C. Coughlin

The Crown brought a pretrial application to admit non-expert recognition evidence from the father and stepmother of one of the accused, who viewed video surveillance of the suspects.

The defence argued the evidence was inadmissible as the witnesses did not definitively identify the accused and their evidence was tainted by police.

The court held that the witnesses' long knowledge of the accused and their observations regarding clothing and physical characteristics were relevant to identification, and the evidence was admissible, with its weight to be determined by the jury.

The accused was charged with manslaughter after killing his father and setting the body on fire in a vehicle.

The accused had a lengthy history of mental illness and was experiencing severe delusions at the time, believing his father was an alien trying to kill him.

Relying on expert psychiatric evidence, the court found that the accused suffered from a schizoaffective disorder that rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible (NCR) and the matter was referred to the Ontario Review Board.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to determine the voluntariness of two statements made by the accused to police.

The first statement was made to patrol officers investigating a trespass complaint prior to the murder, and the second was a six-hour interview following the accused's arrest by a tactical unit.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found no evidence of inducements, oppression, lack of an operating mind, or police trickery.

Both statements were ruled voluntary, with the first admissible in the Crown's case in chief and the second admissible for cross-examination.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter applications alleging abuse of process, unlawful searches, and multiple right-to-counsel breaches arising from his arrest on an outstanding warrant and ensuing firearm and drug investigation.

The court rejected allegations of police cover-up, fabrication, and perjury, and dismissed most alleged s. 8 and s. 10 breaches, but found specific breaches when an officer went onto the unit balcony without authority, when police asked the accused 'where's the gun' before a proper opportunity to consult counsel, when a canine officer re-entered the unit without lawful authority, and when Unit searches proceeded under invalid Criminal Code and CDSA warrants.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded observations and evidence flowing from those specific breaches, including all observations and items seized under the invalid Unit warrants.

The court held, however, that the firearm and drugs found on the neighbouring balcony were not obtained in a manner that infringed the accused's Charter rights and remained admissible.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration.

At trial, the accused brought Charter applications alleging violations of his rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b).

The accused argued that the police failed to accommodate his limited English comprehension, failed to facilitate his right to counsel by not allowing him to speak to a friend, and arbitrarily detained him for seven hours after breath testing.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the accused sufficiently understood his rights, the police made reasonable efforts to contact his friend for a lawyer's name before the accused spoke to duty counsel, and the continued detention was justified given the accused's high blood alcohol level and inability to care for himself.

During a jury trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the accused applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

They argued there was no evidence from which a jury could infer that a reasonable person would have objectively foreseen the risk of bodily harm.

The court dismissed the application, finding that evidence including video footage, the sound and power of the air hose, and the bypassing of a safety mechanism provided a sufficient basis for a properly instructed jury to find objective foreseeability of bodily harm.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion seeking an order for the jury and the court to take a view of the food processing facility where the deceased was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose during an incident of horseplay.

The Crown sought the view primarily to allow the jury to hear the sound of the air hose.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the facility had undergone significant changes since the incident, the exact conditions could not be recreated, and the jury would have access to high-quality video and audio evidence.

The court concluded that the potential prejudice to the accused outweighed the limited probative value of the view.

In a manslaughter trial involving three Punjabi Sikh accused, the defence brought a pretrial motion to determine the wording of a challenge for cause question to be put to the jury panel.

The court ruled that a general preamble was sufficient, rejecting a more detailed version proposed by the defence.

The court also held that the question should specifically identify the accused as Punjabi Sikhs, recognizing that prejudice may be triggered by outward manifestations of religious beliefs such as wearing a turban.

Finally, the court exercised its discretion to not provide the question to prospective jurors in advance, preferring spontaneous answers.

The accused were charged with unlawful act manslaughter following a workplace incident where a co-worker was fatally injured by a high-pressure air hose.

One of the accused brought a motion to admit expert evidence from an occupational health and safety expert regarding the hazards of compressed air and the need for workplace training.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed evidence regarding domestic law was inadmissible, and the factual evidence lacked probative value and was unnecessary, as the objective standard for manslaughter does not require such specialized knowledge.

During a trial for unlawful act manslaughter arising from a workplace incident involving a compressed air hose, the defence sought to cross-examine the Crown's forensic pathology expert on a statement from a 1942 journal article regarding public perception of the dangers of compressed air.

The Crown objected.

Following a voir dire, the court ruled that the question could not be put to the expert.

The court found that public perception was outside the expert's area of expertise, the 1942 article was of limited reliability for assessing public knowledge in 2015, and the question had no probative value while carrying significant prejudicial effect.

A jury trial arising from the kidnapping, extortion, assault, and unlawful confinement of the complainant.

The court issued written reasons for numerous pre‑trial and mid‑trial rulings including mistrial motions, evidentiary disputes, cell tower evidence admissibility, video‑link testimony under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code, interpretation issues under s. 14 of the Charter, and jury charge requests.

The court dismissed several defence mistrial applications, permitted certain Crown evidence including cell tower records as factual evidence, allowed video‑link testimony from a witness abroad, and provided jury instructions concerning fabricated statements and the Browne v. Dunn rule.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused and acquitted one.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained after police entered a residence without a warrant following a 911 call reporting a gun and possible emergency.

