Michele Brady

In an appeal concerning adverse possession of municipal parkland, the appellants sought possessory title to a fenced portion of backyard land registered to the municipality.

The majority held that recognizing a common law immunity for municipal parkland would conflict with Ontario’s statutory scheme under the Real Property Limitations Act and related legislation, which preserves matured possessory claims unless a statutory exception applies.

Because the statutory test for adverse possession was satisfied and no applicable statutory immunity barred the claim, the municipality’s title had been extinguished.

The appeal was allowed and the appellants were entitled to fee simple title to the disputed land.

The Toronto Police Service (TPS) denied Yazdan Khorsand's application for special constable employment with the Toronto Community Housing Corporation (TCHC) based on a pre-screening background check, without disclosing reasons or information.

Khorsand sought judicial review, arguing a breach of procedural fairness and systemic discrimination.

The Divisional Court found the decision judicially reviewable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed this, holding that the pre-screening decision was part of a private employment hiring process by the TCHC, not a sufficiently public exercise of state authority by the TPS Board, and therefore not amenable to judicial review.

The court emphasized that the broad public impact of a decision does not automatically make it judicially reviewable and that public law remedies were unsuitable given the need to protect sensitive law enforcement information.

The applicants sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the City of Toronto from clearing a homeless encampment, arguing the bylaw authorizing the clearance breached section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court applied the three-part test for interlocutory injunctions.

While a serious issue was found, the court determined that the irreparable harm was minimal given the City's offer of hotel shelter accommodation to encampment residents.

The balance of convenience heavily favored the City due to significant fire risks at the encampment and the availability of safer alternative housing.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The appellants sought title to a portion of municipal parkland that their predecessors had fenced off and exclusively used since at least 1971.

The application judge dismissed the claim, finding that municipal parkland is immune to adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while there is no absolute common law immunity, municipal parkland is presumptively unavailable for adverse possession under the 'public benefit' test unless the municipality has waived its rights or acquiesced to the possession.

The dissenting judge would have allowed the appeal, arguing that the Real Property Limitations Act provides a complete code that does not exempt municipal parkland.

The applicant, a racialized individual with no criminal record, applied for a Special Constable position with the Toronto Community Housing Corporation.

He was denied the position after failing a pre-screen background check conducted by the Toronto Police Services Board (TPSB).

The TPSB refused to provide reasons or disclose the information relied upon.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court held that the TPSB's decision was of sufficient public character to be subject to judicial review and that the TPSB breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to provide the applicant with reasons and an opportunity to respond.

The decision was quashed and remitted to the TPSB.

The applicant apartment association applied to quash City of Toronto By-laws 1121-2019 and 1750-2019, which required apartment owners to provide emergency accommodations to displaced tenants and imposed a full cost recovery fee on landlords if the City provided those services.

The court held that the City lacked the legislative authority to require landlords to provide emergency social services regardless of the cause of the building becoming uninhabitable.

The court quashed the specific provisions imposing the fee and the requirement to provide emergency social services, while upholding the remainder of the by-laws.

The applicants sought an order for adverse possession of a parcel of city-owned parkland that had been enclosed in their backyard by a chain-link fence for decades.

The City acknowledged the traditional test for adverse possession was met but argued the lands were immune as public property.

The court found that the lands were originally expropriated for a high public interest purpose and that private individuals cannot acquire title by fencing off public lands.

The application for adverse possession was dismissed.

The defendant sought costs following partial success on a motion to strike and a motion for summary judgment.

The plaintiffs, who were self-represented, also sought costs.

The court found that the defendant was the overall successful party, having successfully struck the 64-page statement of claim with leave to amend certain causes of action.

The court awarded the defendant costs in the all-inclusive amount of $5,000.00 on a partial indemnity basis, representing a 50% reduction to reflect its partial success.

The appellants appealed two interlocutory orders made by a motions judge.

The first order prohibited the parties from bringing any summary judgment motions, and the second required the appellants to produce for discovery anyone who filed an affidavit in support of a summary judgment motion.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, finding that both orders were made prematurely, without an evidentiary foundation, and in a procedurally unfair manner, as the parties had not requested such relief nor had the opportunity to make submissions on it.

The defendant Toronto Police Services Board brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action as statute-barred, or alternatively to strike the Statement of Claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action or being an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion because the defendant failed to file any evidence to discharge its evidentiary burden.

