Major

The respondent confessed to sexually touching young boys after being confronted by the father of one of the victims, who held a knife to his throat and threatened him.

The statements were admitted at trial without a voir dire and without objection from defence counsel.

The respondent was convicted, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the evidence of the parents' prior contact with the police and their plan to trick the respondent was sufficient to alert the trial judge to the need for a voir dire to determine if the father was a person in authority.

The appellant challenged his sexual assault conviction on the basis that the trial judge failed to conduct a voir dire before admitting alleged admissions made to the complainant and her family during a confrontation at his workplace.

The Supreme Court held that the confessions rule continues to apply only to statements made to persons in authority, grounded in concerns for voluntariness, fairness, and deterrence of coercive state conduct.

The defence generally bears the obligation to raise the person in authority issue, subject only to rare cases where the record objectively alerts the trial judge to the need for a voir dire.

On the evidence available before admission of the statements, there was nothing to suggest the complainant or her family were acting as persons in authority.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Supreme Court of Canada ordered a rehearing and amended its previous reasons for judgment and order in this appeal.

The appeal was allowed and the matter returned to the Convention Refugee Determination Division for redetermination of the applicant's refugee claim in a manner consistent with the decision, noting that the respondent may choose to proceed with its powers under ss. 19 and 53 of the Immigration Act.

The appellant, a bank subsidiary, transferred its leasing assets to a partnership to utilize a tax rollover provision under s. 97(2) of the Income Tax Act.

The Minister reassessed the appellant, arguing the partnership was invalid because the Bank Act prohibits banks from participating in partnerships, and the Partnerships Act dissolves partnerships engaged in unlawful business.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the partnership was valid.

The Bank Act prohibition applied to the parent bank, not the subsidiary, and did not render the partnership's business unlawful.

Furthermore, the Bank Act's saving provision prevents transactions from being invalidated solely due to a contravention of the Act.

The appeal was allowed.

The Continental Bank of Canada disposed of a partnership interest acquired from its subsidiary during a winding-up process.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed the Bank, arguing the gain was income rather than a capital gain.

The Tax Court and Federal Court of Appeal held it was a capital gain.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding the transaction was capital in nature and not an adventure in the nature of trade.

The Court also refused to entertain the Crown's new alternative argument regarding recapture of capital cost allowance, as it was raised after the limitation period for reassessment had expired.

The accused, knowing he was HIV-positive, engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with two complainants without disclosing his status, despite being instructed by public health officials to do so.

The complainants testified they would not have consented had they known.

The trial judge acquitted the accused of aggravated assault, and the Court of Appeal upheld the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that a failure to disclose HIV-positive status can constitute fraud vitiating consent to sexual intercourse under s. 265(3)(c) of the Criminal Code if it exposes the complainant to a significant risk of serious bodily harm.

The Governor in Council referred three questions to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the legality of a unilateral secession by Quebec.

The Court held that under the Constitution, unilateral secession is illegal.

However, the democratic principle dictates that a clear majority vote on a clear question in favour of secession would create a constitutional obligation on the rest of Canada to negotiate the terms of secession.

Under international law, the right to self-determination does not grant a right to unilateral secession to a constituent part of a democratic state that respects human rights and provides access to government.

Therefore, there is no conflict between domestic and international law.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder based largely on circumstantial evidence, including post-offence conduct such as flight and concealment.

The trial judge delivered jury instructions in segments throughout the trial and provided written transcripts to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury should have been instructed to apply the reasonable doubt standard specifically to the post-offence conduct, and that the piecemeal jury charge format was a reversible error.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the reasonable doubt standard applies only to the final evaluation of guilt, not to individual pieces of evidence, and that while the format of the jury charge was unorthodox and risky, it did not result in a miscarriage of justice in this case.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder.

Following the murder, they fled the jurisdiction, committed two bank robberies, violated parole, fled from police, and attempted to dispose of the murder weapon.

At trial, they argued this post-offence conduct was explained by the robberies and parole violations, and thus had no probative value regarding the murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that because the appellants denied any involvement in the murder, their identity was in issue, and the post-offence conduct was relevant and properly left to the jury.

The Court further held that the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to the ultimate verdict, not to individual items of circumstantial evidence such as post-offence conduct.

Novopharm held a compulsory licence for the patented medicine nizatidine, owned by Eli Lilly.

Novopharm and Apotex entered into a supply agreement whereby Novopharm would obtain the medicine and supply it to Apotex.

Eli Lilly sought to terminate Novopharm's licence, arguing the agreement constituted an impermissible sublicence, and sought prohibition orders against the issuance of Notices of Compliance to both Novopharm and Apotex.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the supply agreement did not constitute a sublicence, as it did not grant Apotex the independent right to exercise Novopharm's licensed rights.