Police arrived, detained an occupant in the backyard, and conducted a sweep of the home where they discovered a complainant tied to a bed in the basement and seized two envelopes during the search.

The applicants argued the entry and subsequent seizure violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held the warrantless entry was justified under the police duty to protect life and safety in response to an emergency 911 call.

The seizure of the envelopes was lawful as plain view evidence discovered while officers were lawfully present in the home.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of physical evidence and statements following a police investigation into a reported kidnapping.

Police had entered a residence after a 911 call and later attended a second location linked to a vehicle found at the scene, where the accused was arrested.

The accused argued that seizure and search of pants containing identification and items belonging to the complainant breached s.8 of the Charter, and that statements were obtained in breach of s.10(b).

The court held the seizure of the pants was a lawful search incident to arrest for the purpose of confirming identification and therefore did not violate s.8.

Although one post‑arrest question about identification breached s.10(b), the breach was minor and did not justify exclusion under s.24(2), and all statements were found voluntary.

In a criminal prosecution for kidnapping, extortion, and assault, the court conducted a blended voir dire regarding the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police following a 911 call and police entry into a residence where a bound complainant was discovered.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, particularly the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court found that one police officer violated the accused’s right to counsel during investigative detention but declined to exclude certain statements after applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant.

Spontaneous utterances and statements made after proper cautions and waiver of counsel were admitted, while statements allegedly made to another officer in the police cruiser were excluded because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to unreliable notes and evidentiary inconsistencies.

During a jury trial on kidnapping, extortion, and assault charges, one accused brought a Corbett application to restrict use of his criminal record if he testified.

The court applied the balancing analysis governing admissibility of prior convictions, weighing probative value on credibility against the risk of prejudice through impermissible propensity reasoning.

The court held that the prior conviction for failing to comply with a recognizance bore directly on testimonial credibility and was admissible.

The two uttering threats convictions were excluded because their prejudicial effect outweighed their limited credibility value in the context of the Crown theory at trial.

In a mid-trial motion, the accused sought to exclude a forensic DNA analysis on the basis that police handling of cloth restraints during an earlier trial created a serious risk of contamination.

The court held that, even accepting the factual allegations regarding handling and continuity, the complaint went to the weight of the DNA evidence rather than its admissibility.

Applying the trial judge’s case-management authority, the court found there was no reasonable likelihood that a voir dire would assist in determining admissibility.

The application was summarily dismissed as unmeritorious and brought too late.

In a criminal jury trial on kidnapping, extortion, and assault charges, the Crown sought to adduce hearsay statements made by an absent alleged participant through a former friend.

The court held the co-conspirators' exception did not apply because there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that a joint criminal enterprise involving the accused already existed when the statements were made.

The court also rejected alternative hearsay routes based on penal interest, present intention, motive, and credibility corroboration, finding the proposed evidence irrelevant to the live issue of the identity and participation of the accused.

The application was dismissed, subject only to a narrow allowance to refer to the Square One meeting to refresh the witness's memory about a phone number.

In a first-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit several categories of hearsay statements made by the deceased, including statements to a school friend and her sister, text messages to her mother, personal writings, and contextual evidence regarding discipline within the household.

The defence opposed portions of the evidence, arguing that it constituted inadmissible hearsay or impermissible prior discreditable conduct whose prejudicial effect outweighed probative value.

Applying the analytical framework for hearsay admissibility, including the state of mind exception and the principled exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability, the court held that most of the deceased’s statements were admissible as either non-hearsay evidence of state of mind or under the principled exception.

Evidence concerning family discipline and prior incidents was also admitted as relevant contextual evidence with probative value exceeding potential prejudice.

One diary entry dated more than a year prior to the death was excluded because its limited probative value was outweighed by its potential prejudicial impact.

In a pre‑trial voir dire in a first degree murder prosecution, the accused sought to exclude a police interview conducted the day the victim’s body was discovered.

The court considered whether the accused was detained during questioning at the police station and therefore entitled to rights to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Applying the detention factors from R. v. Moran and the objective test for psychological detention articulated in R. v. Grant, the court found the accused was effectively detained when interviewed after being transported in a locked police cruiser and held in an interview room for hours without a caution.

Because the accused was not advised of his right to counsel, his Charter rights were breached.

The statement was excluded under s. 24(2), and the court noted that it would also have had a reasonable doubt regarding voluntariness.

In a pretrial ruling in a first degree murder prosecution, the accused sought to challenge prospective jurors for cause on the basis of potential race‑based bias and requested that the court adopt a multiple‑choice formulation of the challenge question derived from prior jurisprudence.

The Crown opposed the request and argued that the traditional Parks question should be used.

The court held that a question permitting prospective jurors to answer in their own words better assists the triers in evaluating sincerity and bias than a structured multiple‑choice response.

The application to conduct a challenge for cause was allowed, but the court declined to adopt the proposed multiple‑choice wording and instead directed that the traditional Parks formulation, or a modified version used in prior authority, be employed.

The court further held that the question would not be provided in writing to jurors in the witness box.