Lee K. Ferrier

The appellants appealed an order regarding a solicitor conflict of interest.

Leave to appeal was granted on a narrow issue regarding remedy.

The appellants conceded that if the appeal was limited to this single issue—specifically, whether precautionary measures could be put in place after the fact, without arguing that the presumption of receipt of privileged information did not apply—the appeal could not succeed.

The Divisional Court held that the appeal was limited to the narrow ground on which leave was granted and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a support order, arguing that the motions judge should have directed a trial of an issue under Rule 15(13) of the Family Law Rules.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting that neither party sought to cross-examine on affidavits, the motions judge was not asked to direct a trial, and the judge had discretion not to do so.

Applying the standard of review for support orders, the court found no error in principle or significant misapprehension of evidence.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis fixed at $10,000.

The appellant moved to introduce fresh evidence on appeal, consisting of three affidavits prepared to comply with a previous order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the affidavits were not before the original judge and could not be used to support the submission that a trial of an issue should have been ordered.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a decision, which was heard by a motion judge who reserved his decision.

Six months later, the judge issued a brief endorsement denying leave without providing reasons.

The Divisional Court held that litigants are entitled to reasons and that the failure to provide them raised concerns that the motion was not dealt with on its merits.

The Court set aside the endorsement and ordered the motion for leave to be reheard before another judge.

The applicant sought judicial review of the respondent college's decision to involuntarily withdraw her from its nursing program for breaching an Academic Behaviour Contract.

The applicant argued she was denied procedural fairness and natural justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant was afforded procedural fairness, as she was advised of the allegations and given the opportunity to respond before both the Academic Administrator and the Vice President (Academic).

The defendants brought a motion in Toronto for leave to appeal an interlocutory order made in Milton (Central West Region).

The court raised a preliminary issue regarding whether the motion was properly returnable in Toronto.

After reviewing the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined that a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court must be filed and heard in the region where the appeal is to be heard, which in this case was the Central West Region.

The court ordered the motion transferred to the Central West Region.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision dismissing his malicious prosecution action on a motion for summary judgment.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's finding that the appellant failed to establish a triable issue regarding two required elements: that the defendants initiated the proceedings and that they did so out of malice or an improper purpose.

The court found no evidence of malice and concluded that the police independently decided to lay charges after assessing the situation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision dismissing their motion to set aside a Registrar's order that dismissed their action for delay under Rule 76.06.

The appellants conceded the delay was inexcusable but argued there was no prejudice to the respondent, as the principal plaintiff had died.

The Divisional Court applied the contextual approach, finding that a nearly three-year inexcusable delay, the expiration of the limitation period, and the principles of finality and public confidence in the administration of justice outweighed any lack of prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent, a former police officer and whistleblower regarding child sexual abuse allegations, refused to testify before the Cornwall Public Inquiry.

He was previously found in civil contempt and ordered by the court to appear and testify.

He deliberately and publicly defied this order, orchestrating his arrest before the media and supporters.

The court sentenced him to six months' imprisonment for civil contempt and found him guilty of criminal contempt, with sentencing for the criminal contempt deferred until the completion of his civil sentence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, which found reasonable grounds to believe the appellant's undertakings would not be carried out in accordance with law or with integrity, and that there were problems with technical competence based on past chargeable conciliations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law and concluding that the Tribunal's findings of fact were reasonable and supported by ample evidence.

The estate trustee and a residual beneficiary appealed a trial judgment that found the deceased's daughter and grandchildren were dependants under the Succession Law Reform Act and ordered the estate to be kept open indefinitely to provide them housing.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding that the will failed to adequately provide for the dependants.

However, the Court found the trial judge's administrative scheme, which required the estate to obtain a mortgage it could not afford, was impossible to implement.

The Court varied the order, directing the property be transferred to the dependant daughter, who must obtain a mortgage to pay estate debts and a lump sum to the residual beneficiary, with the property to be sold in 2018 and proceeds divided.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the Tribunal failed to make necessary findings of fact regarding the mailing and receipt of a letter, and took into account irrelevant considerations.

The Tribunal's decision was set aside and the matter remitted to a differently constituted panel.

The self-represented applicant brought a motion before a panel of the Divisional Court to set aside an order of a single judge.

The single judge had struck several respondents, documents, an affidavit, and claims for damages from the applicant's application for judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Human Rights Commission.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the single judge was correct in all respects, as the struck respondents were not proper parties, the struck documents and affidavit were not before the Commission, and the Divisional Court lacks jurisdiction to award damages on judicial review.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that refused to stay the plaintiff's constructive dismissal action pending a determination by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT).

The plaintiff alleged constructive dismissal due to abusive conduct by the defendant's CEO.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, agreeing with the motions judge that the plaintiff's claim was for breach of contract and wrongful dismissal, not personal injury, and therefore not barred by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board.

The Board had ruled it lacked jurisdiction to impose conditions on a private developer's subdivision approval for the benefit of an adjacent private landowner's future development.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the Board's decision on jurisdiction and rejecting the argument that procedural defects could bestow jurisdiction.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board that combined two separate lots on a registered plan of subdivision into a single assessment roll number classified as 'large industrial property class'.

The appellant argued the properties should be assessed separately as 'industrial property class'.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board correctly interpreted the word 'parcel' under the Assessment Act and O. Reg. 282/98, as the properties were occupied by a single occupant and collectively exceeded the required square footage.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award which held that the respondent employer was not obliged to pay the Ontario Health Premium (OHP) on behalf of its employees under the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review, noting the strong privative clause in the Police Services Act.

The court found that the arbitrator's conclusion—that the collective agreement language was intended to cover the procurement of OHIP coverage rather than a general health tax like the OHP—was not patently unreasonable.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, a recipient of disability benefits, received a settlement for a personal injury action that included prejudgment interest.

The Director determined that the prejudgment interest was not exempt income under the Ontario Disability Support Program Act, reducing the appellant's benefits.

The Social Benefits Tribunal affirmed this decision.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that prejudgment interest is paid 'for' pain and suffering as part of the overall compensation package.

The appeal was allowed, and the prejudgment interest was deemed exempt income.

The applicant physician brought an application for judicial review regarding a referral to the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario.

The applicant argued that the Associate Registrar lacked the statutory authority to appoint investigators and lacked reasonable and probable grounds to do so.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, holding that the threshold jurisdictional issues could and should be raised before the Discipline Committee prior to any hearing on the merits.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent College.

The Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry stated a case to the Divisional Court after a witness refused to answer questions at the inquiry.

The witness attended the inquiry but refused to answer questions, claiming he had no faith in the justice system and was a scapegoat.

The Divisional Court found that the witness had no lawful excuse for his refusal and found him guilty of contempt under section 8 of the Public Inquiries Act.

The witness was ordered to re-attend the inquiry to answer questions and to appear before the Court for punishment.