Derek Ronde

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action against numerous pharmaceutical manufacturers and distributors regarding the marketing and sale of opioids in Canada.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and one defendant, Pro Doc Limitée, moved to dismiss the action against it for lack of jurisdiction.

The court granted Pro Doc's jurisdiction motion, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The court struck the claims against the distributor defendants without leave to amend, finding no viable cause of action.

The court found that while there were viable causes of action against the manufacturer defendants for breach of the Competition Act, negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, and failure to warn, the plaintiff's pleading was defective.

The court struck the claims against the manufacturer defendants with leave to amend to join representative plaintiffs for each defendant group and to comply with the rules of pleading.

The plaintiff, Dr. Darryl Gebien, sought court approval for a Third-Party Funding Agreement with Omni Bridgeway Ltd. for a proposed class action against numerous pharmaceutical companies regarding the opioid crisis.

Several defendants objected to specific provisions of the agreement, including those related to amendments, assignments, attornment, costs enforcement, termination procedures, accrued costs, and confidentiality.

The court found that while the agreement generally met the requirements for approval, several of the defendants' objections, particularly concerning comprehensive attornment by Omni Bridgeway Ltd. and the broad confidentiality provisions, were "genuinely meaningful" and required resolution.

The motion for approval was adjourned to allow the parties to address these issues, with the court emphasizing that it is not its role to draft the agreement.

The defendants in a proposed opioid class action moved to dismiss the proceeding for delay under s. 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

In response, the plaintiff brought a cross-motion for a nunc pro tunc timetable order and commenced parallel proceedings in Manitoba.

The parties reached a settlement wherein the competing motions were dismissed without costs, the Manitoba proceedings would be discontinued, and the Ontario action would be deemed commenced on October 2, 2020, making it subject to the amended certification test under the Smarter and Stronger Justice Act, 2020.

The court approved the settlement and issued the consent orders.

The plaintiff sought leave to proceed with a statutory secondary market misrepresentation claim under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act and to certify the proceeding as a class action.

The claim alleged that the defendants failed to disclose material risks regarding the potential suspension of a mining license in Guatemala due to a lack of indigenous consultation.

The court found that the plaintiff established a reasonable possibility of success at trial based on credible expert evidence regarding Guatemalan law and economic materiality.

The court granted leave and certified the global class action, rejecting the defendants' objections regarding the representative plaintiff and the inclusion of foreign shareholders.

The plaintiff franchisor sought costs following a successful motion for summary judgment against the defendant franchisee.

The franchise agreement contained a provision entitling the franchisor to costs on a solicitor and client basis.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that the indemnity only applied to third-party claims and upheld the commercial bargain.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixed at $60,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The plaintiff franchisor brought an action against the defendant, the sole shareholder of a former corporate franchisee, to recover over $1.7 million in costs awarded to the franchisor in a prior class action commenced by the franchisee.

The plaintiff moved for summary judgment relying on an indemnification provision in the franchise agreement and a personal guarantee signed by the defendant.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding the defendant personally liable under both the indemnification provision and the guarantee.

The court also dismissed the defendant's cross-motion, rejecting arguments that the claim was statute-barred or previously released.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their franchise dispute action for delay.

The delay was largely attributed to the disappearance of the plaintiffs' initial counsel with trust funds, and subsequent difficulties obtaining the file from replacement counsel.

The court applied the Reid factors and found the plaintiffs had adequately explained the delay, intended to proceed, and the defendants would not suffer actual prejudice.

The dismissal order was set aside.

However, the court granted the defendants' request for security for costs under Rule 56.01, ordering the plaintiffs to post $30,000 as they failed to demonstrate sufficient assets in Ontario.

The Applicants (YESCO, Young, Wardle) brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a counterclaim filed by the Respondents (226 Ontario Inc., Goldlust).

The counterclaim alleged breach of contract, breach of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), and negligent misrepresentation, primarily concerning YESCO's alleged failure to develop a "National Accounts" program as promised in the franchise agreement and disclosure document.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment on limitations grounds, finding that the "appropriate means" test under the Limitations Act, 2002, was not met as the Respondents were reasonably relying on the franchisor's ongoing ameliorative efforts.

The court also dismissed the motion for summary judgment on the substantive merits of the breach of contract and Wishart Act claims, citing significant factual disputes and the risk of duplicative findings with the main action.

However, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the negligent misrepresentation claims, holding that an "entire agreement" clause in the franchise agreement barred such claims, given the commercial sophistication of the parties.

The moving party, William Watters, sought a stay of judgment pending his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

Watters was a director and shareholder of a franchisee that operated a Cora restaurant and had given a personal guarantee of the franchisee's indebtedness.

The motion judge granted summary judgment against Watters on the guarantee in the amount of $117,000 and dismissed his counter-claim as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed Watters' appeal but allowed Cora's cross-appeal regarding the amount owing.

Watters then sought a stay pending leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The motion was dismissed on the grounds that Watters failed to demonstrate a serious issue of national importance, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The appellant, principal owner of a Cora franchise, appealed a summary judgment against him as guarantor of the franchisee's indebtedness.

The appellant sought to assert a set-off and counterclaim for damages arising from the loss of a potential franchise sale that failed to close when the franchisee refused to provide the franchisor with a release as required by the franchise agreement.

