Stephen R. Moore

The plaintiff professional corporation brought an action against the Law Society of Ontario, several individuals, and a Superior Court judge, seeking damages and declarations related to a previous unsuccessful application.

The defendants requested the action be dismissed under Rule 2.1.01.

The court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, finding that the judge had absolute immunity, the plaintiff corporation had no cause of action, the issues had already been decided in the previous proceeding, and the pleadings contained inflammatory and bellicose language.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated September 18, 2020.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding plaintiffs in the amount of $4,625.00 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a representation order under Rule 10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to appoint Chief Kirby Whiteduck to represent the 'Algonquins' in an action challenging Ontario's decision to grant harvesting rights to two Métis communities in a settlement area currently under treaty negotiation.

The Métis Nation opposed the motion, arguing the class was insufficiently defined and the proposed representative lacked authority.

The court found that the class of collective rights holders was sufficiently defined, the claim was collective in nature, and the balance of convenience favoured appointing the proposed representative.

The motion was granted.

Following the dismissal of a motion by a non-party insurer to intervene and compel the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim, the plaintiffs and defendants sought costs against the insurer.

The insurer did not deliver written submissions opposing the costs requests.

The court awarded costs of $18,550 to the plaintiffs and $17,181 to the defendants, payable by the insurer.

Following a train derailment that damaged the plaintiffs' property, the plaintiffs' insurer paid a portion of the losses but failed to commence a subrogated action within the limitation period.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for their uninsured losses only.

The insurer brought a motion for leave to intervene and to compel the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim to include the subrogated claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that where the insured's loss exceeds the insurance proceeds, the insured is not obligated to maintain an action on behalf of the insurer, and the insurer cannot correct its missed limitation period by compelling the plaintiffs to prosecute the claim.

The appellant was rendered a tetraplegic after diving into shallow water at a provincial park and striking his head.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the appellant was contributorily negligent, failed to prove he hit a sandbar rather than the lake bottom, and that the sandbars were not a hazard under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge made fundamentally inconsistent findings on factual causation, disregarded relevant expert and eyewitness evidence, and misapprehended the evidence regarding the absence of previous injuries at the park.

A passenger was seriously injured in a leased vehicle and sued the driver, lessee, and owner.

The driver was insured by ING, while the owner was insured by Lombard under a policy that included umbrella liability coverage.

The application judge ruled that Lombard's policy provided first-loss insurance and had to respond in priority to ING's policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Lombard's appeal, confirming that the umbrella policy was an owner's policy and must respond in priority under s. 277(1) of the Insurance Act.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court judgment regarding an insurance coverage dispute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the lower court and the arbitrator that the insurance endorsement in question included a causal element excluding coverage for loss or damage resulting from the ownership, use, or operation of specific machinery.

On the agreed facts, this causation requirement was not met.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding liability for a fire, arguing the trial judge erred in qualifying the respondent's causation expert, apportioning liability, and denying an adjournment request on the first day of trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the expert's practical experience sufficient for admissibility, upholding the contributory negligence apportionment, and finding no error in the discretionary refusal of the adjournment given the history of prior indulgences granted to the appellant.

Following the release of the court's reasons, the respondent requested that the court address an argument from their factum to strike out allegations concerning duties owed to a non-party.

The Court of Appeal declined to do so, noting that the motions judge was not asked to strike out those allegations, nor was the court asked to do so during oral argument.

The focus of the appeal remained on whether a duty of care was owed to the plaintiffs.

The appellants, parents of a child apprehended by the Children's Aid Society, brought a negligence action against a secure treatment centre and its social worker.

The appellants alleged the defendants negligently treated the child as a victim of sexual abuse and failed to reintegrate her with her family.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding the defendants owed a duty of care only to the child.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was not plain and obvious that the defendants did not owe a duty of care to the parents under the Anns test, given the statutory framework of the Child and Family Services Act and the specific court orders involved.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Divisional Court regarding insurance coverage for a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued that the conduct of the Ministry and/or OPP constituted separate causes of the accident, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Derksen.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if there were separate causes, the bodily injury still arose through the use and operation of an automobile.

The defendants appealed a motion judge's decision that allowed the plaintiff insurer to pursue a subrogated claim for the recovery of statutory accident benefits.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that section 267.8(17) of the Insurance Act bars such subrogated claims.

The court found that the exception in section 267.8(18) applies exclusively to the Ministry of Health and does not permit automobile insurers to subrogate against unprotected defendants.

The appellant insurer sought to add Livent Inc. and several of its directors as defendants by counterclaim in an action brought by outside directors to enforce a Directors and Officers Liability policy.

The insurer also sought to lift a CCAA stay of proceedings against Livent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, adding Livent as a party because the insurer was entitled to seek a declaration regarding the policy's validity against the policyholder.

However, the court refused to add the additional directors, finding it would unnecessarily complicate the discrete legal issue of coverage for the innocent outside directors.

The CCAA stay was lifted to the extent necessary to give effect to the order.

The appellant appealed an arbitration order finding that the insurer was not required to pay him further income replacement benefits because he was knowingly operating an uninsured motor vehicle at the time of the accident.

The appellant sought to introduce fresh evidence and raise a new waiver argument on appeal.

The Director's Delegate admitted part of the fresh evidence but refused the waiver argument.

On the merits, the Director's Delegate upheld the arbitrator's findings that the vehicle's coverage had been deleted at the spouse's request, that the appellant knew of the deletion, and that the insurer was not estopped from denying coverage.

The appeal was dismissed.