Sexual assault

The appellant sought to hold a school board liable after repeated sexual assaults by a school janitor, advancing claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of non-delegable duty.

The Court held that the governing school legislation did not impose a general non-delegable duty making the board strictly responsible for abuse by employees on school premises.

It further held that fiduciary law does not guarantee a particular outcome or convert such claims into no-fault liability, and that no wrongful conduct by the board itself was established.

On the cross-appeal, the Court upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that most of the harm was indivisible and jointly caused by the janitor and later abusers.

The Crown appealed a sentence reduction in a case involving prolonged physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of the offender's children.

The Court held that there is no legal ceiling capping fixed-term sentences at 20 years under the Criminal Code, absent special circumstances, and that the totality principle requires only that the global sentence be just and appropriate and proportionate to the offender's overall culpability.

The Court further confirmed that retribution is a legitimate and important sentencing principle, distinct from vengeance and complementary to denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society.

Applying the deferential standard of review for sentence appeals, the Court held the appellate court erred by intervening absent demonstrable unfitness and restored the 25-year cumulative sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the cross-examination of the complainant's mother constituted impermissible oath-helping.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that there was no violation of the oath-helping rule.

The Chief Justice and Justice McLachlin dissented, finding that the rule had been violated and would have ordered a new trial.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against his nine-year-old granddaughter.

At trial, the Crown introduced a videotaped interview of the complainant pursuant to s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated his rights to a fair trial and fundamental justice under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of s. 715.1, finding that it does not offend the rules against hearsay or prior consistent statements, nor does it violate the right to cross-examine, as the complainant must adopt the video contents while testifying.

The Court emphasized the need to accommodate child witnesses in the justice system and reinstated the accused's conviction.

The respondent, a physician, was charged with 14 counts of sexual assault against seven female patients.

Prior to trial, a chambers judge ordered the counts severed and divided based on the part of the body involved in the alleged assault.

At trial, the trial judge excluded evidence relating to the severed counts and the testimony of the respondent's ranking medical officer, and subsequently granted a motion for a non-suit.

The Crown appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the pre-trial severance order was subject to review despite the rule against collateral attack, and that it was jurisdictionally and substantively flawed.

The Court also found that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence and in granting the non-suit by improperly weighing the evidence and applying the wrong standard.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had ordered a new trial for the accused on charges of indecent assault.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, agreeing with the dissenting reasons in the Court of Appeal.

The Court held that a trial judge may take into account, as a matter of common sense, that sexual misconduct involving children occurs in private and may not be reflected in the accused's community reputation for morality.

Therefore, the trial judge is entitled to find that the propensity value of character evidence is diminished in such cases.

The appellant and a companion forcibly confined and sexually assaulted a young woman.

While the companion strangled the victim, the appellant held her legs to prevent her from struggling.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 214(5) of the Criminal Code.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the phrase 'caused the death' in s. 214(5) requires the accused's actions to be a substantial and integral cause of the death.

The Court found that the appellant's act of holding the victim's legs was a substantial cause of her death, as she likely would have resisted the strangulation otherwise.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was convicted by a jury of engaging in anal intercourse with his step-son.

While the accused's appeal was reserved, the trial judge submitted an unsolicited report to the Court of Appeal stating he would not have convicted the accused and considered the verdict unsafe.

The Court of Appeal relied on this report to quash the conviction and order a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that a Court of Appeal should not routinely request a report from a trial judge under s. 682(1) of the Criminal Code, and that the unsolicited report in this case was unauthorized and should not have been considered.

Without the report, there was ample evidence to support the jury's verdict, and the trial judge's charge to the jury was adequate.

The appellant was convicted of rape and assault against his niece, who had been in his care as a child.

At trial, evidence from the complainant's brothers regarding the appellant's violent control and abuse of other children in the household was admitted without specific jury instructions on its limited permissible use.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the evidence was admissible to rebut the defence of innocent association and explain the delay in reporting, the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury against using it as propensity evidence was a reversible error.

The Court declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding that the verdict would not necessarily have been the same had the jury been properly instructed, and ordered a new trial.

