Alex Alvaro

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and counselling to commit murder after his ex-girlfriend was shot with a concealed crossbow.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's strong financial and emotional motive, his request to an ex-biker friend to find a hitman, and his counter-surveillance conduct after the attack.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no palpable and overriding error in assessing the victim's testimony, no improper reliance on police opinion evidence, and that the verdicts were reasonable given the compelling circumstantial evidence.

The applicant, who pled guilty to manslaughter in 1986, sought a post-conviction disclosure order from the Crown in aid of an application for a Ministerial Review under s. 696.1 of the Criminal Code, claiming he had falsely confessed and was wrongfully convicted.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application for a disclosure order as premature (because the applicant had not exhausted his appeals) and moot (because the Crown had already disclosed all available documents).

However, the court granted declaratory relief, holding that the superior court has jurisdiction under s. 24(1) of the Charter to make post-conviction disclosure orders in aid of a Ministerial Review, and that convicted persons do not need the Crown's consent to communicate with public officials regarding their convictions.

The accused was committed for trial on a charge of second degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

On a certiorari motion, a Superior Court judge quashed the committal and substituted a committal for manslaughter, finding insufficient evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The Crown appealed the quashing, and the accused appealed, arguing he should have been discharged entirely.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that the Superior Court judge exceeded her jurisdiction on a certiorari application by weighing the evidence and failing to recognize that there was some evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer the intent for murder.

The committal for second degree murder was restored.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second degree murder and obstruction of justice.

The primary grounds of appeal related to the reasonableness of the verdict, the trial judge's refusal to admit third-party suspect evidence, jury instructions on out-of-court statements and identification evidence, and alleged Crown misconduct during cross-examination and closing addresses.

The Court of Appeal found that while the Crown's conduct fell below the expected standard of propriety, the trial judge's strong corrective instructions were sufficient to cure the damage and preserve the right to a fair trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a jury acquittal on a charge of second degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing in a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on reflex and voluntariness.

The Court of Appeal held there was no evidentiary foundation for a defence of involuntary reflex and that the impugned instruction was erroneous.

However, applying the governing standard for Crown appeals from acquittals, the court found no reasonable basis to conclude the error materially affected the verdict in light of the defence theory, the evidence, the overall charge, and the jury questions.

The appeal was therefore dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of first degree murder, sought an order under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code assigning counsel for his appeal.

He had previously obtained a Legal Aid certificate but had a falling out with his appellate counsel over communication and strategy, leading to counsel's removal from the record.

Legal Aid refused to fund a change of counsel, finding no exceptional circumstances.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that while the appellant acted unreasonably in his demands of prior counsel, there was no evidence he intentionally precipitated the breakdown for an improper purpose or to abuse the public funding process.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an accomplice and similar fact evidence of two prior incidents involving the appellant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in admitting the similar fact evidence, as its prejudicial effect outweighed its limited probative value.

The evidence lacked sufficient similarity to the charged offence and posed a significant risk of moral and reasoning prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The deceased died from a brain injury after being assaulted twice in quick succession by two different individuals.

At the preliminary inquiry, the judge discharged the first assailant on a murder charge, finding insufficient evidence that his assault caused the death.

The judge also discharged the second assailant on manslaughter and assault charges, finding insufficient identification evidence.

The Crown sought judicial review.

The reviewing judge quashed the first assailant's discharge but upheld the second assailant's discharge.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error in both instances by exceeding his limited weighing function under the Criminal Code and failing to consider the entirety of the evidence.

The first assailant's committal for murder was upheld, and the second assailant's matter was remitted for committal on assault and reconsideration of manslaughter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder following a re-trial.

He argued the trial judge erred in allowing cross-examination on his prior criminal record, in instructing the jury on his false statement to police, in treating the Crown and defence theories unequally, and in instructing the jury on reasonable doubt regarding DNA evidence.

He also argued that transcript errors denied him a meaningful appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding the trial judge properly exercised his discretion on the Corbett application, correctly instructed the jury on the false statement and DNA evidence, and that the transcript errors were inconsequential.

