M. Moon

The accused was charged with attempted murder, aggravated assault, and breaching a recognizance after a five-year-old child was found severely beaten in a wooded area.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's motive stemming from a deteriorating relationship with the child's mother, his opportunity to commit the crime, pattern bruising on the child matching the accused's shoes, and the child's DNA found under the accused's fingernails.

The court applied the Villaroman test for circumstantial evidence and concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused committed the assault.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

During a trial for attempted murder and aggravated assault, a key Crown witness refused to be sworn and testify.

The Crown brought an application under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code to admit the witness's testimony from the preliminary inquiry.

The accused opposed the application, arguing he did not have a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry because he subsequently obtained new impeachment materials.

The court held that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine and that admitting the prior testimony would not occasion unfairness, provided the newly discovered impeachment materials were also admitted into evidence.

The Crown's application was granted subject to conditions.

The accused was charged with manslaughter after killing his father and setting the body on fire in a vehicle.

The accused had a lengthy history of mental illness and was experiencing severe delusions at the time, believing his father was an alien trying to kill him.

Relying on expert psychiatric evidence, the court found that the accused suffered from a schizoaffective disorder that rendered him incapable of knowing his actions were morally wrong.

The accused was found not criminally responsible (NCR) and the matter was referred to the Ontario Review Board.

The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter for his role as a secondary participant in a fatal shooting.

The Crown sought 16-18 years, while the defence sought 13-14 years.

The court determined the appropriate sentence was 15 years.

The court awarded 10 years of standard pre-sentence credit (1.5 to 1) plus an additional 6 months of enhanced credit due to harsh pre-trial custody conditions, including frequent lockdowns and COVID-19 impacts, leaving 4.5 years to be served.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder for the brutal stabbing of his estranged wife in her home.

The Crown sought a 20-year parole ineligibility period, while the defence sought 12 to 15 years.

The court considered the extreme brutality of the attack, the domestic context, and the offender's lack of remorse as aggravating factors.

Applying the Shropshire principles, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 17 years, the top end of the usual range for spousal murder.

The accused was tried for first-degree murder after the victim was found with 138 stab wounds.

During the trial, the defence sought to have the trial judge instruct the jury on self-defence and provocation, arguing that the victim may have attacked the accused first with a knife found at the scene.

The trial judge applied the air of reality test and concluded there was no evidential foundation for either defence, noting that the placement of the knife was staged and there was no evidence of the victim initiating an assault or provoking the accused.

The request to include the defences in the jury charge was denied.

During a first-degree murder trial, the defence sought to admit a portion of a prior court transcript containing a judge's comments ordering an assessment of the accused's fitness to stand trial.

The defence argued the comments provided context to the accused's prior admissions of guilt.

The court ruled the judge's statements were inadmissible, finding they did not provide context to the accused's statements and that admitting them without the subsequent psychiatric assessment finding the accused fit to stand trial would mislead the jury.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder following the stabbing death of his estranged wife.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused brought an application for a directed verdict, arguing there was insufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to go to the jury.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's prior statements, motive, and post-offence conduct provided sufficient circumstantial evidence upon which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer that the murder was planned and deliberate.

During a murder trial, the Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused during a prior plea inquiry where a guilty plea was ultimately rejected by the court.

The Crown intended to use these statements to cross-examine the accused if the defence of duress was raised.

The court ruled that statements made during a rejected plea inquiry are inextricably linked to the aborted plea and are inadmissible, as admitting them would undermine trial fairness and have a chilling effect on plea negotiations.

Prior to a first-degree murder trial, the defence brought an application to permit the in-custody accused to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box.

The Crown opposed the application, citing institutional incident reports demonstrating the accused's history of violence and non-compliance while in custody.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the incident reports established a significant risk to courtroom security.

The court also noted that security concerns were heightened due to anticipated hostility between the accused and certain Crown witnesses.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit prior inconsistent statements made by a recanting witness to a police agent in a courthouse holding cell.

The witness had previously been granted leave to be cross-examined under s. 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay to assess threshold reliability.

The court admitted the first part of the statements, finding sufficient procedural and substantive reliability as the witness confirmed making them and was available for cross-examination.

The second part of the statements was excluded due to poor audio quality and incomplete utterances, which undermined the jury's ability to assess their truth and accuracy.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial applications to exclude audio files found on his Blackberry cell phone.

The files contained rap lyrics referencing a firearm of the same calibre as the murder weapon.

The accused argued that the seizure of the phone, the search warrant, and the delayed report to a justice violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found no Charter breach in the initial seizure or the type of warrant used.

Although the Crown conceded a breach regarding the delayed report to a justice, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also upheld the validity of the search warrant and found the probative value of the rap lyrics outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The applications were dismissed.

The applicant, facing multiple charges of fraud and breach of recognizance, sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

He had been arrested for attending casinos and gambling in violation of his bail conditions, allegedly using a false passport to evade detection.

The reviewing judge upheld the justice of the peace's decision to cancel the previous recognizance under s. 524 and order detention on the secondary ground, finding a substantial likelihood of further offences.

The court also refused to admit fresh evidence regarding gambling addiction and electronic monitoring, and further held that detention was justified on the tertiary ground to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused, jointly charged with unlawful confinement and aggravated assault, brought applications to sever counts on the indictment.

One accused was additionally charged with attempted murder and several counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused argued that trying the drug charges together with the violent offences would cause severe prejudice and propensity reasoning.

The court dismissed the applications, finding that the drug charges provided the context and motive for the violent offences, as the victim was a competing drug dealer.

The court held that the interests of justice favoured a single trial, and any potential prejudice could be addressed through proper jury instructions.

The offenders were sentenced following a jury trial where Bengy was convicted of second degree murder and Modeste was convicted of manslaughter in relation to the stabbing death of Brandon Ramdeen.

Bengy, who stabbed the unarmed victim while he was overpowered, was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 11 years.

Modeste, who participated in the group assault but did not stab the victim, was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, with 49.5 months remaining after credit for pre-trial custody.