Eric Mathieu Joseph Brousseau

The appellant, Bishop Girgis, appealed a lower court decision that interpreted and rectified a will to distribute proceeds from a property sale to the estate of the deceased's brother, rather than to the residuary beneficiary (Bishop Girgis).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the rectification on the basis that it gave effect to the testator's plain intention, despite disagreeing with the application judge's specific analytical path.

Costs were awarded against the appellant.

This costs endorsement followed two applications concerning the interpretation and rectification of a will.

The court had previously dismissed the interpretation application brought by Bishop Moussa and granted the rectification application brought by Sarwat Mansour, supported by Samia Messieh.

The court applied the modern approach to costs in estate litigation, scrutinizing the conduct of the parties.

While acknowledging the initial drafting error in the will necessitated legal advice, the court found Bishop Moussa's continued pursuit of an "absurd" interpretation led to unnecessary litigation.

Consequently, Bishop Moussa was ordered to pay a significant portion of the costs incurred by Ms. Messieh and Mr. Mansour, with some allowances from the estate for initial advice related to the drafting error.

The Plaintiffs, FactR Limited and Constructr Limited, factoring companies, brought a motion for summary judgment against R.R.I.C.H. Construction & Management Inc., 85242 Newfoundland & Labrador Inc. (the "Contract Defendants"), and Michael Mullett (the "Guarantor") for repayment of loans under invoice factoring agreements.

They also sought judgment against Roman Artemovych for conversion of a cheque.

The Contract Defendants, Guarantor, and Mr. Artemovych failed to file affidavits, attend examinations, or appoint new counsel after their previous lawyer was removed, leading to their Statements of Defence being struck.

The court granted summary judgment as requested, finding no genuine issue for trial regarding the claims for unpaid loans and the tort of conversion.

This is a costs endorsement from the Court of Appeal for Ontario concerning multiple appeals and a motion.

The court ordered that all parties bear their own costs for the appeals and the motion before the lower court, indicating a balanced outcome on the issue of costs.

This appeal addresses whether limited partners can bring a common law derivative action on behalf of a limited partnership.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario held that while limited partners have direct causes of action against a general partner for breach of fiduciary duty or contract, negating the need for a derivative action in such cases, a common law derivative action may be available against third parties who have harmed the limited partnership, particularly when the general partner is in a conflict of interest and refuses to act.

The court dismissed the derivative action against the general partner and its director but granted leave for a derivative action against the three third parties, establishing a test for such leave.

The Applicants, limited partners in Binscarth Holdings L.P., sought declarations that they were entitled to annual cash distributions of the partnership's net income, arguing the Limited Partnership Agreement (LPA) contravened the Limited Partnerships Act and the Accumulations Act, or that a specific tax distribution clause in the LPA mandated a higher payout.

The court dismissed all claims.

It found that the Limited Partnerships Act only requires profits to be credited to capital accounts, not mandating cash distributions, and that the LPA's discretionary distribution power was valid.

The court also determined the Accumulations Act did not apply to this commercial partnership transaction and that the applicants had waived any rights under it.

Finally, the court upheld the general partner's interpretation and calculation of tax-related distributions under the LPA.

The court addressed two applications concerning the will of Sidky Nassif: an interpretation application by Bishop Moussa and a rectification application by Sarwat Mansour, the estate trustee.

The central issue was the disposition of Mr. Nassif's house, specifically whether it should pass to Bishop Moussa as part of the residue or to Mr. Nassif's brother, Shoukry Messieh, after his sister Yvonne Nassif's life estate.

The court found the will ambiguous and that Bishop Moussa's interpretation led to an absurd result inconsistent with the testator's intentions.

Applying the "armchair rule" and considering extrinsic evidence, including solicitor's notes, the court concluded there was a drafting error.

Bishop Moussa's application for interpretation was dismissed, and Sarwat Mansour's application for rectification was granted, amending the will to ensure the house transferred to Shoukry Messieh upon Yvonne Nassif's death.

The Gendelman Defendants sought to vary a Mareva order for the third time, requesting authorization to sell a property (Ravel Property) and access proceeds for legal fees, increased living expenses, and repayment of third-party debts.

The Plaintiff opposed the variation.

The court applied the four-part Credit Valley test for varying Mareva injunctions, finding that the Gendelman Defendants failed to establish they had no other assets available, were not fully transparent about their finances and income, and did not adequately explain significant discrepancies in their net worth statements or the nature of the debts they sought to repay.

The court dismissed the motion, emphasizing the strong prima facie case of the Plaintiff regarding alleged misappropriation of funds.

This endorsement addresses several requests to vary existing Mareva, Norwich, Anton Piller, and Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) orders.

The Gendelman Defendants sought funds for living and legal expenses, continued funding for real estate projects, the lifting of a CPL on a property for sale, directions on seized evidence, and the return of their passports.

The court granted limited interim funds for living and legal expenses, adjourned the CPL issue for further discussion, directed the establishment of a protocol for seized evidence, and ordered the return of the Gendelmans' passports, emphasizing the high threshold for infringing liberty by retaining passports.

This is a costs endorsement following motions by three groups of defendants to strike the plaintiff's fresh as amended statement of claim.

The court had previously substantially granted the motion by the 1Plus12 Corporation defendants, dismissed the motions by the Ricci and Karp defendants to strike the statement of claim against them, and struck the plaintiff's affidavit.

This endorsement determines the costs payable between the parties.

The 1Plus12 defendants were awarded $17,000 in partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff, as they were substantially successful.

