R. Lepore

Two actions arose from a construction project where Kelson subcontracted Amar for sheet metal work, and Amar sub-subcontracted Sjostrom for labour.

Sjostrom walked off the job due to non-payment by Amar.

Kelson then directly engaged Sjostrom to complete the work and issued a change order reducing Amar's contract price.

Sjostrom claimed unpaid amounts from Kelson, while Amar claimed the unpaid balance of its subcontract.

The court found that Kelson and Sjostrom formed a direct oral contract, but Sjostrom failed to prove its claimed hours and its action was dismissed.

The court also found that the change order removed the remaining labour from Amar's scope of work, and Kelson breached its subcontract with Amar by non-payment.

Amar was awarded $209,737.88.

In a long-running dispute over a solicitor's account, the solicitor objected to the client's late delivery of a supplementary expert report regarding alleged spoliation of computer files.

The case management judge found that the client's counsel breached prior case management directions by serving the report late and in an obscure manner.

However, because the solicitor had also been granted an extension to file her own expert report, the court admitted the client's late report to ensure procedural fairness, while adjourning the trial and setting strict new timelines.

The client brought an assessment of the solicitor's account, which had been ongoing for ten years.

The parties sought further production and particulars from each other.

The client argued the solicitor should be estopped from seeking production due to delay, which the court dismissed, noting ongoing preservation obligations.

The court applied the principle of proportionality to limit the scope of discovery and ordered both parties to provide specific documents and particulars to ensure each side knew the case to meet, despite the solicitor bearing the ultimate burden of proof.

A jury trial arising from the kidnapping, extortion, assault, and unlawful confinement of the complainant.

The court issued written reasons for numerous pre‑trial and mid‑trial rulings including mistrial motions, evidentiary disputes, cell tower evidence admissibility, video‑link testimony under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code, interpretation issues under s. 14 of the Charter, and jury charge requests.

The court dismissed several defence mistrial applications, permitted certain Crown evidence including cell tower records as factual evidence, allowed video‑link testimony from a witness abroad, and provided jury instructions concerning fabricated statements and the Browne v. Dunn rule.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused and acquitted one.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained after police entered a residence without a warrant following a 911 call reporting a gun and possible emergency.

Police arrived, detained an occupant in the backyard, and conducted a sweep of the home where they discovered a complainant tied to a bed in the basement and seized two envelopes during the search.

The applicants argued the entry and subsequent seizure violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held the warrantless entry was justified under the police duty to protect life and safety in response to an emergency 911 call.

The seizure of the envelopes was lawful as plain view evidence discovered while officers were lawfully present in the home.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of physical evidence and statements following a police investigation into a reported kidnapping.

Police had entered a residence after a 911 call and later attended a second location linked to a vehicle found at the scene, where the accused was arrested.

The accused argued that seizure and search of pants containing identification and items belonging to the complainant breached s.8 of the Charter, and that statements were obtained in breach of s.10(b).

The court held the seizure of the pants was a lawful search incident to arrest for the purpose of confirming identification and therefore did not violate s.8.

Although one post‑arrest question about identification breached s.10(b), the breach was minor and did not justify exclusion under s.24(2), and all statements were found voluntary.

In a criminal prosecution for kidnapping, extortion, and assault, the court conducted a blended voir dire regarding the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police following a 911 call and police entry into a residence where a bound complainant was discovered.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, particularly the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court found that one police officer violated the accused’s right to counsel during investigative detention but declined to exclude certain statements after applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant.

Spontaneous utterances and statements made after proper cautions and waiver of counsel were admitted, while statements allegedly made to another officer in the police cruiser were excluded because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to unreliable notes and evidentiary inconsistencies.

During a criminal jury trial involving allegations including kidnapping and extortion, the Crown sought to introduce oral statements attributed to one accused that differed from the version summarized in an earlier pre‑trial ruling on voluntariness.

The updated police testimony suggested that the accused named co‑accused as involved in the offence.

The trial judge held that the credibility of the differing versions of the statement was a matter for the jury and that the earlier ruling on voluntariness could not be revisited mid‑trial based on a changed evidentiary landscape.

Applying the discretionary exclusionary framework for prejudicial evidence, the court concluded that the probative value of the “new” version was not outweighed by prejudice to the co‑accused.

The statement would therefore be admitted without editing, with appropriate limiting instructions to the jury that it could only be used against the declarant accused.

The accused brought Charter applications seeking exclusion of statements and physical evidence and a stay of proceedings in a prosecution involving kidnapping, extortion, and forcible confinement.

The court considered the voluntariness of statements made before and after arrest, alleged breaches of ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter, and the impact of lost evidence including a wallet and driver’s licence.

Applying the confessions rule and the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held the statements were voluntary and admissible, finding the accused had sufficient English comprehension and had knowingly waived counsel.

A brief s.10(b) breach occurred when an officer asked for identification immediately after arrest, but the statement about the location of the accused’s pants was admitted under s.24(2).

The court also held the accused lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment where the pants were seized and therefore had no standing for a s.8 challenge.

The request to stay proceedings based on lost evidence was adjourned until the conclusion of the trial evidence.