Andrew Perrin

The Crown sought to appeal the respondent's acquittal on assault charges but failed to personally serve the Notice of Appeal within the 30-day limit, citing concerns about using local police due to the trial judge's finding of excessive force.

The Crown brought an application for substituted service or to dispense with service, which the court dismissed because the Crown had not attempted personal service via a process server.

However, the court granted the Crown's alternative request for a 30-day extension of time to effect personal service, finding the Crown had demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal, explained the delay, and raised grounds with some merit.

The accused, Mallorie Makara, a night staff member at a residential care facility, was charged under Section 215(2)(b) of the Criminal Code for failing to provide the necessaries of life to Rhonda McClenaghan, a severely disabled resident who drowned in a bathtub.

The Crown alleged that Makara's conduct, specifically leaving the resident unattended, constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The defence argued that leaving residents to soak was a common practice, even verbally directed by a primary support worker, and that Makara's actions did not meet the high threshold of a marked departure required for criminal fault.

The court found that while the actus reus of the offence was proven, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Makara's conduct represented a marked departure from the conduct of a reasonable caregiver in the same circumstances, leading to an acquittal.

The defendant brought a motion requesting the presiding judge recuse himself because the judge, prior to his appointment, had briefly represented the defendant's counsel and had also represented the local police service in a matter involving the same counsel.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association intervened, arguing for an automatic disqualification rule when a judge's former client appears as counsel.

The court rejected the automatic disqualification argument, applying the standard test for reasonable apprehension of bias.

Finding that the prior retainers were over 20 years old and did not raise a reasonable apprehension of bias, the court dismissed the recusal motion.

The applicant moved for summary judgment to enforce an accepted offer to settle regarding the jointly-owned matrimonial home.

The respondent argued the applicant was only entitled to equity as of the date of separation and sought to extend the expired deadline to buy out the applicant's interest.

The court found a binding agreement existed, the valuation date was the date of buyout or sale, and the respondent was responsible for the delay that caused the buyout deadline to expire.

The court ordered the home to be listed for sale immediately, with the applicant entitled to his share of the equity as of the date of sale.

The accused, facing charges of dangerous driving and trafficking large quantities of fentanyl, underwent a detention review under s. 525 of the Criminal Code.

The accused argued that the passage of time, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a new release plan constituted material changes in circumstances warranting his release.

The court found insufficient evidence that the accused was at a greater risk of contracting COVID-19 or suffering severe harm from it in custody.

Furthermore, the proposed release plan lacked sufficient detail to address the significant secondary and tertiary ground concerns arising from the severity of the offences.

The court ordered the accused's continued detention.

Trayon Johnson, charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder, sought an order under s. 638(1)(b) of the Criminal Code to challenge prospective jurors for cause.

He proposed augmenting the traditional *Parks* questions with multiple-choice options to address subconscious racial bias against men of African ancestry.

The court acknowledged the existence of racial stereotypes and unconscious bias, finding that appropriately-constructed multiple-choice questions could be more effective than standard "yes/no" questions in identifying such biases.

The proposed multiple-choice questions were approved to ensure an impartial jury.

The applicant, Richard Ireland, jointly charged with second-degree murder and attempted murder alongside Trayon Johnson, sought to sever his trial from Johnson's.

Ireland argued that Johnson's police statement, which heavily implicated Ireland and expressed fear of him, would cause incurable prejudice despite excisions of prior discreditable conduct.

The Crown opposed the severance.

The court dismissed the application, emphasizing the presumption of joint trials for co-accused, even with "cut-throat" defences.

It held that proper jury instructions could mitigate any prejudice, and that the interests of justice, including efficiency and avoiding inconsistent verdicts, favoured a joint trial.

The accused pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his two step-daughters, C.F. and T.A. The Crown and defence jointly submitted a six-year incarceration period, acknowledging it was at the low end of the appropriate range for such aggravating facts.

The court accepted the joint submission, emphasizing the profound importance of a guilty plea in providing validation to victims and demonstrating the accused's remorse and potential for rehabilitation, thereby sparing all participants the ordeal of a trial.

The Member, a registered nurse, faced allegations of professional misconduct for failing to report numerous criminal charges and subsequent findings of guilt to the College of Nurses of Ontario.

The criminal matters involved criminal harassment, threatening conduct, and breaches of recognizance.

The Member admitted to the allegations and an Agreed Statement of Facts was presented.

The Discipline Committee found the Member committed professional misconduct and accepted a joint submission on penalty, ordering a 12-month suspension, an oral reprimand, and terms and conditions on her certificate of registration.

The applicant brought a s. 8 Charter application seeking to exclude 141 grams of cocaine seized during a warranted search of his residence and vehicle.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) lacked sufficient grounds as it relied on unproven confidential informants and omitted their criminal records.

The court found the tips from three known informants were compelling, credible, and corroborated by police investigation.

The omission of the informants' criminal records was not material as they did not contain crimes of dishonesty.

The court concluded the warrant was properly issued and there was no s. 8 breach.

Alternatively, the court held the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant sought a stay of charges for sexual assault and sexual interference, or alternatively, a stay of charges related to two complainants or the removal of Crown Attorneys, alleging abuse of process due to prosecutorial misconduct during the preliminary hearing.

