Laura Florence Cooper

The plaintiffs and defendants both sought leave to appeal an order certifying a class action regarding an alleged global price-fixing conspiracy in the lithium-ion battery industry.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal the denial of certification for claims relating to unlawful means conspiracy and umbrella purchasers.

The defendants sought leave to appeal the certification of the civil remedy claim under s. 36 of the Competition Act.

The Divisional Court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal, finding conflicting decisions and that the issues merited appellate attention.

The defendants' motion for leave to appeal was denied, as they failed to establish conflicting decisions or reason to doubt the correctness of the certification order.

The representative plaintiff, Fanshawe College, sought to amend the class definition in a certified class proceeding alleging price-fixing of LCD panels.

Two amendments were proposed: a broad "all purchasers' amendment" to include all direct and indirect purchasers, and an "alternative amendment" to expand the list of named OEMs and distributors.

The court denied the "all purchasers' amendment" finding it an abuse of process as it attempted to re-litigate an issue previously abandoned and decided by the certification judge.

However, the court granted the "alternative amendment" as it was specifically contemplated by the certification judge and the claims were not found to be time-barred.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action on behalf of approximately 7,000 door-to-door sales agents who were hired by the defendants as independent contractors.

The plaintiff alleged that the sales agents were misclassified and were actually employees entitled to benefits under the Employment Standards Act.

The court found that the plaintiff satisfied the requirements for certification under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, noting sufficient evidence of systemic commonality regarding the defendants' control over the sales agents.

The motion for certification was granted.

The representative plaintiff in a securities class action sought court approval of an $11 million settlement agreement, a plan of distribution, and class counsel fees.

The action alleged that the defendants misrepresented the development costs of a mining project.

The court found the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting the significant litigation risks, including proving liability and overcoming statutory liability caps under the Securities Act.

The court also approved the plan of distribution, the appointment of the claims administrator, and class counsel's fee request of $2.75 million (25% of the settlement) plus disbursements, finding them fair and reasonable given the results achieved and risks assumed.

In a national class action alleging price fixing in the Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) market, the representative plaintiff sought approval of multiple settlement agreements with several defendant manufacturers under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The proposed settlements totalled $3,050,000 and followed earlier settlements with other defendants.

The court considered whether the agreements were fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, and reviewed the proposed distribution protocol, administration protocol, claims administrator appointment, class counsel fees, and representative plaintiff honorarium.

The court approved the settlements, associated distribution and administration plans, class counsel fees and disbursements, and dismissed the remaining claim against the final defendant.

The court accepted the settlements as falling within the zone of reasonableness and consistent with the interests of the class.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against several manufacturers of lithium-ion batteries, alleging a price-fixing conspiracy that artificially inflated prices for direct and indirect purchasers in Canada.

The court certified the action solely for the statutory cause of action under section 36 of the Competition Act.

The court excluded 'umbrella purchasers' (those who bought from non-defendants) from the class, finding it plain and obvious they lacked a cause of action due to indeterminate liability and lack of restitutionary basis.

The court also declined to certify the common law claims for unlawful means conspiracy and unjust enrichment, holding that they were precluded by the comprehensive statutory scheme of the Competition Act.

The remaining certification criteria were met for the statutory claim.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action alleging a global price-fixing conspiracy by the defendants regarding airfreight shipping services.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the action as it related to absent foreign claimants, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction simpliciter.

The court granted the motion, finding that the real and substantial connection test should not be applied to establish jurisdiction over absent foreign claimants, as an Ontario judgment would not be recognized abroad, offending principles of order, fairness, and comity.

Alternatively, the court held that even if jurisdiction existed, it would decline it on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The proposed representative plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class proceeding for settlement purposes against certain defendants in alleged price‑fixing within the static random access memory (SRAM) industry.

The action alleged breaches of Part VI of the Competition Act, civil conspiracy, and tortious interference with economic interests.

A national settlement had been reached with certain defendants, providing payment to class members and cooperation in the ongoing litigation against remaining defendants.

The court considered the certification criteria under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 and found they were satisfied for settlement purposes.

The court approved certification against the settling defendants and approved the proposed notice and notice plan, setting a date for settlement approval proceedings.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal.

The appeal was originally filed in a timely manner but inadvertently in the Court of Appeal instead of the Divisional Court as required by the Business Corporations Act.

The responding parties refused to consent to a one-day extension, arguing the appeal lacked merit.

The court granted the extension, finding the delay was de minimis, there was no prejudice, and the appeal met the low threshold of having some merit.

The court issued an endorsement to settle the terms of a certification order in a securities class action, following the certification of conspiracy claims.

The defendants sought to exclude 'early sellers' from the class definition and challenged the class period dates.

The court declined to exclude early sellers, finding it premature as the scope of those entitled to relief for conspiracy was uncertain.

The court also approved the class period dates as they aligned with the plaintiff's theory of the case.

Finally, the court approved the plaintiff as a suitable representative for both primary and secondary market purchasers regarding the conspiracy claim.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a decision conditionally certifying a class action against a parking management company with significantly narrower parameters than proposed.

The plaintiffs challenged the motion judge's dismissal of causes of action under the Consumer Protection Act, 2002, unjust enrichment, and unconscionability, as well as the imposition of a limitation period and the exclusion of punitive damages as a common issue.

The Divisional Court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's order and no conflicting decisions warranting leave.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed in its entirety.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a motion judge's order certifying a class proceeding in part.

The motion judge had declined to certify claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and civil conspiracy, and had restricted the class to Canadian purchasers.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal solely on the issue of the civil conspiracy claim, finding conflicting decisions and good reason to doubt the correctness of requiring the plaintiff to plead special damages at the certification stage.

Leave to appeal was denied for the misrepresentation claims and the class definition.

The appellant brought a proposed class action against Health Canada, alleging negligent regulation of temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants.

The motion judge struck the claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) on the basis that it disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal, holding that it was plain and obvious that Health Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to individual consumers of medical devices.

The statutory scheme did not create a proximate relationship, and the pleadings failed to allege specific representations or reliance that would establish proximity under the Anns/Cooper test.

The appellant appealed an order interpreting the term 'legal custody' in a trust agreement between former common law spouses.

The motion judge had interpreted the phrase in accordance with s. 20 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to construe the words in the context of the whole agreement to give effect to the parties' intent.

The Court held that the self-represented parties intended 'legal custody' to mean custody pursuant to a court order, and ordered the sum of $104,620.80 paid to the appellant.

The respondent moved to dismiss a complaint alleging breach of a settlement agreement under section 43 of the Human Rights Code.

The respondent argued the Board of Inquiry lacked jurisdiction because the settlement had never been approved by the Commission, a necessary precondition under section 43.

The adjudicator found that 'approval by the Commission' requires approval by the Commissioners themselves, not merely administrative approval by staff.

Because the settlement was only administratively closed and never approved by the Commissioners, it was not enforceable under section 43.

The motion to dismiss the complaint was granted.