J. Razaqpur

The offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, firearms offences, and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The murder involved a targeted public shooting with two firearms, resulting in one death and injuries to two others.

The court considered the offender's youth, guilty plea, and social context evidence of anti-Black racism, but found the aggravating factors, including elements of planning and deliberation, required a significant period of parole ineligibility.

The offender was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years, and a concurrent 13-year sentence for the firearms and drug offences.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pretrial application to exclude his formal statement to police, alleging it was involuntary and obtained in violation of his rights under ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the statement was voluntary, as the police interrogation techniques did not overbear the applicant's will.

However, the court found that the police breached ss. 10(a) and 10(b) by failing to inform the applicant of the deceased's name or specific details of the murder charge, which prevented him from meaningfully instructing counsel.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the statement would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the evidence.

During a trial for first-degree murder, the accused requested that the partial defence of provocation be left with the jury.

The accused testified that the victim made threatening comments before the accused killed him.

The trial judge refused the request, finding no air of reality to the objective element of the defence.

The court held that the victim's comments, made while bound and confined by the accused, would not cause an ordinary person to lose the power of self-control.

A jury trial arising from the kidnapping, extortion, assault, and unlawful confinement of the complainant.

The court issued written reasons for numerous pre‑trial and mid‑trial rulings including mistrial motions, evidentiary disputes, cell tower evidence admissibility, video‑link testimony under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code, interpretation issues under s. 14 of the Charter, and jury charge requests.

The court dismissed several defence mistrial applications, permitted certain Crown evidence including cell tower records as factual evidence, allowed video‑link testimony from a witness abroad, and provided jury instructions concerning fabricated statements and the Browne v. Dunn rule.

The jury ultimately convicted two accused and acquitted one.

The accused applied under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained after police entered a residence without a warrant following a 911 call reporting a gun and possible emergency.

Police arrived, detained an occupant in the backyard, and conducted a sweep of the home where they discovered a complainant tied to a bed in the basement and seized two envelopes during the search.

The applicants argued the entry and subsequent seizure violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The court held the warrantless entry was justified under the police duty to protect life and safety in response to an emergency 911 call.

The seizure of the envelopes was lawful as plain view evidence discovered while officers were lawfully present in the home.

In a criminal prosecution for kidnapping, extortion, and assault, the court conducted a blended voir dire regarding the admissibility of statements made by the accused to police following a 911 call and police entry into a residence where a bound complainant was discovered.

The accused argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of Charter rights, particularly the right to counsel under s. 10(b).

The court found that one police officer violated the accused’s right to counsel during investigative detention but declined to exclude certain statements after applying the s. 24(2) framework from Grant.

Spontaneous utterances and statements made after proper cautions and waiver of counsel were admitted, while statements allegedly made to another officer in the police cruiser were excluded because the Crown failed to prove voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt due to unreliable notes and evidentiary inconsistencies.

During a criminal jury trial involving allegations including kidnapping and extortion, the Crown sought to introduce oral statements attributed to one accused that differed from the version summarized in an earlier pre‑trial ruling on voluntariness.

The updated police testimony suggested that the accused named co‑accused as involved in the offence.

The trial judge held that the credibility of the differing versions of the statement was a matter for the jury and that the earlier ruling on voluntariness could not be revisited mid‑trial based on a changed evidentiary landscape.

Applying the discretionary exclusionary framework for prejudicial evidence, the court concluded that the probative value of the “new” version was not outweighed by prejudice to the co‑accused.

The statement would therefore be admitted without editing, with appropriate limiting instructions to the jury that it could only be used against the declarant accused.

The accused brought a voir dire seeking exclusion of statements made to police following his arrest for offences including kidnapping and extortion.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) of the Charter due to investigative detention without timely access to counsel.

The court rejected claims of language barriers, intoxication, coercion, and police oppression, finding the accused understood English, had an operating mind, and spoke voluntarily in the hope of improving his situation.

Although a brief 10‑minute breach of s. 10(b) occurred before counsel rights were given, the impugned statement was spontaneous and the breach was minor.

Applying the framework in R. v. Grant, the court held admission of the statements would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

During a jury trial for cocaine trafficking, the Crown invoked investigation privilege to prevent disclosure of the surveillance location from which a police officer observed the accused during an undercover drug transaction.

The court reviewed the principles governing investigative technique and observation post privilege, balancing the public interest in protecting police methods and cooperating third parties against the accused’s right to make full answer and defence.

The judge permitted extensive cross‑examination regarding the officer’s ability to observe but prohibited questions that would reveal the precise surveillance location or whether the officer was inside or outside a building.

The jury was instructed that the privilege limited defence cross‑examination and that this limitation could affect the weight given to the officer’s testimony.

The jury ultimately acquitted one accused and convicted the other.

The accused brought a pre‑trial application seeking to modify the standard racial bias challenge-for-cause question used during jury selection under the Parks framework.

The moving party proposed a multiple-choice question intended to better detect conscious and unconscious racial bias among prospective jurors.

The court reviewed prior decisions considering the proposed approach, including cases approving and rejecting the use of multiple-choice questions.

Finding no evidentiary basis to conclude the proposed question was more effective than the established Parks question, the court exercised its discretion to maintain the standard formulation.

The jury panel was directed to be asked the traditional Parks question during jury selection.

The applicants, jointly charged with trafficking in cocaine, brought applications to stay the charges under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to trial was approximately 28 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the institutional delay of 15 months was within acceptable limits, considering the inherent time requirements of a joint trial and the actions of the accused.

The court also found minimal prejudice to the applicants.

The applications for a stay were dismissed.