D. Baker

The accused was charged with sexually touching a child on three or four occasions when she was approximately 11 years old.

The Crown alleged that the accused touched the complainant's breasts, buttocks, and vagina under her clothing while she was intoxicated at a firepit and subsequently in the basement and bedroom of the family home.

The accused denied all allegations.

The trial judge found both witnesses credible but identified significant implausibilities in the complainant's evidence, including that she would not be wearing underwear at age 11 and that each alleged incident would follow an identical pattern.

Finding these implausibilities created a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted the accused on both charges.

J.H., accused of three sexual offences, applied for a stay of proceedings under ss. 11(b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms due to unreasonable delay.

The court calculated the total delay, deducted defence delay and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 pandemic), and found the remaining delay of 34.5 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 30 months established in R. v. Jordan.

The application was allowed, and the charges were stayed.

Ryan Abraham pleaded guilty to charges including manslaughter, robbery, threatening death, and firearms offences.

The Crown and defence agreed on a 14-year prison sentence but disputed the amount of "Duncan" credit for harsh presentence custody conditions.

The court, considering aggravating factors (victim impact, repeated firearms prohibitions, prior robbery conviction) and mitigating factors (guilty pleas, remorse, willingness to resolve charges, delays), determined a fit sentence.

The primary issue was the qualitative assessment of presentence custody conditions for the "Duncan" credit, with the court ultimately granting 12 months of Duncan credit, leading to a remaining sentence of just over six years after applying both Duncan and Summers credits.

The applicant, a student with disabilities, sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision that deferred his request to state a case for contempt against the respondent school board.

The applicant alleged the school board failed to comply with an interim accommodation order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding it premature as the HRTO proceeding had not concluded.

The court also dismissed the applicant's motion to adduce fresh evidence and held that the HRTO's decision to defer the contempt issue to the merits hearing was reasonable.

D.H. was charged with criminal negligence causing bodily harm, failing to provide necessaries of life, and assault causing bodily harm related to injuries sustained by a 28-month-old child, B.V. The Crown alleged D.H. assaulted B. or showed wanton disregard for B.'s safety, and deterred B.'s mother from seeking medical attention.

The court found D.H. not guilty on all charges, concluding that the child's severe head injuries were likely caused by a subgaleal hematoma, possibly from hair combing, rather than assault.

The court also found the mother's testimony not credible, noting she changed her story to improve her child protection case, and criticized the police investigation for failing to disprove D.H.'s consistent statements.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm, and the imposed sentence of 18 months incarceration.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's reasons for conviction were inadequate or unreasonable, and that the sentence was excessive.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons adequate for appellate review and reasonable based on the evidence.

The court also found the sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's criminal record and the aggravating circumstances of the offences.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of over $467,000 entered against her in an action for unpaid construction materials.

The defendant claimed she was unknowingly made a director of her son's construction company and had no involvement in its operations.

Applying the five-factor test under Rule 19.08, the court found she had an arguable defence and a plausible explanation for her default, having relied on her son's assurances.

Despite significant delay in bringing the motion, the court balanced the factors and set aside the default judgment, ordering the defendant to pay $2,000 in costs thrown away to the plaintiffs.