On the motion to strike, the court struck the claims for negligent investigation and obstruction of justice without leave to amend, as they are not recognized causes of action.

The remaining claims, including intentional infliction of mental suffering, intrusion upon seclusion, intimidation, defamation, and Charter breaches, were struck with leave to amend due to insufficient pleading of material facts.

The motion to strike the claim as an abuse of process was dismissed.

The applicants brought a motion to enforce an interim settlement agreement with the City of Toronto regarding physical distancing standards in the city's shelter system during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The City had asserted compliance with the agreement on June 15, 2020, which would trigger the termination of the agreement.

The court found that the City breached the agreement by asserting compliance when it had not used its 'best efforts' to achieve the required physical distancing standards across all sites.

The court ordered the City to continue its pre-compliance reporting obligations until it fully met its obligations under the agreement.

The applicants brought a refusals motion to compel answers and document production from the City of Toronto and Ontario in a Charter application challenging shelter standards during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The motion sought to enforce an Interim Settlement Agreement regarding physical distancing and bed capacity in shelters.

The court granted the motion in part, finding many of the City's refusals improper regarding system-wide compliance data for the May 15-June 15, 2020 period, but upheld other refusals based on proportionality, particularly concerning the Central Intake service, daily capacity data, and information outside the specified period.

The respondent requested that the Tribunal defer the human rights application pending the conclusion of the applicant's complaint with the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD).

The Tribunal declined to defer the application, noting that statutory privilege and confidentiality provisions in the Police Services Act make materials from OIPRD proceedings inadmissible before the Tribunal.

The respondent was directed to file a Response.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against the defendants following a successful summary judgment motion.

The defendants sought $50,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, who was self-represented, failed to provide cost submissions within the allotted time.

The court found the defendants' requested costs to be reasonable and fair, considering their complete success, the seriousness and complexity of the allegations, the plaintiff's conduct in litigation, and the modest rates claimed.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $50,000 in costs plus post-judgment interest.

The plaintiff, Leanne Hunt, sued the City of Toronto, Northam Realty Advisors (landlord), and Pattison Outdoor Advertising Ltd. (sign owner) after sustaining a head injury from colliding with a billboard catwalk.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim.

The court dismissed the motion against Pattison, finding genuine issues for trial regarding negligence in sign design and the conflicting expert evidence on visibility and conspicuity.

However, the court granted summary judgment to the City of Toronto, ruling that its officials correctly applied the building code and by-laws regarding sign permits and were not negligent in interpreting 'pedestrian walkway.' Summary judgment was also granted to Northam, as it was not an 'occupier' of the leased sign under the Occupiers' Liability Act and therefore not responsible for hazards related to the sign itself.

The applicant requested to re-activate her deferred human rights application after the conclusion of another legal proceeding.

The request was filed past the 60-day time limit set out in the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure.

The respondents opposed the re-activation due to the delay.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's representative, a counsellor with no legal training, provided a reasonable explanation for the short delay.

Finding no significant prejudice to the respondents, the Tribunal granted the request to re-activate the application and directed the remaining respondents to file their responses.

The appellant sued a police officer, alleging he suffered damages due to the officer's false testimony in a criminal trial where the appellant was ultimately acquitted.

The motion judge dismissed the claim under Rule 21.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no error in the motion judge's analysis and noting there was no basis to conclude the appellant suffered damages from testimony on a collateral issue.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's decision to dismiss the application without prejudice to the appellant's right to bring an action.

The applicant police officer brought a motion under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a civil action against her.

The self‑represented plaintiff alleged the officer provided false testimony at his criminal trial, which followed allegations made by another defendant.

The court applied the test for striking pleadings that disclose no reasonable cause of action, assuming the pleaded facts to be true.

The damages alleged were tied to the commencement of the criminal prosecution rather than the impugned testimony, and the claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

The action against the applicant was dismissed, while the claim continued against other defendants.

Following a merits decision finding that the respondents violated registration and prospectus requirements under the Securities Act, the Ontario Securities Commission held a sanctions and costs hearing.

The respondents did not attend.

The Commission ordered a 10-year cease trade and acquisition ban, a 10-year director and officer ban for the individual respondent, and $2,000 in costs, finding these sanctions necessary to protect investors and deter future misconduct.