Lance Carey Talbot

This is a ruling on the admissibility of child statements made to police officers in a child protection proceeding.

The respondent mother sought to exclude statements made by two children (ages 14 and 12) to police, arguing that the necessity test should be applied to state of mind exceptions and that many statements did not qualify under that exception.

The court ruled that while the principled exception of necessity and reliability applies to categorical hearsay exceptions, this was not a rare case warranting application of the necessity requirement to state of mind statements.

The court admitted certain statements that clearly reflected the children's emotional and mental state at the time they were made, while excluding statements that were too intertwined with causation or allegations of parental conduct.

The court also excluded a police interview transcript sought to be admitted for the truth of its contents, finding it insufficiently reliable without cross-examination given the high stakes of the proceeding.

The applicant society sought to introduce the expert opinion evidence of a psychiatrist regarding the impact of substance abuse on parenting in a child protection trial.

The respondents opposed the admission of the evidence.

The court conducted a voir dire and applied the Mohan and Abbey tests for the admissibility of expert evidence.

The court found that the proposed evidence was neither relevant nor necessary, as the expert had not met the parents or the child and could only speak in generalities.

Furthermore, the expert was not properly qualified in the specific area of addictions, and the late service of the expert report caused undue prejudice to the respondents.

The request to introduce the expert evidence was denied.

A child protection agency sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence regarding the impact of parental substance abuse on child parenting capacity.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the expert evidence.

The respondent parents opposed the evidence on grounds of relevance, necessity, expert qualification, procedural non-compliance, and prejudicial effect.

The court excluded the evidence, finding it lacked relevance and necessity, the expert was not properly qualified in the specific area of substance abuse and parenting, and the probative value was substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect, particularly given inadequate notice and the risk of case delay contrary to the child's best interests.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two young children were in need of protection and should be made Crown wards without access for purposes of adoption.

The respondent father opposed the motion, arguing there were genuine issues for trial and that he had undergone rehabilitation.

The court found that the Society had established a prima facie case based on evidence of the father's extensive criminal history including violent offences, domestic violence against the mother, substance abuse, mental health issues, non-compliance with court orders, and the children's special needs.

The court granted the motion and made the children Crown wards without access.

Following dismissal of a child protection appeal, the successful respondent sought a full recovery costs award.

The court considered Family Law Rule 24, which removes the usual presumption that a successful party receives costs in child protection matters.

Applying discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and by analogy to Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court evaluated factors including the result, settlement offers, importance of the issues, conduct of the parties, and policy considerations related to the statutory mandate of children’s aid societies.

Although the respondent had succeeded and had made a written settlement offer, the court found the society acted reasonably in pursuing the appeal given the seriousness of the allegations and prior judicial comments that the appeal raised serious issues.

In light of the policy that child protection authorities should not be discouraged from pursuing their statutory mandate, the court declined to award costs.

The mother brought a motion seeking leave to extend the time to file her Answer/Plan of Care to an amended status review application.

The child had been out of the mother's care for over 19 months and was thriving in the care of the maternal grandmother.

The mother had missed the filing deadline and had not seen the child for over five months.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the mother failed to present a realistic plan of care or establish that granting the extension was in the child's best interests, emphasizing the child's need for permanency.

Following a family law motion relating largely to support and financial disclosure, the applicant sought full indemnity costs of $14,774.19 and requested that a substantial portion be enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office.

The court found the applicant had been largely successful and that the respondent had failed to provide disclosure and comply with a prior consent order.

Although the respondent argued that no settlement offer had been made, that some disclosure had been provided voluntarily, and that the applicant was not entirely successful, the court held that the absence of an offer did not preclude full indemnity costs.

The court also questioned the necessity of two counsel and considered the tax implications of support-related costs under Rule 24.

Costs were fixed at $7,500 plus HST and disbursements.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for gross indecency and sexual touching involving his stepson, seeking to strike his guilty pleas.

He argued that his trial counsel was incompetent for failing to identify a s. 10(b) Charter breach and for pressuring him to plead guilty, and that his pleas were involuntary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that trial counsel's conduct did not fall below the reasonableness standard and that no miscarriage of justice occurred.

The court also upheld the global sentence of 21 months' imprisonment and three years' probation as fit.