Lisa Corrente

The appellant appealed an Order to Pay an Administrative Penalty issued by the Registrar of the Retirement Homes Regulatory Authority.

Following a case conference, the parties resolved the appeal and requested a consent order.

Pursuant to section 4.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, the Tribunal disposed of the appeal without a hearing on the agreed terms, directing the Registrar to issue an amended Order.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) upholding the Director's proposal to refuse to renew its residential care licence.

The LAT had excluded the appellant's proposed expert evidence regarding fire safety and the standard of care for treatment foster homes, citing efficiency and lack of necessity.

The Divisional Court found that the excluded evidence was central to the case and clearly relevant, and that its exclusion amounted to a palpable and overriding error that prejudiced the appellant's ability to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed, the LAT's decision was set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different panel.

The Member, a teacher, faced allegations of professional misconduct for failing to keep a record of students' marks in the computerized record system and improperly offering daily physical activity to students who ought to have been otherwise engaged.

The Member pled no contest to the allegations.

The Discipline Committee found the Member guilty of professional misconduct.

Accepting a joint submission on penalty, the Committee ordered the Member to complete a course in classroom management with an emphasis on organizational and record-keeping skills.

The Committee also ordered publication of the decision in summary form without the Member's name, noting the minor nature of the misconduct and the Member's unblemished 26-year career.

The applicant requested reconsideration of a decision dismissing her human rights application for failure to comply with Tribunal directions and failure to attend a case conference.

The request was filed past the 30-day deadline.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable medical explanation for the delay and that the delay caused significant prejudice to the personal respondent, who could no longer be located.

The Pay Equity Office (PEO) brought a motion to strike the applicant nursing home's pleadings, arguing it failed to establish a prima facie case regarding abuse of process, deemed approval of its non-union pay equity plan, and compliance with the proxy provisions of the Pay Equity Act.

The Tribunal assumed the applicant's pleaded facts to be true and provable for the purpose of the motion.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's allegations of a nine-year delay by the complainant and a further two-year delay by the Commission could arguably constitute an abuse of process.

Furthermore, the applicant's pleadings regarding the posting of its plan and the lack of objections were sufficient to make out a prima facie case of a deemed approved plan.

The PEO's motion to dismiss the application was dismissed.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination with respect to contracts on the basis of disability.

The Tribunal scheduled a summary hearing to determine if there was a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to appear at the summary hearing, despite receiving notice and a direction that her attendance was required.

The respondents requested that the application be dismissed as abandoned.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned due to the applicant's failure to attend.

The employers brought a preliminary motion arguing that the union was estopped from advancing the argument that proxy pay equity plans applied to retirement home employees, relying on a 2004 Letter of Understanding.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that the Letter of Understanding merely suspended the union's pursuit of pay equity adjustments pending the final legal outcome of a related case, and did not restrict the legal arguments the union could subsequently raise.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in accommodation on the basis of disability and receipt of public assistance after a failed attempt to purchase a co-ownership apartment unit.

The applicant sought an interim remedy granting her a right of first refusal to purchase any unit in the respondents' building, and requested that her name be anonymized.

The Tribunal granted the request to anonymize due to privacy and safety concerns related to stalking.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the request for an interim remedy, finding that while the application appeared to have merit, the balance of convenience did not favour the applicant, the requested order was overly broad, and the applicant had failed to take timely steps to mitigate her alleged harm.

The appellant was largely successful in having his most serious professional misconduct convictions set aside on appeal, but unsuccessful on his main ground of reasonable apprehension of bias, which consumed 90% of the appeal's time.

The appellant sought costs of $132,868.19.

Applying the principles from Boucher, the Divisional Court awarded the appellant reduced costs fixed at $15,000 on a partial indemnity scale to reflect the divided success.

The appellant dentist appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding him guilty of professional misconduct regarding his treatment of temporomandibular joint disorders.

He argued that a committee member's prior involvement with a Quality Assurance Committee created a reasonable apprehension of bias, and that the committee erred in refusing to qualify his proposed expert witness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the bias claim but found the committee erred in refusing to qualify the expert witness.

The findings of misconduct that depended on expert testimony were quashed, and the penalty and costs were set aside and remitted to a newly constituted panel.

The applicant, which operates both a nursing home and a retirement home, sought judicial review of a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal decision.

The Tribunal had ruled that because the applicant held a nursing home license, its entire operation, including the private retirement home, was a 'public sector employer' subject to the proxy method of comparison under the Pay Equity Act.

The Divisional Court quashed the Tribunal's decision, finding that a literal interpretation of the statute led to absurd and unfair results, such as forcing a private, unfunded retirement home to use a public sector pay equity method simply because of common ownership with a nursing home.

The Court held that the definition must be read to apply only to the extent of the nursing home operations.

The plaintiff was seriously injured when the car she was a passenger in swerved off the road and struck a Canada Post super mailbox, which fell onto the car.

The plaintiff sought to amend the statement of claim to add Canada Post as a defendant, alleging negligence in the placement and anchoring of the mailbox.

The Master dismissed the motion, finding no duty of care to users of the roadway.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that it was not plain and obvious that Canada Post owed no duty of care to users of the roadway who might veer off and strike an unsafely anchored structure.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services refusing to consent to the abolition of the municipal police force unless the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) agreed to binding arbitration regarding the hiring of a specific officer.

The Divisional Court allowed the application, finding that the Commission's jurisdiction under section 40(3) of the Police Services Act is limited to ordering arbitration between a police board and a member regarding severance pay.

The Commission had no statutory authority to order the OPP to submit to arbitration regarding an officer's suitability for employment.

The condition was set aside and the Commission was directed to consent to the termination.