superior Court upheld the LTB’s decision, finding that the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA) allows for implied terms and that the LTB properly considered the pattern of conduct and statutory context.

The landlord’s argument that the lease allowed for unilateral reallocation of parking was rejected.

The appeal was dismissed.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of Stacey Lee Crawford, declaring her the owner of her former family home and setting aside a default judgment obtained by Veeru Kantoor.

The decision addresses the validity of a second mortgage registered by Dinesh Khanna and Metro Financial Planning Limited, finding that the mortgage amount was altered without Crawford’s consent and that the business practices of Khanna and Metro were essentially illegal.

The court found that the default judgment and subsequent transfer of the property were tainted by fraud and lack of proper accounting, and ordered the property returned to Crawford, with remaining accounting issues to proceed to trial.

The plaintiff, Richard Ross Shaker, sought to add Katie Miller as a defendant to his action for intrusion upon seclusion, but the court found the claim against her was statute-barred.

The decision turns on when the plaintiff discovered he had a claim against Ms. Miller.

The court held that by July 27, 2022, the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the material facts to commence a claim, and later-acquired information only affected the scope of damages, not discoverability.

The motion to amend the claim to add Ms. Miller was dismissed.

The decision addresses a motion by Varinder Grewal and Sukhjit Sonia Singh to set aside a 2013 default judgment for a sum owing under a mortgage and for possession of property.

The court reviews the history of the mortgage, the sale of the property, and the conduct of the parties, including the involvement of third parties and prior regulatory and disciplinary findings.

The court finds that the motion was not brought promptly, the defendants lacked a plausible excuse for the default, and there was no arguable defence on the merits.

The motion to set aside the default judgment is dismissed.

The court considered an application by Mustafa Elawad to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop and subsequent search, on the basis of breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police engaged in racial profiling, that the stop was not justified by the stated reason of obscured plates, and that the subsequent search and seizure were unlawful.

The evidence of drugs and a firearm was excluded, and Mr. Elawad was acquitted of all charges.

The decision addresses a motion by the plaintiff, James Pushie, in a property dispute with Carmela Guidarelli following the breakdown of their romantic and business relationship.

The court considers the admissibility of evidence previously ruled inadmissible, the scope of evidence at trial, the amendment of pleadings, and ongoing disclosure obligations.

The court grants the plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings, clarifies that evidence previously excluded at the application stage may be tendered at trial subject to relevance and admissibility, and sets out procedural directions for the conduct of the trial.