Following a judgment awarding aggravated and punitive damages for sexual assaults, the appellant applied for a re-hearing on the issue of interest.

On consent of the parties, the Supreme Court of Canada ordered that $15,017.48 in interest be awarded on the aggravated damages from the mid-point of the assaults to the date of judgment, with no interest on the punitive damages.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, agreeing with the dissenting reasons of Houlden J.A. in the Court of Appeal, which found that the trial judge unintentionally misled the jury regarding assistance on questions of fact and that the Crown's address to the jury was not a fair and dispassionate presentation of its case.

The appellant wrote anonymous letters to three cheerleaders threatening to rape them.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that a threat to rape did not necessarily constitute a threat to cause serious bodily harm under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that 'serious bodily harm' includes psychological harm and that a threat to rape, viewed objectively in its context, constitutes a threat to cause serious bodily harm.

The appellant was convicted of indecent assault of his ex-wife and sexual assault of his common law wife's daughter.

The convictions were upheld by the Court of Appeal.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on discrepancies regarding the dates of the offences, improperly admitted similar act evidence, and that the Crown failed to disclose a witness statement relevant to the complainant's credibility.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the cumulative effect of the errors, including the failure to disclose the statement and the admission of highly prejudicial similar act evidence without proper weighing, deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial that hinged on the credibility of the accused versus the complainant.

During the main charge, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, in a brief recharge requested by the Crown, the judge erroneously framed the core issue as whether the jury believed the complainant or the accused, omitting the third alternative that they might disbelieve the accused but still have a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that, despite the error in the recharge, the charge read as a whole adequately instructed the jury on the proper standard of proof, given the correct instructions in the main charge and the short time elapsed before the recharge.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 214(5) of the Criminal Code after killing a woman while attempting to commit a sexual assault.

He appealed, challenging the constitutionality of ss. 213(a) and 214(5) under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 213(a) is unconstitutional, s. 214(5) does not violate s. 7 of the Charter as it merely classifies murders for sentencing purposes and is not arbitrary or irrational.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The appellants, elementary school students, were acquitted at trial of sexually assaulting a fellow student.

The trial judge had a reasonable doubt as to their involvement and found the date of the offence was an essential element that had not been proved.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred in considering the evidence of the complainant and an accomplice in isolation.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appellants' appeal, holding that the trial judge's failure to consider the evidence in its totality was the result of misdirection, which constituted an error of law alone giving the Court of Appeal jurisdiction to intervene.

The appellant, a young offender, was charged with aggravated sexual assault against a five-year-old child.

At trial, the unsworn testimony of the child was corroborated as to the occurrence of the assault, but no independent evidence implicated the appellant as the perpetrator.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, holding that corroborating evidence must connect the accused to the crime.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under section 586 of the Criminal Code, the corroborating evidence need only confirm the child's story in some material particular, and does not strictly need to implicate the accused independently.

The respondent newspaper challenged the constitutionality of s. 442(3) of the Criminal Code, which mandated a publication ban on the identity of a complainant in a sexual assault case upon request.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the mandatory ban infringed the freedom of the press under s. 2(b) of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit justified under s. 1.

The Court found that the objective of encouraging victims of sexual offences to come forward by protecting them from the trauma of publication was of pressing and substantial concern, and that a discretionary ban would not achieve this objective as it would deprive victims of certainty.

The Court also held that the provision did not infringe the accused's right to a public hearing under s. 11(d).

The respondent was convicted at trial of sexual assault upon a young girl.

The Manitoba Court of Appeal allowed his appeal, finding that similar fact evidence from other children was inadmissible.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The majority of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the similar fact evidence was admissible to show a system adopted by the respondent and its probative force outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The respondent entered the home of a 15-year-old girl uninvited, grabbed her breasts, and made suggestive comments.

He was convicted of sexual assault at trial, but the Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for common assault, holding that sexual assault required contact with genitalia.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the sexual assault conviction.

The Court held that sexual assault is an offence of general intent and is determined by an objective test of whether the sexual or carnal context of the assault is visible to a reasonable observer, considering all circumstances including the part of the body touched, words, and gestures.