Tracy A. Pratt

The plaintiff staked unpatented mining claims on Crown land where the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) planned to build a realigned highway.

The plaintiff subsequently applied for aggregate permits, which were delayed and limited due to the highway construction.

The plaintiff brought an action claiming the MTO expropriated the property and sought compensation for the lost aggregate value.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that an unpatented mining claim is not 'land' under the Expropriations Act.

The court further held that even if it were land, the claims had no value because the plaintiff could not have obtained an aggregate permit for the entire property, and the property was not wrongfully downzoned.

The appellants achieved modest success on their appeal, successfully striking down a ban on signs under s. 2(b) of the Charter and certain prohibitions in a municipal by-law.

However, the respondent municipality was substantially successful overall.

The Court of Appeal awarded the respondent reduced costs of the appeal fixed at $25,000.

The court declined to interfere with the lower court's costs award of $350,000 for the injunction motion and by-law application, finding it fair and reasonable.

The appellants, representing the Haudenosaunee Development Institute, challenged two municipal by-laws passed by the City of Brantford to prohibit unauthorized interference with development and the imposition of unauthorized fees.

The appellants argued the by-laws were passed in bad faith, violated the open meeting requirements of the Municipal Act, 2001, infringed sections 2(b) and 15 of the Charter, and were ultra vires the province under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court of Appeal dismissed most of the appeal, finding the by-laws were validly passed and did not target the Haudenosaunee.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, striking the words 'invite', 'request', and 'sign' from the by-laws as they unjustifiably limited freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The plaintiffs, indigenous Mayan Q'eqchi' from Guatemala, sued a Canadian mining company and its subsidiaries for human rights abuses allegedly committed by security personnel at a mining project in Guatemala.

The defendants brought motions to strike the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action, arguing that a parent company does not owe a duty of care for the actions of its foreign subsidiary.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that it was not plain and obvious that the negligence claims would fail, as the plaintiffs pleaded facts that could establish a novel duty of care.

The court also dismissed a motion to strike one of the actions as statute-barred, finding that the claim was based on sexual assault and fell within the exception in section 10 of the Limitations Act.

The applicant municipality successfully obtained an interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondents from blockading various development sites and successfully defended a motion to quash its by-laws.

The applicant subsequently sought its costs of the proceedings.

The respondents argued they were public interest litigants and that costs should be in the cause or paid by the province.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the respondents' unlawful conduct necessitated the litigation and they were not acting in the public interest.

The court awarded the applicant costs fixed at $350,000, significantly reducing the $887,000 claimed due to duplication, excessive time, and the exclusion of costs for a court-ordered consultation process.

The appellant mining company appealed an interim injunction that halted its exploration activities and required consultation with the respondent First Nation.

Prior to the appeal, the Mining Amendment Act, 2009 came into force, establishing a new legislative regime for exploration plans and permits involving Aboriginal interests.

The Divisional Court declined to hear the appeal, finding it moot because the rights and obligations of the parties now rested on the new statutory foundation, rendering the propriety of the original injunction an academic exercise.

Following a motion for leave to appeal, the court received written submissions on the reserved issue of costs.

The moving parties argued for a no-costs order, while the responding party sought its costs.

The court found that the responding party was entitled to its costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting that the moving parties had a full hearing on constitutional issues and did not disclose their funding arrangements to support a no-costs order.

Costs were fixed at $28,000 all-inclusive.

Following a successful appeal of sentences imposed for contempt, the appellants sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their costs of the appeal fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondent corporation was ordered to pay $20,000, and the respondent Minister was ordered to pay $5,000, as the Minister's position during the original contempt and sentencing hearings was instrumental in leading to the appeal.

The appellants were successful on their appeal and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants costs fixed at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondent Frontenac Ventures Corporation was ordered to pay $40,000, and the respondent Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario was ordered to pay $10,000, as its position during the original contempt and sentencing hearings was instrumental in leading to the appeal.

The appellants, a First Nation and its leaders, engaged in a peaceful protest and blockade to prevent a private mining company from conducting exploratory drilling on lands subject to an ongoing aboriginal land claim.

They were found in civil contempt for violating interim and interlocutory injunctions and were sentenced to six months' imprisonment and substantial fines.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the custodial and monetary sentences, holding that they were excessively harsh and that the sentencing principles from R. v. Gladue apply to aboriginal persons facing civil contempt proceedings.

The appellants, a First Nation and six individuals, appealed their six-month sentences for contempt of a court order.

The respondent did not oppose the appeal, conceding that the appellants had spent enough time in jail and that the underlying dispute required negotiation.

The Court of Appeal accepted the respondent's position and allowed the appeal, ordering the release of the appellants.

The accused, charged with arson, retained out-of-town counsel under a legal aid certificate.

Legal Aid Ontario refused to authorize travel expenses or junior counsel.

Shortly before trial, the accused successfully applied for a 'Fisher' order requiring Legal Aid or the Crown to pay these expenses to ensure a fair trial.

The Crown and Legal Aid appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the order, holding that the state has no positive obligation to fund counsel of choice except in rare circumstances where a fair trial is otherwise impossible.

The court found no evidence that local competent counsel were unavailable or that the accused's right to a fair trial was imperilled.