Laura Emmett

During a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff called her treating psychologist to give evidence as both a participant expert and a Rule 53.03 litigation expert.

On cross-examination, it was revealed that the expert had not reviewed the plaintiff's pre-accident medical records or the full medical brief before authoring her reports, relying instead on summaries and the plaintiff's self-reports.

The court exercised its ongoing gatekeeping function and disqualified the psychologist as a litigation expert, finding her evidence lacked the requisite objectivity because she could not identify what documents she had reviewed.

The court instructed the jury to disregard her litigation expert opinions, though she was permitted to give participant expert evidence.

In a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought to call a lay witness to testify about her pre-accident work performance and anticipated retirement age.

The plaintiff served the witness's willsay statement on the 14th day of trial.

The defendants objected to the late disclosure, arguing it amounted to trial by ambush.

The court denied the plaintiff leave to call the witness, finding that the late disclosure violated Rule 31.06 and the plaintiff's discovery undertakings.

The court held that the probative value of the evidence was modest, while the prejudice to the defendants was significant given the inability to investigate the claims mid-trial.

During a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident, the plaintiff sought to call her treating psychologist to give opinion evidence beyond that of a participant expert.

The defendant objected, arguing the psychologist's reports did not comply with Rule 53.03, the plaintiff had not sought leave to call more than three experts under s. 12 of the Evidence Act, and the psychologist lacked the requisite impartiality.

The court held that the reports collectively complied with Rule 53.03 and granted leave to call the witness, finding no trial unfairness or prejudice to the defendant.

The court also found no clear evidence that the treating relationship would prevent the psychologist from fulfilling her duty to the court, leaving the final assessment of her impartiality to a qualification voir dire.

Appeal from a summary judgment dismissing a negligence action brought by the estate and family members of a deceased man who died in a motor vehicle accident.

The motion judge applied the doctrine of emergency to find that the driver, who was engaged in a drug deal, acted reasonably when he drove away while the deceased was attempting to enter the vehicle, resulting in the deceased's death.

The majority upheld the summary judgment, finding no error in the application of the emergency doctrine.

Justice Pepall dissented, arguing that the motion judge failed to properly analyze the elements of the emergency doctrine and that material inconsistencies in the evidence should have precluded summary judgment.

The court issued a corrigendum to correct and add the names of counsel for the plaintiffs and defendants in the original Reasons for Judgment issued on December 7, 2016.

All other contents of the original judgment remain unchanged.

The plaintiff was rendered a quadriplegic after the minivan he was a passenger in was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant Ellis at an intersection.

Ellis had stopped at a stop sign rather than the faded stop line, resulting in poor sightlines, and pulled into the intersection when it was unsafe.

The court found the City of Hamilton 50% liable for failing to maintain the stop line, which created an unreasonable risk of harm.

Ellis was found 50% liable for failing to ensure it was safe to proceed.

Claims against the driver of the minivan were dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to restore a personal injury action to the trial list, discontinue the Family Law Act claims of two siblings, and remove counsel of record for the parents.

The defendants consented to the discontinuance but sought a condition allowing them to examine the siblings for discovery, arguing their evidence was necessary to understand the injured plaintiff's pre-accident condition given his traumatic brain injury and young age at the time of the accident.

The court granted the discontinuance on the condition that the defendants may examine the siblings for discovery, distinguishing prior case law due to the unique circumstances and lack of alternative sources for the information.

The court also granted the order removing counsel of record for the parents.

The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment against a third‑party insurer seeking a declaration that the third‑party insurer provided valid coverage to the tortfeasor at the time of a motor vehicle accident.

The moving party argued the third‑party insurer had improperly denied coverage after cancelling the policy prior to the accident.

The court held that the doctrine of privity prevented the moving insurer from asserting contractual rights under the policy because it was not a party to the contract and had not obtained an assignment of rights from the insured.

Further, under s. 258(1) of the Insurance Act, a third party may only proceed directly against an insurer after obtaining judgment against the insured.

As no judgment or assignment existed, the motion for summary judgment was premature and dismissed.