The alleged misconduct involved Crown Attorneys encouraging, hugging, and providing candy to child witnesses during breaks in cross-examination, and one Crown Attorney unilaterally excusing a witness.

The court applied the R. v. Babos test for abuse of process, considering the unique challenges of child witnesses in sexual assault cases.

The court found the Crown's actions, while requiring judicial direction, were innocuous attempts to console distressed child witnesses and did not compromise trial fairness or undermine judicial integrity.

The application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to eleven offences involving child sexual abuse, child pornography, and conspiracy charges.

The Crown sought a Long Term Offender (LTO) designation with a sentence of 4-6 years and a Long Term Supervision Order (LTSO) for 10 years.

The defence argued for 4 years less credit for pre-trial custody and a 2-year LTSO.

The court found the accused to be a Long Term Offender and imposed a global sentence of 4 years 6 months (8 months remaining after pre-trial custody credit) followed by a 6-year LTSO.

The court emphasized the gravity of the offences, the accused's active participation in planning and facilitating child sexual abuse, and the need for public protection and rehabilitation.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a simplified procedure wrongful dismissal action after his employer terminated him alleging cause.

The employer relied on two grounds: alleged misrepresentation of credentials at the time of hiring and failure to complete required winter flight training.

The court held that the employer failed to establish misrepresentation of credentials, noting the lack of supporting evidence and the absence of the allegation in the termination letter.

However, the evidence regarding the training dispute involved conflicting affidavits and credibility issues that could not be resolved on the written record.

The court declined to grant summary judgment and directed that further procedural submissions be made to determine an appropriate process, potentially involving oral evidence.

The defendant brought a Charter application under sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms challenging a traffic stop and the issuance of a ticket for driving without a valid license.

The defendant alleged that the stop constituted an arbitrary detention based on racial profiling.

The court found that the officer had articulable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle based on specific information that the defendant was an unlicensed driver, information that was only two weeks old at the time of the stop.

The court rejected the racial profiling allegation, finding that the circumstances did not support an inference of racial profiling and that the stop was lawful under provincial legislation.

The accused was charged with having care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and over 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood.

The trial examined whether the accused, who was found sitting in the driver's seat of a running vehicle in a parking lot behind a bar, had the requisite care and control.

The accused testified he entered the vehicle solely to charge his dead cell phone using the vehicle's aftermarket stereo, with no intention to drive.

Corroborating witnesses testified the accused had arranged alternative transportation.

The court found the accused successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control under section 258 of the Criminal Code and that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a realistic risk of danger existed.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

Sentencing following convictions for multiple sexual offences against a minor in a familial relationship.

The offender sexually abused his common-law stepdaughter over a prolonged period between the ages of 10 and 18, escalating from touching to sexual intercourse.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives in cases involving sexual abuse of children and rejected the defence request for a conditional sentence.

Aggravating factors included abuse of trust, the victim’s age, and the devastating impact on the victim and family.

A penitentiary sentence was imposed despite mitigating factors such as the offender’s lack of criminal record and advanced age.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence charges involving his common law spouse's daughter over a period extending from childhood into adulthood.

The court accepted parts of both the complainant's and the accused's evidence, rejected other portions, and found that sexual touching began when the complainant was a child and progressed to oral sex and later intercourse.

Applying the law of consent and vitiation by authority, the court held that the complainant's apparent participation in certain acts after reaching the age of consent was nevertheless invalid because of the accused's coercive exercise of parental authority and the pre-existing pattern of abuse.

However, the court found reasonable doubt on one later adult intercourse count where the complainant was no longer sufficiently under the accused's authority.

Convictions were entered on counts 4, 5, 6, 8 and 10, and counts 3 and 11 were dismissed.

Historical sexual offence prosecution arising from longstanding sexual contact between the accused and his common law stepdaughter beginning when the complainant was a child.

The court conducted a detailed credibility analysis, accepting parts of both witnesses' evidence and applying the W.D. framework.

It found that pre-1988 sexual touching, oral sex, and later sexual acts in 1988 and 1989 were proven, and that apparent participation after the age of consent was vitiated by the accused's coercive exercise of parental authority and prior grooming.

The court rejected one count because the charged provision had been repealed before the proved conduct and acquitted on a later count because the complainant, as an adult, was no longer shown to be under the accused's coercive authority.

The accused brought a motion to reopen a previously dismissed Charter application challenging the validity of a search warrant under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The motion arose after a mistrial in a jury trial when the Crown disclosed a production order related to a seized cell phone.

The defence argued the new information might have assisted in challenging the information to obtain the search warrant.

Applying s. 653.1(1) of the Criminal Code, the court held that prior rulings remain binding after a mistrial unless it would not be in the interests of justice.

The defence failed to demonstrate how the cell phone information would have been relevant to the prior Charter ruling, and the application to reopen the motion was dismissed.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered at trial for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operating with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

The trial judge had rejected the defence of non‑insane automatism but nevertheless acquitted on the basis that the accused lacked the requisite mens rea due to a confused mental state preceding alcohol consumption.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in law by finding that confusion pre‑dated the drinking without any evidentiary basis.

The accused had not adduced evidence showing that the alcohol consumption was unknowing or involuntary as required under the presumption discussed in R. v. King.

The appeal was allowed and convictions were entered on both counts, with further submissions invited regarding the Kienapple principle and sentence.