Kelly Hayden

The plaintiff, Hayley Szeto, brought a medical negligence claim against her gynecologist surgeon, Dr. Sari Kives, after suffering a bowel perforation during a reproductive organ surgery.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant fell below the standard of care by failing to detect and repair the perforation.

The court found that the bowel injury occurred during the surgery and was significant (1-2 cm), and that the defendant failed to adequately inspect the bowel, especially given additional risk factors like significant adhesions, uterine fundus perforation, obesity, and epiploica.

The court concluded that the defendant's failure to meet the standard of care caused the plaintiff's damages, leading to emergency surgery and severe complications.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against two radiologists for failing to detect a lung lesion on three chest x-rays taken between April 2012 and June 2013.

The court found that both radiologists breached the standard of care by failing to identify the abnormality.

On causation, the court held that 'but for' the first radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in April 2012, the plaintiff would not have required adjuvant chemotherapy, suffered a recurrence of his lung cancer, or experienced the associated psychological harm.

However, the court found that the second radiologist's failure to detect the lesion in October 2012 did not cause the plaintiff's outcome, as the cancer had already progressed to a stage requiring the same treatment.

The first radiologist was found liable for the agreed-upon damages, and the action against the second radiologist was dismissed.

The plaintiff underwent a laparoscopic-assisted vaginal hysterectomy performed by the defendant gynecologist.

Following the surgery, the plaintiff experienced incontinence and was diagnosed with a vesicovaginal fistula caused by two sutures inadvertently placed in her bladder.

The parties agreed on damages prior to trial, leaving only the issue of liability.

The court found that the defendant failed to adequately mobilize the bladder during the procedure, leading to the inadvertent suturing.

The court concluded that the placement of the sutures was the result of negligence rather than non-negligent surgical misadventure, and granted judgment for the plaintiff.

Following a successful appeal where the court suggested wording to amend section 22 of a condominium declaration regarding the duty to repair and maintain, the parties were unable to agree on the final wording.

The appellant accepted the court's proposed wording, while the respondents sought different wording and the removal of a paragraph from the earlier reasons.

The Court of Appeal rejected the respondents' submissions as an attempt to reargue the decided issues and ordered that the formal order reflect the court's originally proposed wording.

The appellant condominium corporation appealed a decision refusing to amend its declaration under s. 109(3) of the Condominium Act.

The dispute centered on who should bear the cost of replacing deteriorated chimney flues that exclusively serviced 22 residential units.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in concluding there was no inconsistency between sections 22 and 23 of the declaration.

The Court held that the sections failed to clearly delineate the responsibilities for repairing exclusive use common elements after normal wear and tear, creating an unworkable mutual obligation.

The appeal was allowed and an order was granted to amend the declaration to clarify that unit owners are responsible for maintaining and repairing exclusive use common elements at their own expense.

The applicant condominium corporation sought to amend its Declaration under section 109 of the Condominium Act, 1998, to address issues concerning wood-burning fireplaces and chimney flues.

Specifically, it requested amendments to designate chimney flues as exclusive use common elements, to shift the responsibility for their maintenance and repair from the corporation to the unit owners, and to redefine unit boundaries to include the entire length of the chimney flues.

The court granted the order to amend the Declaration to specify the chimney flues as exclusive use common elements, finding an error in the original Declaration's omission to specify such elements.

However, the court dismissed the requests to alter the maintenance and repair obligations, concluding there was no error or inconsistency in the existing mutual duties, and rejected the proposed redefinition of unit boundaries, finding the current description unambiguous.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action against the defendant obstetrician, alleging that he negligently caused a permanent brachial plexus injury to the infant plaintiff during delivery.

The plaintiffs argued that the defendant applied excessive downward lateral traction and improperly directed supra-pubic pressure after encountering shoulder dystocia.

