Mark J. Freiman

The applicants, parents elected to a school council, brought an application for judicial review after the Toronto District School Board (TDSB) disbanded the council and ordered a new election due to a procedural irregularity.

The Divisional Court held that the TDSB lacked the statutory authority under the Education Act and O. Reg. 612/00 to disband a school council or review its elections.

The court granted a declaration that the TDSB's decision was made without jurisdiction, but declined to grant further remedies as the school year had already ended.

The applicant, a school board trustee, sought judicial review of the respondent school board's decision to sanction her for breaching its Code of Conduct.

The sanctions arose from the applicant's conduct and statements, including social media posts, criticizing the board and fellow trustees.

The applicant argued the decision infringed her freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and that she was denied procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the board's decision was reasonable, proportionately balanced the applicant's expressive rights with the statutory objectives of the Education Act, and afforded her adequate procedural fairness.

The moving party sought a panel review of a prior order by Pardu J.A. that dismissed her motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing her appeal for delay and to extend time to perfect the appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no error in the motion judge's assessment of the moving party's delay or the lack of merit in the underlying appeal.

The appellant/moving party sought to review a previous order granting security for costs and motion costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the review motion, finding no reversible error in the original decision.

The moving party was ordered to post security for costs and pay specified motion costs within 30 days, failing which her further review motion would be automatically dismissed by the Registrar.

The appellant, Elisa Romero Hategan, moved to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of her appeal and for an extension of time to perfect it.

The underlying appeal was from a summary judgment that dismissed Hategan's claims (wrongful appropriation of personality, civil conspiracy, injurious falsehood, negligence, unlawful interference with economic interests) and awarded damages for defamation against her, along with a permanent injunction.

The Court of Appeal considered the factors for extending time to perfect an appeal, including the length of delay, explanation for delay, prejudice to respondents, and merits of the appeal.

The court found the appellant's delay unreasonable and the appeal to have little or no merit, as her original claims lacked evidentiary support for false statements and the defamation counterclaim was well-founded.

The motion to set aside the dismissal and extend time was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a former member of a white supremacist group, sued the defendants, also former members or individuals involved in anti-hate work, alleging they appropriated her life story and committed various torts including injurious falsehood, civil conspiracy, and negligence.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims, and one defendant counterclaimed for defamation, invasion of privacy, and appropriation of personality.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's claims as frivolous and vexatious, finding no evidence to support any of the alleged torts.

The court granted the defendant's counterclaim, awarding $100,000 in general damages, $50,000 in aggravated damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages, along with a permanent injunction.

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 59.06 and the court's inherent jurisdiction to reopen a previous decision dismissing her application to set aside an arbitral award.

She alleged fraud regarding statements made by opposing counsel during the arbitration and sought to introduce new evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no evidence of fraud and concluding that the applicant was improperly attempting to reargue the merits of her application without meeting the test for fresh evidence.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a College finding that he breached the Advertising Regulation.

The applicant was listed as the 'Associate Medical Director' of a clinic that offered a Groupon deal for Botox, though he only provided retinal surgery and was unaware of the ad.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it reasonable for the Board to conclude that by allowing his name to be associated with the clinic in a directorial capacity, he permitted himself to be associated with the advertising.

The applicant lawyer sought to set aside an arbitral award that upheld LawPRO's decision to settle a claim against her without her consent.

The applicant argued she was denied procedural fairness under section 19 of the Arbitration Act because the arbitrator refused her request for an adjournment and allegedly forced LawPRO's preferred procedural approach on her.

The court found that the arbitrator properly exercised his discretion in denying the adjournment and that the applicant was not treated unfairly.

The application was dismissed.

The proposed intervenor appealed the dismissal of her motion for leave to intervene in an Ontario action seeking recognition of a United States judgment against a foreign state and its security ministry under the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act.

The Court of Appeal held that she met the intervention criteria under rule 13.01(1) because she had a contingent interest in the proceeding and might be adversely affected if the foreign judgment were recognized and enforced against limited Canadian assets.

The court further held that the motion judge erred by treating the matter as a private commercial dispute and by failing to recognize the public importance of the new statutory regime.

The proposed intervenor had a useful contribution to make, particularly on a limitations argument not raised by other parties.

The appeal was allowed and leave to intervene was effectively granted through directions permitting the filing of a factum.

