Marvin Kurz

The accused was convicted by a jury of criminal harassment after sending 131 unwanted and increasingly threatening text messages to a former intimate partner over a two-week period.

The Crown sought a sentence of time served, which would have equated to penitentiary time given the accused's 22 months in pre-trial custody on an unrelated charge.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the complainant's age and the accused's attempt to control her against mitigating factors including his youth, learning disabilities, and family support.

The court imposed a suspended sentence followed by 24 months of probation.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a lower court order dated December 7, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and ordered that the appeal be expedited.

The court also directed that the moving party's motion for interim relief be scheduled on an expedited basis before a single judge.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal two decisions of the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $2,500 to the responding party.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Wilson J. dated August 24, 2023.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The applicant sought removal of her sister as attorney for personal care and property for their elderly mother, a declaration that later powers of attorney were invalid, and appointment of herself as guardian.

The court found the grantor incapable of making personal care and financial decisions, held that the 2021 powers of attorney were executed in suspicious circumstances, and concluded that the evidence did not establish capacity at execution.

The court further found that the respondent failed to meet fiduciary and personal care obligations, including arrears in long-term care rent, utility disconnections, deficient disclosure, and exclusion of supportive family members.

The applicant was appointed guardian for property and personal care, subject to conditions including no removal from Ontario without further court order.

The applicant father sought an order for unsupervised parenting time with his two young children, H. (8) and O. (4), after seven months of no contact following his arrest on serious criminal charges, including assault and sexual assault.

The respondent mother opposed, insisting on supervised parenting time due to concerns about family violence and the children's safety.

The court, applying the best interests of the child principle and considering family violence factors under the Divorce Act, found that supervised parenting time was necessary.

The father's request for unsupervised access was denied.

The motion was adjourned to allow the father to propose suitable supervisors, who must provide affidavits confirming their willingness and duty to prioritize the children's best interests.

The court also requested the Office of the Children's Lawyer to reconsider its involvement to conduct a clinical investigation.

The accused, Cassandra Bell, pleaded guilty to one count of assault under s. 265(1) of the Criminal Code, a lesser charge than the original sexual exploitation and uttering threats charges.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's young age (8-9 years old), the repeated touching of the victim's groin area (5-7 times over clothing), the significant emotional harm to the victim and his family, and the fact the offence occurred in the child's home.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, its timing, the accused's deafness, community support, and counselling.

The Crown sought a 6-month conditional sentence, while the Defence sought probation or a 90-day conditional sentence.

The court imposed a 90-day conditional sentence followed by two years of probation, a DNA order, and a five-year weapons ban, emphasizing the need for denunciation despite the plea to a common assault.

Following a family law trial with divided success on parenting and financial issues, both parties sought costs.

The applicant sought $250,000, while the respondent argued for no costs or $50,000 in the alternative.

The court reviewed the principles of costs in family law, including the impact of divided success, reasonable behaviour, and offers to settle.

Finding that neither party enjoyed a monopoly on success, neither beat their offers, and neither had a monopoly on reasonable conduct, the court ordered that no costs be payable by either party.

The applicant sought to remove his sister as co-estate trustee of their late father's estate and to order her to vacate the estate's residential property.

The respondent had an option under the will to purchase the property at fair market value but refused to accept the appraised value or vacate the property, living there rent-free.

The court found the respondent's option to purchase had expired and that she was in a conflict of interest that prevented the proper administration of the estate.

The court removed the respondent as estate trustee, vested the estate assets in the applicant as sole trustee, and ordered the respondent to provide vacant possession of the property.

The plaintiff bank brought an ex parte motion for a writ of possession following a judgment.

The motion was supported by an affidavit from a law clerk attaching an unsigned occupancy report prepared by an unnamed author, constituting double or triple hearsay.

The court dismissed the motion without prejudice, emphasizing that the permissiveness of Rule 39.01(5) does not excuse sloppiness or the admission of unreliable hearsay, especially on an ex parte motion where a duty of candour applies and the order sought would evict individuals from their home.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful application by Halton Condominium Corporation No. 61 (HCC 61) to enforce its non-smoking rule against the respondents.

HCC 61 sought full indemnity costs of $87,377.16 or, alternatively, partial indemnity costs of $70,900.62.

The respondents argued for no costs or a lower scale.

The court awarded HCC 61 costs on an enhanced but not full indemnity basis, totaling $70,476.66, considering HCC 61's full success, their reasonable offer to settle, the Condominium Act's provisions for cost recovery, and the respondents' unreasonable conduct.

This endorsement addresses remaining issues from a trial, including parenting terms, equalization payment, prospective and retroactive section 7 expenses, life insurance to secure support, retroactive spousal support, and post-separation adjustments.