The court found that the defendant met the standard of care expected of an obstetrician in 2004, properly executing the required maneuvers to resolve the obstetrical emergency.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the mere presence of the injury inferred excessive traction, noting that medical literature and expert evidence established that such injuries can occur from endogenous forces or gentle traction.

The action was dismissed.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision.

The appellants sought to appeal an order of Justice Edward M. Morgan dated June 6, 2018.

The respondents were successful on the appeal.

The court determined costs payable to the successful respondents.

The appellants made a one-million-dollar charitable donation to a mental health hospital for a designated workplace mental health program over three years.

When dissatisfied with the program's progress and reporting, the donor sought an investigation by the Public Guardian and Trustee under the Charities Accounting Act.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding no evidence of mismanagement or misuse of funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the motion judge's findings that the funds were properly spent on the designated program and that no public interest was served by ordering an investigation.

The appellant, 2138746 Ontario Inc., appealed a trial judgment finding that the respondent, Friday Harbour Village Inc., acquired legal and beneficial ownership of the Marina Strip by adverse possession, did not abandon its titled right of way over the Marina Strip, had a prescriptive easement over the Marina Strip, and did not commit actionable trespass.

The respondent cross-appealed a finding that its right of way over the Western Strip was abandoned.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings on adverse possession and related matters.

This costs endorsement follows the dismissal of Luciano Sammut's application for adverse possession.

The respondent, Heather McGhee Peggs, sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the application was commenced to interfere with her property sale.

The court found no reprehensible conduct by the applicant to warrant substantial indemnity costs and determined that Rule 49.10 did not apply to the respondent's offer to settle as the applicant's claim failed.

Considering the importance of the boundary issue, the complexity, and comparable counsel time, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $32,267.53, inclusive of disbursements and HST, to be paid by the applicant.

The applicant sought a declaration of ownership and exclusive use over a strip of land via adverse possession.

The properties were converted to Land Titles in 2002, requiring the applicant to prove adverse possession for the continuous ten-year period from December 1992 to December 2002.

While the court found actual possession of the disputed land by the applicant's predecessors in title, it determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate the requisite intention to exclude the true owner or establish mutual or unilateral mistake, primarily due to a lack of direct evidence from predecessors in title during the relevant period.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.

The applicant donor pledged $1 million to the respondent charity to develop a workplace mental health program, payable in three installments.

After paying the first installment, the applicant became dissatisfied with the program's direction, withheld the second installment, and demanded a refund.

The applicant then applied under section 6 of the Charities Accounting Act for an order directing the Public Guardian and Trustee to investigate the charity's use of the funds.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's concerns regarding the program's vision and timeline constituted a private interest rather than a public interest.

The court noted there was no evidence of financial mismanagement to justify the costly and disruptive investigation.

The applicants requested that the judge recuse himself from the present application, arguing that an endorsement he made in a motion four years ago involving the individual applicant demonstrated an apprehension of bias.

The judge reviewed the prior endorsement and the test for apprehension of bias, noting that the reasonable person is vested with knowledge of the judicial process.

The judge concluded that a reasonably informed reader would not find an adverse view had been formed, as the prior endorsement explicitly stated no fault was found with either side.

The recusal request was dismissed.

Sobeys appealed a decision finding it contractually obligated to directly fund a pension plan deficit following the termination of a warehousing and transportation agreement with Tibbett.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that the parties had entered into a new agreement for Sobeys to assume direct responsibility for the deficit, that Tibbett had acted with due diligence, and that the claim was not statute-barred because Tibbett was not notified of Sobeys' refusal to fund the deficit until 2013.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought an omnibus motion for certification, settlement approval, class counsel fees, and representative plaintiff honoraria in a class action against 407 ETR.

The action alleged that 407 ETR unlawfully used the plate denial remedy against insolvent vehicle owners, contrary to the stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court certified the action for settlement purposes and approved a settlement fund of $7,965,800, finding it fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved class counsel's 30% contingency fee and a $10,000 honorarium for each of the three representative plaintiffs.