The motion judge found no basis for set-off and determined the damages claim was statute barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding the franchise agreement explicitly precluded set-off, the damages claim belonged to the franchisee not the appellant, and the limitation period had commenced before the appellant commenced the action.

This decision addresses a costs award following the dismissal of a franchisee class action against Pet Valu Canada Inc. The court awarded costs to the defendant on a partial indemnity basis, adjusting senior counsel's hourly rate to align with the Grid.

The defendant's motion to hold a non-party, Robert Rodger (the plaintiff company's sole shareholder), jointly and severally liable for these costs was dismissed.

The court found that the defendant failed to satisfy the three-step test for non-party costs, specifically by not demonstrating that the plaintiff company was a "man of straw" or a sham.

The plaintiff was awarded $10,000 in costs for successfully defending the non-party liability motion, which was deducted from the defendant's overall award.

The applicant franchisees sought leave to appeal an order that refused to restrain the franchisor from terminating their franchise agreements and granted an injunction restraining the franchisees from continuing to operate.

The court applied the test for leave to appeal under Rule 62.02(4)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and no matters of general or public importance, the court denied leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent franchisor.

The franchisor appealed a motion judge's decision finding it breached the duty of fair dealing under s. 3 of the Arthur Wishart Act by failing to disclose that it did not receive significant volume rebates.

The motion judge had read language into a certified common issue without notice to the parties.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by effectively amending the common issue and by concluding that the alleged non-disclosure constituted a breach of the duty of fair dealing in the performance of the franchise agreement.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal regarding the dismissal of its motion to add a new common issue was dismissed.

The franchisor (moving party) brought a motion to hold the former franchisees (responding parties) in civil contempt for breaching an interlocutory injunction that required them to immediately shut down their home care businesses.

The court found that while the franchisor's own confusing communications mitigated some of the franchisees' conduct, the franchisees deliberately violated the order by sending communications to caregivers and customers stating their intention to remain in business.

The court held the corporate franchisees and their individual operating minds in civil contempt, reserving the penalty to a future hearing.

A franchisor sought an interlocutory injunction restraining former franchisees from breaching post‑termination obligations and effectively continuing operations, while the franchisees sought an injunction preventing termination of their businesses.

Applying the interlocutory injunction test, the court found a serious issue to be tried and concluded the franchisor had a strong prima facie case that the franchisees breached contractual prohibitions against common ownership and multiple franchise interests.

Both parties demonstrated potential irreparable harm, but the court held the franchisor’s harm to goodwill, reputation, and system integrity—combined with the franchisees’ inability to satisfy damages—tipped the balance of convenience.

The court emphasized the franchisor’s duty to maintain the integrity of its system under franchise legislation and the risk posed by a rogue franchisee operating contrary to contractual obligations.

The appellant franchisor appealed a declaration that a clause in its franchise agreements requiring a general release as a condition of assignment was void and unenforceable under s. 11 of the Arthur Wishart Act.

The Court of Appeal held that while the clause was not void ab initio, it was unenforceable because it required a release of statutory claims.

The Court declined to apply notional severance to read down the clause to apply only to non-statutory claims, finding that doing so would subvert the protective purpose of the Act and invite franchisors to draft overly broad releases.

On a defendants' motion for partial summary judgment in a franchise misrepresentation action, the court dismissed six remaining challenged causes of action relating to pre-opening events.

The court held that claims based on opening costs, profit-and-loss cost projections, alleged disclosure deficiencies, construction-manager selection, unsupported excessive-fee allegations, and an alleged exclusive-territory representation were either commenced outside the two-year limitation period or lacked evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue.

Applying the post-Hryniak summary judgment approach, the court rejected the responding parties' attempt to defer proof until discovery or future expert investigation.

The action was permitted to continue only on the remaining causes of action not disposed of by the motion.

In this franchise class proceeding, the plaintiff moved to amend its pleading to add a new common issue alleging failures to disclose the franchisor's purchasing power and the insignificant nature of supplier volume discounts.

The court held there was no tenable basis for a generalized purchasing-power allegation, but found an arguable and in part compelling complaint concerning the non-disclosure of the virtual non-existence of meaningful volume discounts, particularly under s. 3 of the Arthur Wishart Act.

The motion to amend was nevertheless dismissed because, in the unusual procedural circumstances, allowing the amendment after the summary judgment hearing would cause non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court then answered deferred common issues by holding that the franchisor had breached its s. 3 duty of good faith and fair dealing in failing to disclose whether significant volume rebates were received, and the amounts received, retained, or shared, while reserving damages for further submissions.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and perfect the appeal in a class proceeding regarding franchise volume rebates.

The delay was caused by an administrative error.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the delay was short and explained, the proposed appeal lacked any merit as it challenged purely factual findings without providing any basis for the appeal.

Following a partially successful Rule 21 motion to strike pleadings, the moving defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The responding plaintiffs argued costs should be in the cause due to mixed success and that the amount sought was excessive.

The court applied the discretionary principles governing costs under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Although success was mixed, the defendants achieved significant success by striking entire causes of action.

The court awarded reduced partial indemnity costs reflecting that the defendants were not entirely successful.