The Court also held that Apotex's proposed reformulation of the bulk medicine into final-dosage form would not infringe Eli Lilly's patents.

The appeals by Novopharm and Apotex were allowed.

Apotex applied for a Notice of Compliance (NOC) to market the patented drug Norfloxacin, alleging non-infringement because it would obtain the drug from Novopharm under a supply agreement.

Novopharm held a compulsory licence that prohibited sublicensing.

The patentee and its licensees sought an order prohibiting the Minister from issuing the NOC, arguing the supply agreement was an invalid sublicence and the application was premature.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the supply agreement was not a sublicence.

Furthermore, the Court determined that the proper date for assessing the justification of a Notice of Allegation is the date of the hearing, not the date it was issued.

Since Novopharm was legally entitled to produce the drug for the Canadian market by the hearing date, the allegation was justified.

The appeal was allowed and the prohibition order was dismissed.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada based on a dissent in the Court of Appeal.

The Crown brought a motion to strike paragraphs of the appellant's factum because they did not deal with the legal issues raised in the dissent.

The Court granted the motion, noting that the appellant had not sought leave to appeal on the other matters raised in the factum despite being informed that leave would be required.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown brought applications to quash two appeals purportedly brought as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The applications were based on recent amendments to the Criminal Code that eliminated the right to appeal without leave where an acquittal is overturned by a court of appeal and a new trial ordered.

The appellants argued their right to appeal had accrued before the amendments came into force.

The Court held that the right to appeal as of right is only acquired when the court of appeal renders its judgment.

Since the conditions precedent were not fulfilled before the amendments took effect, the appeals were quashed.

The appeal concerned whether status Indians in New Brunswick had to pay provincial sales tax on goods purchased off reserve but intended for use on reserve.

The majority held that s. 87 of the Indian Act protects only property physically situated on a reserve, or exceptionally property whose paramount location is on a reserve, at the time the tax attaches.

The court characterized the New Brunswick scheme, in the context of retail sales, as a sales tax triggered at the point of sale rather than a true consumption tax.

Because the goods were purchased off reserve and the tax attached there, the statutory exemption did not apply and the provincial legislation was not rendered inoperative.

The aboriginal accused was charged with robbery and sought to challenge potential jurors for cause based on widespread racial prejudice against aboriginal people in the community.

The trial judge dismissed the application, and the accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and directed a new trial, holding that evidence of widespread racial prejudice in the community establishes a realistic potential for partiality, entitling the accused to challenge prospective jurors for cause under section 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant employee's hours of work were gradually reduced when her department was reorganized and combined with another.

While her hours were reduced, junior staff from the other department were assigned tasks normally performed by her department.

A labour arbitration board allowed her grievance, finding the reduction in hours amounted to a constructive layoff in breach of the collective agreement.

The Court of Queen's Bench dismissed the employer's application for judicial review, but the Court of Appeal allowed it.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitration board's decision was not patently unreasonable, as a significant reduction in hours where a particular employee is singled out may amount to a constructive layoff.

The appellants challenged a Court of Appeal decision setting aside an arbitration award that had characterized a drastic reduction in scheduled hours, despite largely unchanged actual hours through call-ins, as a constructive layoff.

The Supreme Court majority held that the applicable standard of review was patent unreasonableness because the arbitration board was interpreting a collective agreement within its specialized jurisdiction under a near-privative clause.

The majority concluded that layoff in labour law requires a denial or cessation of work, and that the board patently unreasonably expanded the concept by treating scheduling changes without an actual reduction in hours as a layoff.

The majority further held that the board imposed a remedy not rationally connected to the breach alleged under the collective agreement.

The appeal was dismissed, with a dissent that would have restored the arbitration award.

The appellant claimed Convention refugee status but was granted permanent residence.

He was later convicted of conspiracy to traffic in a narcotic and sentenced to eight years in prison.

He renewed his refugee claim, but the Immigration and Refugee Board excluded him under Article 1F(c) of the Convention, finding him guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review for the Board's decision on this question of law is correctness.

The Court concluded that drug trafficking, while a serious crime, does not constitute a serious, sustained, and systemic violation of fundamental human rights amounting to persecution, and therefore does not fall within the Article 1F(c) exclusion.

The appeal was allowed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and unlawful confinement to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court dismissed the appeal from the bench, adopting the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal.

Media appellants challenged the federal election provision prohibiting the broadcasting, publication, or dissemination of new opinion survey results during the final three days of an election campaign.

The majority held that the ban infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1 because the measure was overbroad, underinclusive, and failed minimal impairment.

The Court accepted that guarding against the possible influence of inaccurate late polls was a pressing and substantial objective, but found the evidentiary basis for broad deference insufficient and emphasized the central constitutional value of political expression.

The appeal was allowed and the provision was declared of no force or effect.