6 total
Crown appeal of conditional discharge dismissed; failure to seek submissions was error but sentence fit.
The Crown appealed a conditional discharge imposed on a 19-year-old first offender who pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm.
The sentencing judge had imposed the discharge without giving the Crown notice or an opportunity to make submissions, which the appeal court found to be an error in principle.
However, upon conducting a fresh assessment, the appeal court concluded that a conditional discharge was the fit and appropriate sentence given the offender's youth, lack of record, genuine remorse, and positive rehabilitative steps.
The appeal was dismissed and the conditional discharge was upheld.
A trial judge must explain evidentiary shortcuts and reverse onuses to an unrepresented accused.
The appellant, unrepresented at trial, was convicted of impaired care or control and refusing a breath sample.
The appeal court found that the trial judge failed to adequately assist the unrepresented accused by not explaining the essential elements of the offences, particularly regarding the evidentiary shortcut for care or control and the reverse onus for reasonable excuse in refusing a breath sample.
This failure resulted in an unfair trial, constituting a miscarriage of justice.
The curative proviso was deemed inapplicable.
The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered on both counts.
The Court of Appeal upheld a ten-year sentence for arson, finding consecutive sentences appropriate for distinct offences.
The appellant appealed his sentence of ten years and two months imposed for arson causing bodily harm and arson causing property damage.
The Court of Appeal upheld the sentence as fit, finding that even if the trial judge erred in referring to an aggravating factor, it had no impact on the global sentence.
The court confirmed that consecutive sentences were appropriately imposed as the offences involved different elements.
Leave to appeal sentence was granted and any victim fine surcharge was set aside.
Custody Appeal dismissed
The applicant sought an extension of time to appeal a summary conviction sentence, arguing that a change in immigration law (Tran v. Canada) made his original sentence, which led to deportation, disproportionate.
The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had not shown a bona fide intention to appeal within the period, had not adequately explained the four-year delay, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit.
The court emphasized the principle of res judicata and that the applicant was no longer "in the judicial system" for the purpose of retroactively applying new legal interpretations.
Certiorari application to quash committal for human trafficking dismissed as there was some evidence of exploitation.
The applicants sought an order in the nature of certiorari quashing their committal to stand trial on charges of trafficking in persons and receiving a financial benefit.
They argued the preliminary inquiry justice erred in law by committing them despite an absence of evidence that they exploited the complainant.
The court dismissed the application, finding there was sufficient evidence that the applicants abused their position of trust or power as the complainant's drug suppliers to induce her to provide sexual services, which could reasonably be expected to cause her to fear for her safety if she stopped.
Sentence appeal allowed in part to grant 1.5:1 pre-sentence custody credit; otherwise dismissed.
The appellant appealed his four-year sentence for criminal harassment and assault of his former partner.
He argued the trial judge erred by denying 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody, sentencing him to a penitentiary term for treatment, and imposing a demonstrably unfit sentence.
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in denying the 1.5:1 credit based on the likelihood of bail denial, applying the Summers principle to grant the enhanced credit.
However, the court dismissed the other grounds, finding the penitentiary sentence was not imposed solely for treatment and the four-year total sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the egregious domestic abuse.