The appellants, two Black lawyers, were aggressively asked for identification in a lawyers' lounge by a librarian who did not question anyone else.

The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario found this constituted racial discrimination.

The Divisional Court quashed the decision, finding the tribunal applied the wrong test and reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the tribunal's decision, holding that the Divisional Court erred by requiring a 'causal nexus' for discrimination and by confusing the legal burden of proof with the shifting evidential burden.

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding they discriminated against the respondents, two Black men, by asking them for identification in a lawyers' lounge.

The Divisional Court quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding no evidence of differential treatment or a causal nexus to race.

The Court held that the Tribunal improperly reversed the burden of proof by requiring the applicants to provide a non-discriminatory explanation for routine identification checks without the respondents first establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

The appellant, suffering from liver cancer, was deemed ineligible for a liver transplant in Ontario.

He obtained a life-saving living-related liver transplant in England at a cost of $450,000 and sought reimbursement from OHIP.

The Health Services Appeal and Review Board denied the claim, finding the treatment was not an 'insured service' under s. 28.4(2) of Regulation 552 because it was not generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in his medical circumstances.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the regulation did not violate section 7 of the Charter, as it did not deprive the appellant of life or security of the person but merely limited a financial benefit.

The appellant appealed an order striking its claim against the respondent employees on a Rule 21 motion.

The motion judge had concluded that a release executed by the corporate parties included the employees and that the action was an abuse of process.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the release covered the employees, and that the motion judge impermissibly weighed evidence.

The Court also held that bringing a subsequent action against the employees was not an abuse of process, as the specific issues and duties of care were not decided in the earlier action against the principal.

The appellant, suffering from liver cancer, was denied a liver transplant in Ontario as he did not meet the medical criteria.

He obtained a living-related liver transplant in England for $450,000 and sought reimbursement from OHIP.

OHIP denied the claim because the treatment was not 'generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in the same medical circumstances' under s. 28.4(2) of Regulation 552.

The Health Services Appeal and Review Board upheld the denial.

On appeal, the Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and concluding that the Regulation did not violate s. 7 of the Charter because the state's refusal to fund out-of-country treatment did not constitute a deprivation of life or security of the person.

Following an appeal where the appellant achieved partial success against multiple respondents, the Court of Appeal determined the appropriate costs awards.

Recognizing the divided success at both the motions and appellate levels, the court ordered the appellant to pay costs for the motions below, while ordering certain respondents to pay costs for the appeal.

The court accounted for the multiplicity of counsel and the novelty of the appellant's arguments in fixing the amounts.

The appellant, former Commissioner of the Canadian Football League, appealed an order striking out his statement of claim against the CFL, its member clubs, and various individuals.

The claim alleged breach of confidence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, defamation, injurious falsehood, and interference with contractual relations arising from his hiring and subsequent dismissal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that while the statement of claim was prolix and contained evidence rather than material facts, certain causes of action for negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and defamation were viable.

The Court struck the entire pleading but granted the appellant leave to deliver a fresh amended statement of claim for the surviving causes of action.

The appellant, former Commissioner of the Canadian Football League, sued the League's member clubs and various individuals for almost $19 million following his dismissal.

The defendants successfully moved to strike out most of the statement of claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the claims for breach of confidence, injurious falsehood, and intentional interference with contractual relations.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, permitting certain claims for negligent misrepresentation and defamation to proceed against specific defendants, subject to the delivery of a fresh amended statement of claim to cure pleading deficiencies.

The appellant sought to amend his appeal to the Divisional Court to include a section 7 Charter challenge against OHIP's refusal to fund his out-of-country liver transplant.

The Charter issue was not raised before the Health Services Appeal and Review Board.

Applying the prerequisites from R. v. Brown, the court allowed the amendment, finding a sufficient evidentiary record, no tactical delay, and that refusing the amendment could result in a miscarriage of justice, particularly given recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in Chaoulli and legislative changes preventing the Board from hearing constitutional issues.

The respondent Commission brought a motion to quash a judicial review application filed by the applicants.

The applicants sought to review the Commission's refusal to enter into a settlement agreement.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that the Commission's discretion to enter into a settlement is not a 'statutory power of decision' under the Judicial Review Procedure Act, as it does not affect legal rights or eligibility for benefits.

No costs were awarded due to miscommunications between the parties.