The court ordered a six-month review of parenting terms, set out specific prospective section 7 expenses and their payment ratio (Father 69.4%, Mother 30.6%), and clarified university expense coverage for the first degree.

Retroactive section 7 expenses were denied due to a lack of documentary proof.

The Father was ordered to maintain $2.1 million in life insurance, reducible biennially.

No adjustment was made to retroactive spousal support for 2021-2022, as interim payments were deemed fair, but the Father owes $30,000 for 2023 underpayments.

Claims by the Father for HELOC interest and matrimonial home carrying costs were denied due to lack of proof and prior agreement.

Costs were left for the parties to resolve.

The defendant, Karen Patino-Ramirez, brought an urgent motion to set aside four default judgments and stay their enforcement, primarily focusing on one judgment concerning two Oakville properties.

The plaintiff, CMI High Yield Opportunity Fund, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the default judgment, finding no arguable defence on the merits regarding the mortgage default or the validity of a forbearance agreement.

However, the court acknowledged an arguable defence concerning certain administrative fees charged by the plaintiff and ordered a mechanism to resolve this issue, staying enforcement of the judgment and writ of possession on the matrimonial home until the fee dispute is resolved.

The respondent mother brought an urgent motion seeking to have the applicant father's parenting time supervised after he failed multiple drug tests for cocaine.

The father denied drug use, claiming the positive tests resulted from passive exposure, and relied on letters from his treating addictions physician to support this theory.

The court exercised its gatekeeper function and rejected the physician's opinion on passive ingestion, finding he was a participant expert without toxicological expertise.

Finding strong prima facie evidence of the father's renewed cocaine use and inadequate care, the court ordered that his parenting time be supervised and directed a section 30 parenting assessment.

This trial decision addresses the financial issues between separated spouses, including child support, spousal support, equalization of net family property, and division of assets.

The parties had previously settled parenting issues.

The court made significant findings on the credibility of the Respondent, Michael, particularly regarding his employment history, alleged mental health issues, and a purported $100,000 loan from his parents, which the court found to be fabricated.

The court imputed income to both parties for support purposes, ordered retroactive and ongoing child support, and found the Applicant, Kathryn, entitled to spousal support (with quantum to be determined later).

The decision also dealt with the division of timeshare units, valuation of vehicles, and various post-separation adjustments, ultimately favouring the Applicant's financial claims.

The accused sought a mistrial or adjournment of his jury trial after the jury panel inadvertently overheard discussions about his pre-trial incarceration.

The defence argued this created a risk of moral prejudice, while the Crown contended a pre-trial instruction would suffice.

The court granted the adjournment, finding it was in the interests of justice given the risk of moral prejudice, the inability to ascertain what jurors heard without further prejudice, and the fact that the trial had not yet commenced, distinguishing it from cases where mid-trial instructions cured similar disclosures.

The applicant, Rui Dong, moved for interim recovery of a motor vehicle purchased from the respondent, J. Lockwood Leasing, which the respondent had repossessed.

Lockwood repossessed the vehicle after discovering a $10,000 undercharge, despite having no conditional sales agreement, possession, or validly registered lien.

The court found that Rui was the lawful owner and Lockwood was not entitled to a security interest or lien under the Personal Property Security Act, nor was it entitled to repossess the vehicle, especially from private property, as this amounted to execution before judgment.

The balance of convenience favored the applicant due to the respondent's high-handed and disproportionate conduct.

The court ordered the immediate return of the vehicle, discharge of the improper lien, payment of $500 to the applicant for the improper lien registration, and transfer of the action to Small Claims Court given the remaining amount in dispute.

The applicant mother sought temporary orders for sole decision-making authority for the child, and to dispense with the respondent father's consent for the child's passport renewal and international travel.

While the father consented to the passport and travel issues after the motion was served, the court proceeded to determine the interim decision-making issue.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making authority, finding that the father's abusive communication, non-compliance with previous orders, and general unwillingness to co-parent made joint decision-making impossible and contrary to the child's best interests.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

Halton Condominium Corporation No. 61 (HCC 61) brought an application under s. 134 of the Condominium Act, 1998, to enforce its non-smoking rule against the Respondents, Nikolay Kolarovaliev and Borislava Borissova.

The Respondents, who were "grandfathered" under the rule, were accused of continuously breaching their Grandfathering Agreement by allowing smoke to emanate from their unit into common areas and adjacent units.

Despite HCC 61's attempts at mediation and remediation, the issue persisted.

The court found that the Respondents repeatedly violated the Grandfathering Agreement and that their claims of political motivation were unfounded.

The court granted the application, terminating the Grandfathering Agreement and prohibiting smoking within Unit 801, allowing it only outside the building at a distance of at least nine meters from all doorways, operable windows, and air intakes.