Roger Pinnock

The appellant was convicted of four counts of murder relating to four victims killed over 75 days using the same handguns.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by refusing to sever one murder count from the other three, delivering an unbalanced jury charge, and admitting unusual motive evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary refusal to sever the counts, concluding the jury charge was fair and balanced, and holding that the motive evidence was properly grounded in the record.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and sexual offences against child complainants, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The court held that trial counsel's performance fell far below the standard of reasonably competent representation, including inadequate trial preparation, failure to use prior inconsistent statements, failure to bring or properly address a s. 276 application, and failure to respond competently to similar fact or discreditable conduct evidence.

The Crown conceded that the convictions relating to one complainant were unreliable, but argued the assault conviction involving another complainant should stand.

The court rejected that distinction, finding the incompetence pervasive and the miscarriage of justice engaged both verdict reliability and trial fairness.

All convictions were quashed and a new trial was ordered on all counts.

The appellants were acquitted of first degree murder and convicted of second degree murder.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge erred during jury selection by unilaterally ordering the use of static triers for challenges for cause, despite the appellants' requests for rotating triers and the absence of an application under s. 640(2.1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal held that the improper use of static triers deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers, rendering the court improperly constituted to try them.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) could not apply.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in failing to answer a jury question regarding closing arguments.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered for second degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, which occurred during a car theft.

The Crown's case relied heavily on a confession the appellant made to three associates, one of whom recanted his preliminary inquiry testimony at trial.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting the recanted testimony under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, in instructing the jury on collusion, in refusing to grant a mistrial when another witness refused to testify, and that the first-degree murder conviction based on unlawful confinement was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings or jury instructions, and concluding that it was open to the jury to find the murder was committed during a distinct act of unlawful confinement.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's refusal to make a mandatory Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

The respondent conceded the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting the trial judge offered no explanation for refusing the mandatory order, and issued a 20-year SOIRA order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for prostitution-related offences, assault, and sexual assault, as well as his designation as a long-term offender and the ten-year supervision order.

He raised evidentiary issues regarding a prior consistent statement and collateral evidence of the complainant's subsequent conduct, and argued the jury charge was inadequate and lacked a Vetrovec warning.

He also challenged the validity of the Attorney General's consent for the long-term offender application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, or the long-term offender proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the doctrine of recent possession and in dismissing his application for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly applied the doctrine of recent possession without reversing the burden of proof.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's decision to treat the appellant differently from his co-accused regarding the delay, given his greater number of charges, role in the offences, and minimal prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his designation as a long-term offender and his sentence of 8.5 years imprisonment followed by 8 years of community supervision for 17 predicate offences, including arson and harassment.

He argued that the assessing psychiatrist improperly relied on a police statement that had been ruled inadmissible at trial due to a Charter breach.

The Court of Appeal held that while the statement should not have been considered, the error was trivial and did not affect the outcome, applying the proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii).

The court also upheld the sentence, finding that the custodial term and community supervision serve discrete purposes and were not disproportionate.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple property-related offences, including break and enters.

At trial, there was a joint submission for a three-year sentence, but the trial judge rejected it and imposed a five-year sentence.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the proposed three-year sentence was within the appropriate range, given the appellant's youth, lack of prior lengthy sentences, and efforts to overcome addiction.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to three years by making certain sentences concurrent.