The Crown appealed a jury verdict acquitting the respondent of sexual offences against a young complainant.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by refusing to allow re-examination of the complainant on prior consistent statements and by failing to grant a mistrial following defence counsel's closing address.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence cross-examination did not implicitly allege recent fabrication, and the trial judge's refusal to declare a mistrial was well within his discretion.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's demeanour after the event and at trial as confirmatory of a lack of consent, and by failing to resolve critical credibility issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while demeanour was not confirmatory of lack of consent, its use did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's comments were largely a response to defence counsel's suggestions.

The court also found the credibility issues raised by the appellant to be peripheral or adequately explained.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer, who took over the case shortly before trial expecting a guilty plea, was inadequately prepared when the trial proceeded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that claims of ineffective assistance based on inadequate preparation only lead to a miscarriage of justice if the lack of preparation undermines the reliability of the verdict.

The appellant failed to show any prejudice or that the trial could have been conducted differently.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence or her refusal to impose a conditional sentence.

The appeals from conviction and sentence were dismissed.

The appellant appealed jury convictions arising from a multiple shooting in a drug-trafficking setting, advancing Charter, evidentiary, jury-instruction, inconsistent-verdict, and sentence grounds.

The court held that the police did not deny reasonable access for obtaining blood or urine samples from the accused in custody, and rejected the argument that the state forced the accused to surrender privacy or self-incrimination protections as a condition of obtaining samples.

Although the court concluded that evidence of a prior violent stabbing by the deceased should have been admitted on the self-defence issue, it found the error harmless because the excluded evidence would not have affected the jury’s rejection of self-defence.

The court further found substantial compliance with the Lifchus principles, no misdirection on self-defence, no true inconsistency in the verdicts, and no basis to interfere with the life sentence for attempted murder.

In a criminal conviction appeal, the self-represented appellant advised that he did not want counsel appointed to represent him but did not oppose the appointment of amicus curiae.

The court was informed that the appeal had previously been adjourned to permit preparation of the appeal book and consideration of whether amicus should be appointed.

The court appointed amicus curiae under s. 684 of the Criminal Code to assist on the appeal and adjourned the appeal to a date to be fixed by the registrar for further speaking to or hearing.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence.

The court held that the 15-year starting point used by the trial judge may have been at the upper end of the range, but it was not outside the range and no error in principle was established.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The sentence was nonetheless varied to reduce a lifetime firearms prohibition to a 10-year prohibition because no notice had been given.

The appellant appealed his attempted murder conviction arising from a gang invasion of a karaoke bar, arguing that the trial judge misdirected himself on the principles governing eyewitness identification evidence.

The court held that the identification case was very strong, based on circumstantial evidence and the eyewitness identification of two persons, and found no error in the trial judge's treatment of that evidence.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence, submitting that a three-year sentence for extortion should have been concurrent rather than consecutive.

The court held that, regardless of that issue, the total sentence of 18 years, taking into account two years of pre-trial custody, was entirely appropriate.

The appellant, a young person, appealed an order transferring him to adult court for numerous offences including robbery, unlawful confinement, and related property offences.

The Court of Appeal held that the youth court judge erred in concluding that the maximum youth sentence was inadequate to protect the public and failed to give sufficient weight to the appellant's excellent progress in secure custody.

The court found that the objectives of public protection and rehabilitation could be reconciled within the youth justice system.

The appeal was allowed and the Crown's transfer application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her habeas corpus application with certiorari in aid following committal for trial on a charge of second degree murder.

She alleged denial of natural justice at the preliminary inquiry based on limits on cross-examination, continuation of the inquiry during her absence, inadequate assistance while unrepresented, and failure to conduct a fitness hearing during the inquiry.

The court held there was no denial of natural justice and no loss of jurisdiction, noting that irrelevant questioning was properly curtailed, witnesses heard in her absence were later recalled for cross-examination, and fitness had already been addressed.

The appeal was dismissed.