Emilio S. Binavince

The appellant appealed a decision finding that an oral agreement to settle an action, reached during mandatory mediation, was enforceable.

The appellant argued that because the agreement was not reduced to writing and signed as contemplated by Rule 24.1.15(3), it was unenforceable, and that mediation confidentiality precluded its enforcement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the parties had agreed formal minutes were not required, the appellant had confirmed his agreement, and evidence of what occurred at mediation may be considered when the enforceability of a settlement is in issue.

The appellant, a civilian employee of the RCMP, brought a civil action against a co-worker, a supervisor, and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging harassment and failure to provide a safe working environment.

The motion judge dismissed the action against the supervisor and the Attorney General, finding the dispute was governed by the collective agreement and the Public Service Staff Relations Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that courts must defer to the statutory grievance procedure for matters involving employment relations and workplace safety.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the motions judge.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the motions judge and dismissed the appeal, fixing costs at $10,000 inclusive of G.S.T. and disbursements.

The appellant appealed an order of the Licence Appeal Tribunal upholding the Director's decision to require audited financial statements as a condition for renewing children's residence licences.

The appellant argued the Director lacked statutory authority to use this information to set per diem rates.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal was correct in its interpretation of the statute and reasonable in concluding the information was not being sought for an unauthorized purpose.

The appellants sought leave to appeal a judgment for costs.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle to justify granting leave.

Leave to appeal was denied and the appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $8,500.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims for malicious prosecution and defamation against the police services board and several officers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that the claims were not properly pleaded until 2002 and were therefore statute-barred under the applicable limitation periods, including the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondent employees were transferred from the Ottawa Police Force to the City of Ottawa.

They alleged that prior to the transfer, the City entered into a pre-employment agreement guaranteeing they would retain their previous terms and conditions of employment.

After the transfer, they were placed under a collective agreement with reduced benefits and brought an action for damages.

The City moved to strike the claim, arguing the dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential character of the dispute concerned a pre-employment contract, not the collective agreement, meaning the courts had jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the factual dispute regarding the existence of the contract could not be resolved on a preliminary motion to strike.

The plaintiffs, comprising Canadian citizens and Yugoslavian residents, sued the Government of Canada for damages in tort and under the Charter relating to Canada's participation in the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.

The Crown brought a motion to strike the statement of claim, which was initially dismissed.

On appeal to the Divisional Court, the court allowed the appeal and struck the statement of claim in its entirety.

The court held that the executive decision to participate in the bombing was a matter of high policy and Crown prerogative, making the tort claims non-justiciable.

Furthermore, the Crown is immune from tort liability for military actions and pure policy decisions.

While the Charter claims were justiciable, the court found that state-to-state military action does not engage section 7 or section 15 of the Charter.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment decision by Swinton J. dismissing their claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's principles or application, as the appellants produced no evidence of publication by the respondents beyond a communication that was absolutely privileged.

The appellant, a federal public servant, grieved his suspension and subsequent dismissal under the collective agreement.

After his grievances were partially allowed and he was reinstated, he brought a civil action against his employer and several individuals alleging discrimination, intimidation, conspiracy, and interference with contractual relations.

The motions judge struck out the statement of claim on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying the exclusive jurisdiction model from Weber v. Ontario Hydro, finding that the essential character of the dispute arose under the collective agreement and the appellant was not deprived of an ultimate remedy.

The appellants, former civilian employees of the police force, alleged they agreed to transfer to the respondent's employment based on a pre-employment representation that their terms and conditions would remain the same.

The motions judge dismissed their action, holding under the Weber doctrine that the dispute arose out of a collective agreement and was subject to exclusive arbitral jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a pre-employment agreement does not necessarily arise out of the collective agreement, and therefore the court may have jurisdiction.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss a human rights complaint for abuse of process.

The complainant had repeatedly requested last-minute adjournments on the first day of scheduled hearings, citing medical reasons stemming from a car accident.

The Board of Inquiry found that the complainant showed a complete disregard for the process by failing to notify the Board of his medical issues in a timely manner, despite agreeing to hearing dates.

Concluding that continuing the proceeding would be vexatious and oppressive to the respondents, the Board granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.

The appellant, a police officer with 31 years of service, appealed his demotion from Staff Sergeant to Sergeant after being found unfit for duty due to alcohol consumption.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed his appeal against conviction, rejecting arguments under section 11(d) of the Charter.

However, considering his prior good service, his efforts at rehabilitation through Alcoholics Anonymous, and the financial penalties already suffered, the Commission varied the sentence.

The appellant was reinstated to the rank of Staff Sergeant without the requirement to rewrite qualifying examinations.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed the termination of his employment by the Board of Commissioners of Police.

The termination was based on a physical disability—an inherited blood clotting disorder requiring anti-coagulant medication—which placed him at a high risk of fatal hemorrhage if he sustained trauma.

The Commission dismissed the appellant's preliminary motion to introduce new evidence, finding it was available prior to the initial hearing.

On the merits, the Commission upheld the termination, concluding that the medical evidence supported the finding that the appellant was incapable of performing his duties safely, and that the Board could not condone the assumption of such a high risk of harm.

The Law Society of British Columbia disciplined a lawyer, Donald Jabour, for advertising his legal services.

Jabour and the federal Director of Investigation and Research challenged the Law Society's actions, arguing they violated the Combines Investigation Act and freedom of speech.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Combines Investigation Act does not apply to regulatory schemes validly established by provincial legislation.

The Court also affirmed that provincial superior courts have jurisdiction to declare federal statutes unconstitutional, despite the Federal Court Act.

Finally, the Court held that the Law Society's advertising restrictions, authorized by valid provincial law, did not unlawfully infringe freedom of speech.

The appellants and respondent TransCanada entered into a contract for the sale and delivery of gas at a fixed price.

TransCanada applied to the National Energy Board to fix just and reasonable rates or tolls for transportation services.

The Board ordered that the Imputed Alberta Border Price be substituted for the contractual sale price of the gas.

The appellants appealed, arguing the Board exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's authority under the National Energy Board Act to fix transportation tolls did not include the power to alter the contract price for the sale of gas as a commodity.