Marvin Kurz

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) applied to be appointed as the permanent guardian of property for Fumio Hara, a 91-year-old suffering from dementia, and to terminate the existing power of attorney naming his brothers, Gerald and Katsushi Hara.

The court found compelling evidence that Gerald had misappropriated and mismanaged Fumio’s property, and that no other family member was willing or able to act as guardian.

The court appointed the PGT as permanent guardian, despite Fumio’s prior wishes, and awarded substantial indemnity costs against Gerald.

This decision concerns a motion by Jaspreet Kaur for security for costs against Ronald Dawson in a dispute over the beneficial ownership of real property.

The court finds that Dawson failed to pay prior costs orders, appears to be a nominal applicant, and that the application is arguably frivolous and vexatious.

The court orders Dawson to post security for costs, with leave for Kaur to seek further security as the litigation progresses.

This is an appeal of a decision by the Joint Compliance Audit Committee for the Town of Oakville, which authorized a compliance audit of a municipal councillor's campaign finances.

The appellant argued that the applicant for the audit lacked standing because they were not an elector of the specific ward in which the councillor ran.

The court, applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation and the presumption of consistent expression, found that the relevant statutory provision (s. 88.33(1) of the Municipal Elections Act, 1996) must be read in conjunction with s. 19(7) of the same Act, which limits an elector's voting entitlement to their ward of residence in ward-divided municipalities.

Consequently, the court held that only an elector residing in the specific ward has standing to request a compliance audit for a candidate in that ward.

The Committee's decision to order the audit was set aside due to the applicant's lack of standing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing or refusing to comply with a breath demand following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued that the police lacked valid grounds to make the demand, that the demand was not made as soon as practicable, and that he had a reasonable excuse for refusing because he was not the driver.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of the law or assessment of credibility, and declined to depart from binding Supreme Court precedent establishing that not driving is not a reasonable excuse for refusing a valid breath demand.

The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to be restored as a director of a closely held corporation after being unilaterally ousted by his equal partner, the respondent.

The respondent claimed authority to remove the applicant based on his role as president of the holding company and alleged the applicant had abandoned his post.

The court found the applicant established a strong prima facie case that the respondent lacked authority and acted in a conflict of interest.

Finding irreparable harm and a balance of convenience favouring the applicant, the court granted the injunction, reinstating the applicant as a director upon specific terms to level the playing field pending trial.

The Applicant sought urgent, ex parte leave to bring a motion to change a final order dated July 22, 2024, less than six months after its issuance.

The motion was brought under s. 37(3) of the Family Law Act, or alternatively, as a variation under the Divorce Act.

The court found that the proposed motion was an attempt to reargue issues already decided by a previous seven-day trial, and that the applicant's affidavit provided no evidence of a material change in circumstances since the prior order.

Citing principles of abuse of process, issue estoppel, and res judicata, and the court's duty of active case management under the Family Law Rules, the court dismissed the motion for leave, concluding there was no air of reality to the claim for a material change.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion and the action regarding a real estate transaction, the successful defendant sought costs of $57,953.69 on a substantial indemnity basis, relying on an offer to settle.

The court reviewed the principles of costs, including proportionality and the rules regarding offers to settle.

Finding no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiffs to justify elevated costs, the court fixed the costs payable to the defendant at $30,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The defendant, Capital One Bank, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(c) and (d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing the issues were res judicata.

The court found that the issues raised in the current action were previously decided or could have been raised in a prior Small Claims Court action and its subsequent appeal.

Applying the principles of res judicata and issue estoppel, the court dismissed the action as an abuse of process, finding no reason to exercise discretion to allow it to continue.

Home Trust Company (HTC) applied to set aside a residential tenancy agreement between the Landlords (Ahmad Mahmood and Shanaz Bigem) and the Tenants (Uzair Rashid and Aimen Rashid) for a property under mortgage.

The Landlords had defaulted on the mortgage, and the lease was entered into after default, with rent significantly lower than mortgage payments.

The court found that the lease was made with the object of discouraging HTC from taking possession or adversely affecting the property's value, satisfying the three-pronged test under section 52 of the Mortgages Act.

Despite the Tenants' unawareness of the Landlords' circumstances, the application was granted.

The tenancy agreement was set aside, possession was granted to HTC, and the Tenants were given until November 1, 2024, to vacate, with an order to pay outstanding rent to HTC.

The Landlords were ordered to pay HTC's costs.

The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) brought a motion seeking an order for the release of $812,000 from a Bank of Montreal (BMO) account held by Justwing Group Inc., claiming ownership of the funds.

RBC had previously obtained default judgment against Justwing and Terra Metals Inc. The funds originated from dishonoured cheques deposited by Aravind Sakthivel, which were subsequently transferred to other accounts, including the BMO account.

RBC argued it should be entitled to the funds without resorting to ordinary execution or garnishment procedures due to perceived delays.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that RBC failed to provide statutory or common law authority to bypass standard enforcement processes or to establish exclusive ownership of the funds, especially given the lack of evidence regarding the account's current balance or other potential claims.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend the statement of claim to reduce the prayer for relief to an agreed-upon total of $152,500, continue the action as a simplified proceeding under Rule 76, and strike the jury notice.

