Lorne Waldman

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion for partial summary judgment, which he had brought on the basis of issue estoppel relying on findings from a Federal Court security certificate proceeding.

During oral argument, the appellant conceded he was no longer appealing the correctness of the order dismissing the motion, but only sought to appeal the motion judge's conclusion that issue estoppel did not apply.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that an appeal lies from an order and not from the reasons of the court below.

The appellant, an internationally trained teacher from France, appealed the refusal of the Ontario College of Teachers Accreditation Committee to grant her a certificate of qualification.

The Committee found she met the linguistic and degree requirements but concluded her distance education program did not meet the professional education requirement.

The Divisional Court found the Committee's decision unreasonable because it focused on extraneous factors, such as the program being online and not granting a diploma, rather than assessing whether the program was substantially different from an accredited Ontario program.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Committee for reassessment.

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal from a decision dismissing a motion for partial summary judgment.

The appellant had sought partial summary judgment using issue estoppel offensively, based on findings from a prior Federal Court decision quashing a security certificate against him.

The Court of Appeal held that the dismissal of the summary judgment motion was a final order, as it finally determined the question of issue estoppel and deprived the appellant of a substantive right.

The motion to quash the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario, appealed a decision regarding the enforcement of sponsorship debts against eight sponsors whose relatives received social assistance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the government has a duty to collect the full sponsorship debt, it retains a limited discretion to defer enforcement based on a sponsor's circumstances.

In exercising this discretion, the government owes a minimal duty of procedural fairness to notify the sponsor, allow them to explain their circumstances, consider those circumstances, and notify them of the decision.

The Court found that Ontario's debt collection policy did not improperly fetter its discretion and met the requirements of procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellants were awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale for both the appeal and the proceeding below.

The costs were fixed at $45,000 for one group of appellants, $20,000 for another group, and $60,000 for a single appellant, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

Appeal from dismissal of an application challenging the enforcement of immigration sponsorship undertakings after sponsored relatives received Ontario social assistance.

The court held that the federal and provincial governments have a case-by-case discretion whether to enforce sponsorship debt, and that Ontario unlawfully fettered that discretion by applying policies inconsistent with the family class immigration scheme.

The court further held that sponsors are owed procedural fairness before enforcement, including a meaningful opportunity to explain relevant personal and financial circumstances, consideration of those submissions, and notice of the decision made.

The court rejected the argument that undertakings signed under the former immigration statute became unenforceable under the new regime.

The appellants, permanent residents ordered deported for serious criminality, appealed their removal orders under the former Immigration Act, triggering automatic stays.

Before their appeals were heard, the new Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) came into force.

Section 196 of the IRPA discontinued pending appeals for serious criminals unless they had been 'granted a stay'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that 'granted a stay' refers only to actively ordered stays, not automatic statutory stays.

Applying principles of bilingual statutory interpretation, the Court found the narrower English version aligned with Parliament's intent to expedite the removal of serious criminals.

The Court also dismissed arguments that the retroactive removal of the appeal right violated section 7 of the Charter, concluding that deportation does not inherently implicate section 7 interests and the transitional scheme did not breach principles of fundamental justice.

The appellant sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister of Justice refusing a request for reconsideration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Minister carefully considered the matters raised and that his reasons amply justified the refusal on any test for reconsideration.

The court considered written submissions from the parties regarding costs following an appeal.

The court decided to vary its previous reasons to provide that the appellant is entitled to one third of the costs of the appeal, rather than full costs.

The appellant appealed an order of the motions judge, arguing that the judge erred in abridging the time for service of motion materials and refusing a brief adjournment.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that voluminous materials were served less than 24 hours before the hearing and the appellant's counsel had another commitment.

The Court also found no urgency requiring a final determination on that date.

The appeal was allowed, the motions judge's order was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a rehearing.

The appellant claimed Convention refugee status but was granted permanent residence.

He was later convicted of conspiracy to traffic in a narcotic and sentenced to eight years in prison.

He renewed his refugee claim, but the Immigration and Refugee Board excluded him under Article 1F(c) of the Convention, finding him guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the standard of review for the Board's decision on this question of law is correctness.

The Court concluded that drug trafficking, while a serious crime, does not constitute a serious, sustained, and systemic violation of fundamental human rights amounting to persecution, and therefore does not fall within the Article 1F(c) exclusion.

The appeal was allowed.