Joseph Campisi Jr.

The decision addresses a motion by the defendants (including His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario and several OPP officers) to strike portions of the plaintiffs’ Amended Amended Statement of Claim and Economical Insurance Group’s Defence and Crossclaim, under Rules 21 and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court strikes certain paragraphs for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, particularly those alleging a private duty of care in negligent investigation by police officers to victims, but allows others to stand and grants leave to amend.

The court reviews the legal principles for striking pleadings and the scope of police officers’ duty of care, ultimately finding that a tenable claim may exist based on statutory duties.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment dismissal of his action against the City of Toronto, which was based on his failure to provide timely notice under s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors in her conclusion that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the three-year delay in providing notice, despite having sufficient information to investigate earlier.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its request to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01.

Due to an administrative error, the motions judge did not receive or consider the appellant's responding submissions before releasing her decision.

When notified of the error, the motions judge declined to reconsider the matter and directed the parties to pursue their remedies under the Rules.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge should have set aside her decision and either reconsidered it or directed it to another judge, rather than requiring an appeal.

The decision was set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action against it for failure to provide notice within 10 days of the injury, as required by s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident in 2015 but did not notify the municipality until 2018, after retaining an expert who suggested a potential intersection design defect.

The court found the matter appropriate for summary judgment and held that the plaintiff failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the delay under s. 42(8), as he had sufficient facts to investigate a potential claim against the municipality much earlier.

The action against the municipality was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision that found it lacked jurisdiction to grant interim statutory accident benefits.

Before the appeal could be heard, the appellant's underlying claim was settled, rendering the appeal moot.

The appellant argued the court should still hear the appeal because the issue was evasive of review and of public importance.

Applying the Borowski factors, the Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding that the issue was not evasive of review and that a future, non-moot case would provide a better factual foundation.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the release of the court's reasons for judgment on an appeal, the respondent Aviva Canada Inc. requested that the court reopen its decision based on a recently released Supreme Court of Canada decision regarding the standard of review.

Aviva argued that the new decision altered the applicable standard of review from reasonableness to correctness due to concurrent jurisdiction provisions in the Insurance Act.

The court denied the request, noting that the parties did not agree an error had been made and finding that it was not in the interests of justice to withdraw the reasons and rehear the case on the merits.

The appellant was struck by a car and suffered significant physical injuries that led to chronic pain and mental disorders.

She applied for enhanced statutory accident benefits, claiming a catastrophic impairment under s. 2(1.1)(g) of the SABS.

A designated assessment centre and an arbitrator found she met the criteria because she had a marked impairment in one category of daily living, and they included physical pain in their assessment of her mental disorder.

The director's delegate upheld this decision.

The Divisional Court overturned the delegate's decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court erred by applying a correctness standard of review.

Applying the reasonableness standard, the Court of Appeal found the delegate's interpretation of s. 2(1.1)(g)—that a single marked impairment is sufficient and that physical pain can be considered cumulatively with a mental disorder—was reasonable.