HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
African Canadian Legal Clinic
Applicant
-and-
Legal Aid Ontario and Sue McCaffrey
Respondents
INTERIM DECISION
Adjudicator: Kaye Joachim
Indexed as: African Canadian Legal Clinic v. Legal Aid Ontario
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS BY
African Canadian Legal Clinic, Applicant ) Margaret Parsons, ) Counsel
Legal Aid Ontario, Angelo Longo and ) Tracy A. Pratt, Sue McCaffrey, Respondents ) Counsel )
1This Interim Decision addresses whether the personal respondent Angela Longo should be removed as a party to these proceedings.
Background
2On May 20, 2004, the African Canadian Legal Clinic (“ACLC”) filed a complaint with the Ontario Human Rights Commission against Legal Aid Ontario (“LAO”) and the personal respondents. Angela Longo was President of LAO when the ACLC made its complaint. Sue McCaffrey was Vice President, Clinics and Special Services at the time.
3ACLC identified itself as a legal aid clinic protecting the rights and interest of African Canadians. The majority of their staff and the entire Board of Directors are African Canadian.
4The ACLC asserts that LAO treated the ACLC differently compared to other legal clinics in the manner in which the LAO conducted an investigation into alleged financial and other irregularities of the ACLC from April 2003 to May 2004.
Removal of Personal Respondent
5The corporate respondent asked that the personal respondent Angela Longo be removed from these proceedings. In a prior Interim Decision 2010 HRTO 1255, the Tribunal refused this request on the basis Ms. Longo’s conduct is central to the allegations of racism and, if proven, could give rise to a remedy against her.
6Since that time Ms. Longo has died. The respondents have renewed their Request which the applicant continues to oppose. In my view, the death of the personal respondent is sufficient reason for me to consider altering my earlier decision.
7The Tribunal has generally considered the following factors as set out in Persaud v. Toronto District School Board, 2008 HRTO 31 at paras 4-5 in deciding whether to remove personal respondents from a proceeding:
Is there is a corporate respondent in the proceeding that also is alleged to be liable for the same conduct?
Is there any issue raised as to the corporate respondent’s deemed or vicarious liability for the conduct of the personal respondent who [is] sought to be removed?
Is there is any issue as to the ability of the corporate respondent to respond to or remedy the alleged Code infringement?
Does any compelling reason exist to continue the proceeding as against the personal respondent, such as where it is the individual conduct of the personal respondent that is a central issue or where the nature of the alleged conduct of the personal respondent may make it appropriate to award a remedy specifically against that individual if an infringement is found?
Would any prejudice be caused to any party as a result of removing the personal respondent?
In considering whether any compelling reason exists to continue the proceeding against a personal respondent, one way of approaching this question is to ask whether it is necessary to involve this person as a party in order to have a fair, just and expeditious resolution of the merits of the complaint.
8In my view there is no longer a compelling reason to keep the estate of Ms. Longo as a personal respondent to these proceedings. The corporate respondent will be vicarious liable for the actions of Ms. Longo and has the capacity to provide any remedy. In the circumstances of this case, the potential remedies which may have been available against the personal respondent (i.e., training) would not be appropriately made against the estate.
9For these reasons, Ms. Longo is removed as a personal respondent from these proceedings.
Dated at Toronto, this 27th day of October, 2010.
“Signed by”
Kaye Joachim
Member