The Ricci defendants were awarded $9,000 in partial indemnity costs from the plaintiff, despite their motion to stay being dismissed, due to the necessity of responding to allegations of criminal conduct that were struck.

No costs were awarded to or against the Karp defendants, as their motion to strike the claim against them was dismissed, although they succeeded in striking the plaintiff's affidavit.

This appeal concerned the appropriate measure of damages for a vendor's breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for real property.

The appellant purchaser sought to recover the significant capital appreciation realized by the breaching vendor two and a half years after the breach, when the vendor resold the properties for $56 million more than the original contract price.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, affirming the general principle that damages for breach of a real estate contract are assessed at the date of breach, unless the innocent party can demonstrate a later date is fair due to an inability to re-enter the market and mitigate.

The court found the appellant, a long-term investor, was not a speculator and failed to prove its loss or justify a departure from the date of breach.

The appeal on damages and costs was dismissed, as was the cross-appeal on costs thrown away.

The individual defendants brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff's claim against them for fraudulent misrepresentation.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants, as officers/directors of the vendor corporation, knowingly provided a false lease and statutory declarations regarding the property's condition and tenant obligations during a property sale.

The defendants argued the claim was an attempt to convert a breach of contract into a personal tort.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the claim for fraudulent misrepresentation was sufficiently pleaded, as allegations of fraud, deceit, and dishonesty against corporate officers/directors can proceed, taking their actions outside their corporate role.

This endorsement addresses the costs of an appeal where the defendant's appeal from a master's decision, granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim, was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, as successful parties on appeal, sought partial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs of $8,975.75, payable within 30 days, finding that the defendant's re-litigation of issues on appeal justified the award, despite the underlying motion being for an amendment.

The defendant appealed a master's order granting the plaintiffs leave to amend their statement of claim to include a breach of an earlier manufacturing agreement, after the expiry of the limitation period.

The central issue was whether the proposed amendment constituted a new cause of action.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the master's decision that the amendment did not introduce a new cause of action, as it arose from the same factual matrix and alleged breaches, and the defendant had notice of the underlying facts.

The court affirmed that the "clean hands" doctrine is not applicable to limitation period analyses and that the tenability of amendments is assessed by assuming pleaded facts are true, deferring substantive merits to trial or summary judgment.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiffs, seeking additional security for the discovery stage and for the period from discoveries to trial.

Previously, $45,000 in security had been ordered, with the court finding that 1636833 Ontario Inc. (833) had insufficient assets.

On this motion, the plaintiffs provided new, more comprehensive evidence of 833's financial condition, including significant bank balances, investment accounts, and revenue from an active business relationship.

The court found that 833 now demonstrated sufficient liquid and unencumbered assets in Ontario to satisfy a potential costs award, dismissing the defendants' motions for further security for costs.

The decision reiterated the limits of speculative inquiries into a company's future financial prospects on such motions.

The defendants brought a motion seeking to strike the plaintiff's claim against an individual defendant (Sam Mizrahi) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, an order requiring the plaintiff and its employee to undertake not to interfere with the defendants' economic relations, and security for costs.

The court granted the motion to strike the claim against the individual defendant without leave to amend, finding no reasonable cause of action and that it was frivolous/vexatious.

The motion for injunctive relief was dismissed as there was no underlying cause of action.

Security for costs was granted in the amount of $200,000, payable in installments.

The appellants sought to add three health care providers as defendants to a medical malpractice action more than two years after the original injury.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the wrong test under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the motion judge failed to make proper findings of fact regarding when the appellants knew or ought reasonably to have known of their claims against the proposed defendants.

The court also found that the motion judge erred in treating lack of due diligence as a standalone ground for finding claims statute-barred.

The key distinction was that the claims against the proposed defendants differed from the claim against the original defendant, as they involved allegations that the health care providers failed to take immediate action once cauda equina syndrome was suspected, information that was only revealed during examinations for discovery in 2015.

The respondent Picture Perfect Film Assets, LLC (PPFA) brought a motion to stay an application by the MacLaren Art Centre (MAC) concerning the ownership and sale of Rodin bronze sculptures.

PPFA argued for a stay based on forum non conveniens, issue estoppel, res judicata, abuse of process, and the 'good case management rule,' favouring a broader, earlier-filed Washington action.

MAC contended that its Ontario application, rooted in local bankruptcy proceedings and involving Ontario parties and law, was appropriate.

The court dismissed PPFA's motion, finding that Ontario was an appropriate forum and PPFA failed to demonstrate that Washington was 'clearly more appropriate' under the forum non conveniens analysis.

The court also declined to apply equitable doctrines or the good case management rule to stay the Ontario proceedings.

The court considered costs following a successful motion by Hardath Singh, Ramkali Mohan, 1415006 Ontario Ltd., and Maple Leaf Wheelchair Manufacturing Inc. to secure a stay of a Notice of Arbitration.

The success was based on the legal principle against a multiplicity of proceedings and inconsistent findings of fact, which outweighed the policy favouring arbitration agreements.

Despite the successful outcome for these parties, the court ordered that costs be "in the cause," citing fairness under Rule 57.01(i).

This decision defers the final determination of costs to the trial judge, who will have a full understanding of the conflicting claims and procedural history.

M.N., suffering from terminal cancer with a prognosis of less than six months, sought a court order declaring that she met the criteria for a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption granted in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4.

She also sought a declaration that her physician-assisted death would not require physicians to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The court found M.N. to be a competent adult with a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering, and that she clearly consented to the termination of her life.

The application was granted, allowing M.N. to proceed with physician-assisted death and exempting involved healthcare providers from certain Criminal Code provisions and coroner notification requirements.