The defendants opposed, arguing prejudice from the loss of a jury trial.

The court granted the motion, finding it in the interests of justice due to significant changes in the litigation, including the deaths of two original plaintiffs, the recent agreement on damages, and the benefits of a more expeditious and cost-effective resolution under simplified procedure, despite the substantive right to a jury trial.

The Purchasers (Plaintiffs) moved for summary judgment seeking damages from the Vendor (Defendant) after a real estate transaction failed to close on time due to a 9-minute delay in fund transfer, leading the Vendor to terminate the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) based on a "time is of the essence" clause.

The Vendor subsequently offered to "revive" the APS for an additional $113,000, which the Purchasers paid.

The Purchasers argued the Vendor acted in bad faith, imposed an improper penalty, and that the "revived" APS was entered into under economic duress.

The court found the "time is of the essence" clause was operative and breached by the Purchasers, entitling the Vendor to terminate.

It further ruled that the "revival fee" was part of a new, freely negotiated contract, not an unenforceable penalty, and that the Purchasers failed to establish economic duress.

Consequently, the Purchasers' motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and summary judgment was granted to the Vendor, dismissing the action.

The plaintiff, Resco Mortgage Investment Corporation, moved for summary judgment to enforce a defaulted mortgage against the defendant, Sandeep Kaur.

The defendant argued the renewed mortgage terms were unconscionable due to unequal bargaining power and an improvident bargain.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, determining that the mortgage terms were not unconscionable as Resco did not act predatorily or take advantage of a power imbalance.

The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, allowing recovery of principal and interest, but disallowed certain default fees claimed by the plaintiff, and granted leave *nunc pro tunc* for the timing of the notice of sale and statement of claim.

The Applicant Father sought to reinstate week-about parenting time as per a separation agreement, while the Respondent Mother cross-moved for the appointment of the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL), counselling for the eldest child, and supervised parenting.

The court ordered OCL involvement and established a modified parenting schedule for the Father (alternate weekends and Wednesday overnights), noting the detrimental impact of restrictive bail terms on parenting arrangements.

The court also encouraged the parties to discuss mutually agreeable counselling.

The plaintiff, Royal Bank of Canada, brought a motion for judgment seeking to recover unpaid credit card and overdraft balances, characterizing the debt as fraud to ensure survivability in bankruptcy.

The court granted judgment for the liquidated damages (unpaid credit card and overdraft amounts) but dismissed the claims for fraud and punitive damages, finding insufficient evidence of fraudulent intent and that the request for a fraud declaration was premature.

The court also noted that the action, being for less than $10,000, should have been brought in the Small Claims Court, and consequently, no costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful application by Denise Pettipas to remove Deborah Johnston as power of attorney for their mother, Eileen Bessie Pettipas, and to appoint Denise as guardian.

Denise sought full indemnity costs.

The court applied principles from the Courts of Justice Act and Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as specific considerations for estate and Substitute Decisions Act proceedings.

The court found Deborah's conduct less than ideal, including failure to disclose and placing Eileen in financial jeopardy, but no personal benefit.

The court ordered substantial indemnity costs of $25,341.50, payable by both Eileen and Deborah, with Eileen or her estate entitled to full reimbursement from Deborah, emphasizing public policy to protect vulnerable persons and not discourage well-meaning relatives.

The Applicants, Roof Tile Management Group Inc. and Roof Tile Management Inc., brought an application seeking declaratory relief and other non-monetary orders, along with a motion to amend their Notice of Application to seek a reference for damages.

The Respondents, Henry Forget and 2149220 Ontario Inc., opposed both the amendment and the application as the proper form of proceeding, arguing that the case involved highly contested facts requiring an action.

The court dismissed the Applicants' motion to amend, finding it would improperly bifurcate the proceeding and cause procedural injustice.

The court also converted the application into an action under Rule 38.10, determining that an application was not the appropriate forum to resolve the significant factual disputes concerning liability and damages.

The Applicant mother sought prospective and retroactive child support for the parties' child and to terminate or vary a preservation order on the former matrimonial home.

The Respondent father opposed retroactive support prior to August 2023 and the termination of the preservation order.

The court ordered temporary retroactive child support from January 1, 2023, and varied the preservation order to allow it to be registered against another property owned by the Mother, rather than terminating it.

The issue of child support from separation to December 31, 2022, was reserved for trial.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Social Benefits Tribunal upholding the cancellation of her Ontario Works benefits and an overpayment assessment of over $95,000.

The administrator had determined she was not living as a single person.

After the Tribunal denied her appeal and first reconsideration request, the appellant obtained her Ontario Works file and submitted new, highly material evidence in a second reconsideration request.

The Tribunal denied the second request using boilerplate reasons identical to the first denial.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by failing to provide adequate reasons addressing the new evidence, which was material to the appellant's credibility and living situation.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for a de novo hearing.

The applicant dentist sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee of the Royal College of Dental Surgeons of Ontario.

The Committee had ordered the applicant to complete a remediation program and receive a verbal caution after he posted sexually suggestive TikTok videos linked to his dental practice.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the application, finding that the Committee's conclusions regarding the breach of practice advisories and the risk to the public were justified and available on the record.